The Russian Empire was the first in the world to officially adopt armored vehicles. Many of them have not survived to this day. But in 2009, the forerunners of modern tanks were restored according to original drawings from the archives of the Polytechnic Museum. In our review, there are 7 armored vehicles that were in service with the Russian Imperial Army.
In 1908, the Russian army received 10 models of equipment created by the French company Charron according to the project of the Russian officer M. Nakashidze. Armored car "Nakashidze-Charron" received a very positive reviews from the military, but due to the tragic death of M. Nakashidze, this project was not developed. As a result, by the beginning of the First World War throughout Russian Empire there was only a combat unit of armored vehicles, armed with Russo-Balt type C machine-gun armored vehicles. In wartime conditions, they were urgently modernized, and the Russian army received several various types armored vehicles.
1. "Austin-Putilovets"
"Austin-Putilovets" was produced for the Russian army in the UK in 1914-1917 on the basis of a rear-wheel drive truck chassis of the British company Austin. The armored car was used in the battles of the First World War.
2. "Garford-Putilov"
At the beginning of the First World War, the Putilov Plant began to manufacture a cannon-machine-gun armored car based on the chassis of an American truck from Garford Motor Truck Co.
In the period from 1915 to 1916, 48 armored cars were produced, which were distinguished by high power, reliability and an acceptable degree of booking.
3. Austin Kegress
In 1917, the Austin-Kegress half-track armored car was developed in Russia. A total of 40 copies were released.
4. "Jeffery - Poplavko"
Machine-gun armored car "Jeffery - Poplavko" - the first all-wheel drive armored car, which was adopted by the Russian Empire. The first cars appeared in the army in 1915. The armored car, which the military nicknamed the "Sorcerer", was produced at the Izhora plant. Its main purpose is the delivery of fuel and ammunition, as well as the towing of damaged armored vehicles from the battlefield to the rear.
5. Fiat-Izhora
Fiat-Izhora, created on the basis of the chassis of the car of the Italian company Fiat, was a light machine gun vehicle of the Armed Forces of the Russian Empire, and later of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army. Mass production of these armored cars began only after the February Revolution.
During the year, 80 copies of armored vehicles were built at the Izhora plant. Armored cars were actively used by the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army in the battles of the Civil War.
6. "Mercedes"
In 1915, Captain Bylinsky, based on a Mercedes car, developed a cannon-machine-gun armored car for the armed forces of the Russian Empire, using many innovative engineering solutions. At the Obukhov plant, two copies of the armored car were built, which were used by the Russian Imperial Army in the battles of the First World War.
7. Tank "Freedom Fighter Comrade Lenin"
Of course, Russia was developing projects of its own tanks, but it took a lot of time to fine-tune them. The first tanks appeared thanks to military cooperation with France.
Narkomvoenomor comrade. Trotsky acted simply: he launched French Renault FT tanks at the Krasnoye Sormovo plant in Nizhny Novgorod. They called them "Freedom Fighter Comrade Lenin."
Today, armored vehicles have become a status accessory. Anyway .
The first armored car entered the battlefields of the First World War at its very beginning. And although it has been known in Russia since 1905 (from the tests of the Sharon-Girardeau e Voy armored vehicles, built at the insistence of the Nakashidze lieutenant), the Germans were the first in the world war to use lightly armored vehicles armed with a machine gun. In East Prussia, such combat vehicles successfully operated from the very beginning of hostilities as part of cavalry detachments, with which they penetrated the front line, sowing confusion and causing panic in the rear of the Russian troops.
Armored car "Sharon-Girardeau e Vois" during testing in Russia, 1905
Russian armored cars appeared at the front spontaneously, as a response to the German initiative. So, in August, an officer of the 5th automobile company, staff captain Bazhanov, armored the Italian SPA truck with shields of captured German guns, which was later armed with two machine guns and was used in the battles of units of the 25th Infantry Division. Armored cars of their design at that time were made by many, but they were used in different ways. Therefore, summarizing the information on the use of German and German armored vehicles at the front domestic production, as well as information about similar machines from the allies, the Russian military department raised the question of the advisability of deploying a factory production of such machines.
Note of the Minister of War, which marked the beginning of armored vehicles in Russia, 1914
On August 19, 1914, the Minister of War, Adjutant General Sukhomlinov, summoned Colonel Dobzhansky, temporarily assigned to the office of the War Ministry of the Life Guards of the Jaeger Regiment, and invited him to form an "armored machine-gun automobile battery." With this, the Minister of War "laid the foundation for the existence of armored cars" in Russia.
Armored car "Russo-Balt" after the battle, 1915
However, to start the production of armored vehicles in Russia, one order was not enough. After all, Russia at that time did not have a developed automotive industry. The capacities of the only car production plant - the Russian-Baltic Carriage Plant - were not enough to cover the needs of the army, even in trucks, let alone armored cars. Therefore, they began to make them "from what is at hand." This led to the appearance in the first year of the war of a large number original cars built in one copy. In order to normalize this state of affairs, in the fall of 1914, by order of Sukhomlinov, a special procurement commission was formed, which soon left for England in order to purchase automotive equipment and property, including armored vehicles.
Armored cars "Austin" on the way to the front, 1917.
However, it was not possible to find an armored car here that would suit the Russian military. An executor was urgently needed, who would undertake in a short time to develop a project for an armored car that would meet Russian tactical and technical requirements. And such a performer was soon found. They became the Austin Motor Company (Austin Motor Co. Ltd.), with which on September 29, 1914 a contract was signed for the manufacture of 48 vehicles for the needs of the Russian army. In addition, this commission purchased 40 ready-made cheap Renault armored vehicles from France.
Armored car "Monster" type "Garford-Putilovets" between battles, 1916
Armored cars "Austin" became the most massive combat vehicles of the Russian army of that time. The basis for them was the "colonial type" passenger chassis with a 30 hp engine. They were protected by armor plates 3.5-4 mm thick, had a crew of 4 people (commander, driver and two machine gunners), their combat weight was 166 pounds (2650 kg), and the cost to the treasury reached 1150 pounds sterling. But they were made not only abroad. After receiving the first batch of vehicles, the Russian military considered their armor to be weak and re-booked them with 7-mm armor plates, and starting from 1915, Austin vehicles were armored only in Russia. On all Russian-made armored vehicles, if possible, a second (stern) control post was installed. The presence of this post allowed armored cars to act according to special tactics when they went into battle in reverse, hiding the most vulnerable nodes from shelling - a radiator and steered axle, and when shelled by enemy artillery, they quickly got out of the shelling with a forward move, which allowed them to develop greater speed.
Armored car "Renault" booked according to the project of staff captain Mgebrov, 1916
The formation of the first machine-gun automobile platoons was carried out by the Officers' Rifle School, the head of which, Major General Filatov, showed great interest in armor business. At the beginning of 1915, he proposed to book a two-axle 4-ton truck of the American firm Garford (Garford Motor Truck Co) and arm it with a cannon and two machine guns. The first armored Garford was ready to be sent to the front on May 3, 1915, and by October, work had been completed on all 30 chassis planned for armor.
The car had very weak engine, a non-wheel drive chassis, which also turned out to be heavily overloaded, did not have a rear control post ... But despite all the shortcomings, the car had one advantage for which everything was forgiven for it - extremely powerful weapons.
The entire back of the armored car was occupied by a rotating armored turret with a 76.2-mm anti-assault gun mod. 1910. The cannon had shrapnel and grenades in its ammunition load, which made it possible to use it both against manpower and against field fortifications.
Reservation of cars according to the Mgebrov project at the Izhora plant, 1916.
Speaking of Russian armored cars, one cannot forget about the work of the officer of the Military Automobile School, Staff Captain Mgebrov. The fact is that the French Renault armored cars, which were purchased in 1914 and began to arrive in Russia in the spring of 1915, did not have an armored roof, which made their crew vulnerable to shrapnel fire.
Armored freight car"Packard" "Captain Gurdov", 1916
These vehicles were rarely used in combat. In some machine-gun automobile platoons, they were used only for the transport of ammunition, but this was not rational. Mgebrov proposed to re-armor these cars with sheets with large angles of inclination. He placed the Maxim machine guns in a triple tower of complex shape. The armor protection of the car has improved, but the car was heavily overloaded. Therefore, in the spring of 1916, the heavy tower of Mgebrov was replaced by two cylindrical towers of the type used on Austin armored vehicles.
In total, Mgebrov booked 11 Renault cars, as well as one sample from Isotta-Fraschini, White, Benz, Pierce-Arrow, and Russo-Balt.
The information is taken from the book of Mikhail Svirin. History of the Soviet tank 1919-1937
It is traditionally believed that the first armored car for the Russian Army was designed by the podsaul of the 7th Siberian Cossack regiment, Prince Mikhail Aleksandrovich Nakashidze during the Russo-Japanese War. Allegedly, the car, made in France, was intended for operations in the conditions of the Far East, but because of the backwardness of Russia and the inertia of the tsarist officials, the armored car was “hacked to death”. Let's try to figure out how things really were.
Prince M. Nakashidze was indeed a great lover and popularizer automotive technology. In 1902, in St. Petersburg, he published the book "The Automobile, Its Economic and Strategic Importance for Russia", which was the first book in the country on military motoring.
While serving in Warsaw, M. Nakashidze, together with Count Potocki and Colonel Golovin, founded a motor transport company called the Large International Car Garage, which opened in July 1903. In addition to selling cars from the French company Panard-Levassor, several cars were manufactured here. own design called "International".
Apparently at this time, Nakashidze began to cooperate with the French company "Charron, Girardot, Voigt" (Chraron, Giarardot, Voigt), founded in 1901. So far, it has not been possible to establish how the relationship between the Russian prince and the French was built, but, according to some information, Nakashidze was one of the co-owners of this enterprise. In any case, already at the beginning of 1904, he sold the "Large International Car Garage", and in correspondence with representatives of the General Staff of the Russian Army, he introduced himself as the director of the Sharron armored car department.
In 1902, "Charron, Girardot, Voy" presented at the Paris exhibition a car with an 8-mm Hotchkiss machine gun mounted on it and partial armor. The following year, this machine was tested during the maneuvers of the French cavalry in the Chalons military camp, but did not receive further development.
In 1905, the retired French artillery colonel Guyet, who worked at the Charron company, designed a fully armored vehicle with a machine-gun turret, and on February 13, 1906, he received patent No. 363712 for the turret rotation mechanism of the original design. "made two of these armored vehicles.
With the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, M. Nakashidze leads a team of scouts he formed from volunteers, with which he is sent to the front at the disposal of the 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment. In early July 1905, he sent the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian troops in the Far East, Adjutant General Lenevich, a proposal to order one armored vehicle armed with a machine gun in France to test it in front-line conditions. Most likely, Nakashidze already knew about the project of Colonel Guyet's armored car and counted on the fact that the Russian government would be interested in the novelty. He took on the role of an intermediary in the transaction, as well as financing the delivery of an armored car to Russia.
Adjutant General N.P. Lenevich agreed with Nakashidze's proposal. In addition, the latter received permission from the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Empire for the duty-free import of an armored car into Russia: it was assumed that the state would pay taxes if the car was purchased. If the deal did not take place, the armored car was supposed to be sent to France within 3 months.
Apparently, Nakashidze, having enlisted the support "from above", what is called "got a taste", since the head of the military communications department of the General Staff informed the quartermaster general of the Main Staff of the Russian army:
“Prince Nakashidze drove up with a memorandum dated December 3, p. Mr.. asked for the immediate passage through customs of five more of the same armored vehicles, but this request was denied on December 8, since it was supposed to purchase only one motor for testing by the military department.
The armored car arrived in St. Petersburg on March 8, 1906. The car was sent to the St. Petersburg artillery depot, which was located in the kronverk of the Peter and Paul Fortress (now there is the Military History Museum of Artillery, engineering troops and signal troops. - Approx. author).
Armored car "Sharron" on the road. Russia, 1906 (RGVIA)
The tests of the novelty were entrusted to a commission of the Main Artillery Directorate specially created for this, chaired by Lieutenant General Takhtarev. In the period from March 22 to May 29, 1906, the armored car made several runs in the vicinity of St. Petersburg. Shooting tests and shooting of armor were also carried out at the Rifle Range of the Officers' Rifle School.
On June 30, 1906, the “Journal of the Commission at the GAU for testing an armored vehicle equipped with a machine gun” was compiled, which summarized all the materials for testing the vehicle:
“The car, according to Nakashidze, has a power of 30 hp, a supply of gasoline for 500 km, gasoline consumption is 1.25 pounds per hour, i.e. 37.5 pounds per hour, the weight of the entire car is 180 pounds (2400 kg), the number of people is 4 (an officer, a driver and 2 machine gunners).
From all sides it is covered with armor of 4.5 mm, in front the armor is hinged and can, at will, rise or fall down, 4 windows are cut on the side (2 on each side), closed with steel sheets 4.5 mm thick. Thus, in combat form, the car is almost completely covered with armor, only small holes for the eyes remain.
The wheels with their inflated tires remain uncovered, which are not protected by armor. For lighting inside there are small incandescent bulbs. The front seats are for the officer and the driver, around which all the mechanisms and levers for control are concentrated, while the rear part is designed for a machine gun mounted in a rotating turret lying above the roof of the car.
This tower can move around a special vertical axis, to which a machine gun is attached with two curved levers ...
In the machine gun room there is a seat for machine gunners, which is removed during firing. In addition, there are also two vertical tanks- one for transporting 140 liters of gasoline, the other 20 liters of oil. The rest of the gasoline is transported in a tank under the front seats. The rearmost part of the vehicle is designed to carry 2,400 rounds of ammunition packed into 10 metal boxes of 10 packs of 24 rounds each. There is no special room for the rest of the cartridges, but some more can be transported directly on the floor of the car near the machine gun rack.
On the outside, in front, the car is equipped with an acetylene lantern, on the outside, two portable bridges are attached to it for moving over the ditches, and on the back spare wheel and a spare machine gun.
The car is armed with a Hotchkiss machine gun firing French cartridges.
Not too impressive were the results of tests of armor by shelling from a 7.62-mm Mosin rifle, which showed that “the armor put on the car is significantly inferior to our steel in terms of impenetrability, and its fragility is also confirmed by the fact that when it is pierced by falling bullets near the holes broke off small pieces of armor.
In its conclusions on testing the Sharron armored vehicle, the commission of the main artillery directorate noted the following:
"1. The machine gave quite good results:
a) on a very good road, the car was moving at a speed of 60 miles per hour;
b) climbs up to 18-20 degrees, the car took well;
c) on sandy compacted shallow soil and on dry arable land, the car moved freely.
2. Having a sufficient supply of water and gasoline, the car moves for a long time without replenishing them.
3. Driving a car is convenient due to the fact that all the levers and mechanisms are concentrated near the driver.
4. It is necessary to note the expedient arrangement of the cooler of the machine.
Flaws:
5. A car cannot move at all on a wet, damp, non-mooved road (with ordinary soil in the vicinity of St. Petersburg), along a path covered with even shallow loose snow, and also without roads, on dry soft pounds, along which an ordinary light passenger 8-seater car can pass . When driving on such soils, the car bogged down almost to the axles.
6. The agility of the car is negligible. To turn, you need a circle of 17.5 arshins in diameter and 9.5 arshins to turn in a sequential forward and backward movement.
7. There is no complete independence of moves.
8. Some parts of the car, such as exhaust pipe, are located very low, as a result of which, if the wheels are tied, their breakdowns are possible.
9. The center of gravity of the car is raised very high due to the rather significant weight of the armored turret and machine gun located on top of the roof of the car, which adversely affects its stability.
Not everything went smoothly when testing the machine by shooting. If the results were quite satisfactory when firing from a place, then it turned out that in motion "accuracy decreases significantly, and with increasing speed, the decrease increases."
In addition, it was noted that fighting compartment it is not enough to accommodate a machine gun and two machine gunners, the rotation of the turret and aiming it at the target is quite difficult, and "shooting requires special dexterity and skill due to the tightness of the room." Also, members of the commission spoke out against the use of a Hotchkiss machine gun on an armored car: "It shoots with French cartridges, therefore it is unsuitable for our army."
View of the Sharron armored car with the turret turned back. Russia, 1906 (RGVIA)
In its final conclusions, the commission wrote:
"The delivered car does not meet certain delivery conditions, and therefore cannot be accepted for acceptance."
Prince Nakashidze, who was present at the tests, apparently realizing that the armored car presented to him did not meet the requirements of the military, on June 18, 1906, sent a memorandum to the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General F. Palitsin, as follows (by the way, in this document Nakashidze was called "Director of the armored department cars of the company "Charron, Girardot, Voy"):
“The car I built was adapted to the conditions of the war in the Far East. The current political situation on this outskirts does not at all give grounds for assuming that we are not on the eve of new grounds with our enemy. The Japanese Ministry of War has already applied to our plant twice with a request to supply it with 50 vehicles, and a commission of Chinese officers who came to inspect the vehicle placed an order for 150 vehicles for the Chinese government.
Being connected with me by contract, the plant was forced to temporarily abandon these orders, but if before September 1 this year. If I do not submit to the plant from the Russian Government an order for a certain number of vehicles, at least 50, then the plant will have the right to supply armored vehicles to anyone ...
From all that has been said, it follows how important it would be for the purposes of national defense and to make our military forces more powerful if the Russian Army were now equipped with a sufficient number of armored vehicles, which, being concentrated in parks, would make it possible to prepare a contingent of mechanics in advance and study combat tactics of this new species.
In conclusion, I consider it my duty to add that, meeting the Government’s needs in view of its difficult financial situation, we would be ready to open a large automobile plant in St. Petersburg.
Most likely, with information about the alleged purchases of armored vehicles by various countries, Nakashidze tried to put pressure on the Russian military ministry and force him to buy a batch of armored vehicles from him. Moreover, the enterprising prince had already tried to influence in this way earlier. For example, introducing an armored car that arrived in March 1906 to representatives of the military communications department, Nakashidze said that according to his "secret data, the German War Ministry entered into a condition with one of the large German firms to supply 80 vehicles on demand within two months and that a similar a contact was made by the French Minister of War with one of the French firms for the delivery within three months of 100 vehicles of approximately the same type as that manufactured by the Sharron plant.
Armored car "Sharron", stuck on sandy ground. Russia, 1906 (RGVIA)
By order of the Chief of the General Staff dated July 21, 1906, the armored car was “ordered to be placed at the disposal of the headquarters of the Krasnoselsky military camp collection for a period from July 24 this year. G.". To conduct tests, by order of the commander of the troops of the guards and the St. Petersburg military district, a special commission was created under the chairmanship of Major General Rosenshield von Pauli. It is unlikely that the reason for the tests was Nakashidze's dubious information about orders for armored cars from other countries. Most likely, the command of the Russian Army wanted to receive full information about the armored novelty, since the order of the commission indicated that "tests should be carried out exclusively for tactical purposes." In its conclusion, the commission of Major General Rosenshield von Pauli noted the following:
“... When tested from July 25 to August 5 this year. in practice, it turned out that the car is very suitable for the following tasks:
a) for extensive reconnaissance in the rear and on the flanks of the enemy;
b) for a breakthrough with a reconnaissance purpose through the enemy's chain;
c) for the communications service in the area of enemy fire, especially with a significant development of the track network;
d) to disrupt cavalry units going on the attack ...
e) as a convenient tower for making observations on flat terrain, especially if there are bushes behind which you can hide the car.
In addition to the above appointments, the car can be expected to benefit in the following cases:
a) to quickly advance to the front of the enemy or behind him in order to destroy any important structures, especially crossings, with the help of a transported stock of explosives;
b) for various auxiliary purposes in partisan operations;
c) for the rapid delivery of cartridges and shells to the battle lines, as well as replenishment of the loss of officers;
d) when pursuing the enemy, constant anxiety from all sides with machine-gun fire.
Although the commission was instructed to speak out about the tactical significance of an armored car, nevertheless, one cannot ignore some technical aspects that significantly affect the tactical use of the vehicle. In this sense, it should be noted:
1) The Nakashidze armored car, due to its bulkiness (180 pounds), will be widely used only in the field of a dense highway network.
2) The car is too heavy, which is why it easily gets stuck in the mud.
3) Slow on the roads, so it takes a lot of time to turn, which under enemy fire can be disastrous.
4) The front end sits too low above the ground, as a result of which there are delays from hitting stones, etc.
5) In its external outline, the car presents too much resistance to air and few surfaces on which bullets would slide.
6) Wheel tires should be covered with armor if possible.
7) For observation on the sides, instead of the existing large holes, make narrow slots.
8) All attachments for the machine gun should be lightened and the machine gun should be made removable, and the method of its attachment more convenient for the shooter.
9) To quickly jump into the car, it should be equipped with a large number of doors.
10) If possible, reduce the noise from the movement in order to make it possible to approach the enemy more discreetly.
Thus, general conclusions both commissions that tested the machine in March - May and July - August generally coincided. Their assessment of the armored car as a whole came down to one thing - in this form it is not suitable for operation and use in the Russian Army.
However, this turn of affairs did not suit Nakashidze, who was directly financially interested in Russia acquiring a batch of Sharron armored vehicles. Apparently, under the impression of the battles of the revolution of 1905-1906, he proposes to use the machine "to maintain internal order." Having made an appointment with the then Minister of Internal Affairs P. Stolypin, Nakashidze arrived at his dacha on August 12, 1906. It was on this day that an assassination attempt was made on the minister, and his dacha flew into the air. Stolypin himself was not injured - he was absent during the explosion. However, as follows from the note of the Comrade Minister of the Interior,
“On August 12, 1906, among others, who came to the Minister with a proposal for police and security purposes of the type of car invented by him, the headquarters captain, Prince Mikhail Alexandrovich Nakashidze, was killed, and with him all the drawings, plans, contracts with the French automobile company and other documents relating to his invention."
But despite such tragic fate Nakashidze himself, the armored car he proposed continued his "odyssey" in Russia. The car was supervised by a friend of the deceased prince, retired guard colonel A. Ofro-simov, who was also a representative of the Sharron company.
“According to the Main Directorate of the General Staff, the armored car of Prince Nakashidze, although it turned out to not satisfy some of the conditions presented to it, nevertheless, according to the results of tests at the Krasnoselsky maneuvers, it could be suitable for performing well-known combat missions, and therefore it is desirable to purchase one in the Military Office to develop further tests with it and to improve its technical data."
Apparently, on the basis of this document, on January 9, 1907, the Russian military department acquired an armored car, paying a French company 30,000 rubles.
By the way, one of the conditions for acquiring an armored car, the General Staff set the delivery of the car "in good condition" with the replacement of the armored hull and turret. We must pay tribute to the efficiency of the retired colonel Ofrosimov - on February 19, 1907, he concluded an agreement with the Putilov plant in St. Petersburg for the repair of an armored car. In doing so, the following work was carried out:
"1. Installation of new armor delivered from France;
2. Correction of wheel shields;
3. Make all machine gun attachments removable;
4. For observation on the sides in the existing window shutters, make loopholes in the form of oblong slots;
5. Make a loophole in the back wall;
6. Renewal of the outer color.
On March 28, 1907, a commission of representatives of the military communications department, the main artillery department and a representative of the Sharron company Ofrosimov received an armored car repaired by the Putilov factory. After a short test run, the car was sent for storage to the crown building of the Peter and Paul Fortress.
In early August 1907, the armored car was again sent to Oranienbaum for testing at the rifle range of the Officer Rifle School. The head of the test site, Colonel N. Filatov, supervised the tests, and Pavel Vasilyev, a soldier of the 1st Caucasian railway battalion, was the driver of the car.
Intermittent tests lasted until mid-October, and both the speed and maneuverability of the vehicle were tested, as well as the ability to install on it and fire from Hotchkiss, Maxim and Madsen machine guns. While at the training ground, the armored car covered more than 600 miles, showing high speeds on good highways and a complete lack of patency on dirty roads or country roads. In addition, there were a large number of breakdowns, for the correction of which it was necessary to purchase spare parts from the Lessner plant. In general, the conclusions on the maneuverability and patency of the vehicle completely coincided with the conclusions of the commissions that conducted the tests in 1906.
Armored car "Sharron" during the test run on the way to Oranienbaum. Russia, 1906 (RGVIA)
In July 1908, the armored car was placed at the disposal of the troops of the Guards and the St. Petersburg Military District, and it was sent to Krasnoye Selo "for testing by driving on maneuvers." However, the results were disappointing: "An armored car in its present form, due to excessive weight, cannot serve for the above purposes." At the same time, the headquarters of the St. Petersburg Military District offered to convert the car "to a lighter type" (i.e., unarmor it), taking all the expenses at its own expense.
On September 17, 1908, the armored car was transferred to the “full ownership” of the Petersburg District, and by October 16, the armor was removed from the car, and the car itself was converted into a passenger car.
Thus, despite more than two years of testing of the Sharron armored car in Russia, this vehicle did not receive recognition from our military, and this is not surprising. The fact is that before that, no country in the world had anything like this in service, and, of course, no one at that time had experience in using a new type of military equipment. In addition, we should not forget that the technical level of armored cars of that time was directly related to the development of the automotive industry. And in the early years of the 20th century, cars were still very imperfect designs, which had low reliability of the units and low cross-country ability, as well as being very complex and capricious in operation.
The Sharron company, in addition to the armored car for Russia, manufactured several more similar vehicles based on a Russian order. According to French sources, six built armored cars were sent to Russia in late 1906 or early 1907, but they were not allowed to cross the border. A little later, two cars were bought by the Germans, and with a solid discount (according to some sources, up to 40%). After testing in 1909, the vehicles participated in the exercises of the 5th Guards Brigade, and then they were sent to one of the fortresses in East Prussia. According to some reports, both armored cars were used by the Germans in the battles in East Prussia in August 1914.
One armored car was bought from the Charron company by the French military, and in 1914 it was used in battles as part of the cavalry corps of General Sorde.
In addition to the armored car of Prince Nakashidze, before the First World War in Russia there was another armored car, about which practically nothing is known in our country. True, the car was ordered not by the military, but by civilian authorities.
On November 11, 1911, the management for the construction of the eastern part of the Amur Railway concluded an agreement with the German company Benz and Co. for the manufacture of an armored car, which had to meet the following requirements:
“The total weight of the car is about 120 pounds, the weight of armor with a thickness of 4.5 mm from Krupp steel should not exceed 30 pounds.
Lifting force - 60 pounds of cargo or 6 people and 20 pounds.
Chassis cargo type. The motor must be 4-cylinder, 35/40 hp, with cylinders cast in pairs ...
The maximum speed at full load is 20 miles per hour.
6. The car must be equipped with a combat rotating turret, the impenetrability of the armor is guaranteed against rifle shots.
Apparently, before issuing the order, the Benz company submitted to the construction department for the eastern part of the Amur Railway a draft design of the machine, which, with minor changes, was approved.
On August 4, 1912, the armored car was delivered to St. Petersburg, to the Russian branch of the Benz and Co. trading house, after which the car was sent to Khabarovsk. According to the docs, appearance and the characteristics of the machine corresponded to the task, however, the German company did not fully fulfill the set conditions. So, the armored car did not have a “combat rotating turret”, and the cargo tires were of a smaller diameter, for which 1,203 rubles were withheld from the contractor (the total cost of the car was 11,500 rubles).
The interest in the armored car by the management for the construction of the eastern part of the Amur railway is not accidental. The fact is that during the Russo-Japanese War it turned out that the Chinese Eastern Railway, laid through the territory of Manchuria, does not fully ensure the interests of Russia. Therefore, already in 1906, the design of the Amur railway from Sretensk to Khabarovsk began with a total length of 2041 versts with branches to Nerchinsk, Reinov and Blagoveshchensk. Construction began two years later, and was carried out in sparsely populated areas close to the Chinese border. Therefore, there were frequent cases of attacks on the workers' parties by Chinese gangsters - the Honghuzi. For the safe travel of engineers, as well as the transportation of valuable cargo, at the suggestion of the head of the construction of the eastern part of the Amur Railway, engineer A.V. Liverovsky, the Benz armored car was ordered.
The armored car, which arrived in Khabarovsk on September 15, 1912, was converted at the beginning of the next year for movement along the railway track, since there were very few highways and good dirt roads in this area, and in winter it was almost impossible to drive along them.
After the outbreak of the First World War, the Benz armored car was accepted "to the Military Department for military automobile service" under Act No. 16495 of October 5, 1914. As follows from the accompanying documents, by this time the car "during the period of service at the construction site for 25 months made a run of only 2425 miles." By the way, in the same documents this car was called an “armored bus” - apparently because of its large overall dimensions.
In mid-October 1914, an "armored bus" from Khabarovsk was sent to Petrograd, at the disposal of the Military Automobile School, but the car was lost in the vast Russian expanses, never reaching the capital.
In the spring of 1918, the car "floats" in Omsk. Here, for the characteristic shape of the hull, the armored car was nicknamed "Lobkov's coffin" (3. I. Lobkov - one of the organizers of the Red Guard detachments in Omsk, chairman of the city committee of the RSDLP (b)).
Thus, by the beginning of the First World War, there were no armored vehicles in service with the Russian Army. However, in other countries that had a more developed (compared to Russia) automotive industry - Austria-Hungary, Germany, England, America and France - the situation was exactly the same. Various models of armored vehicles built by these countries in 1906-1913 did not go beyond prototypes, and none of them interested the military.
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“... On the highway, because of the German chains, a black-and-blue armored car drove out and began to drive with the trunks of machine guns, repelling a bayonet attack. Like an irresistible monster, the armored car drove farther and farther, driving the young Krasnoyarsk people to flight.
Avaricious evidence
From the very beginning of the First World War and still there is an opinion that it was the Germans who were the first to use armored cars on the Russian-German front - in August 1914. This opinion is so rooted that even in late fiction there are stories about the actions of German armored cars in East Prussia. Often these plots are simply fantastic, like the above excerpt from the novel by the Soviet writer S.Yu. Rybas. His rich imagination was even enough to invent the color of an armored car, which is impossible in strict German army regulations.
But jokes aside. The use of armored vehicles by the Germans in the summer-autumn of 1914 is spoken of by sparing and vague reports in the Russian, and later in the German press. There are also official documents of the Military Department, including orders, which also mention the armored vehicles of the German army, which were actively operating in repelling the Russian offensive in East Prussia.
It is confirmed by numerous sources that the Belgians first used armored cars in defensive battles in the Western European theater of operations of the First World War in early August 1914. Their actions were very successful. True, the Germans captured about ten vehicles, including both fully combat-ready factory-made armored cars - mainly manufactured by the Belgian company Minerva (Minerva), and auxiliary vehicles, hastily booked in army workshops. The Germans immediately used these trophies in the offensive in Flanders. As for the Eastern Front, one of the first mentions of German armored cars is found in the order of the commander of the North-Western Front, cavalry general Ya.G. Zhilinsky No. 35 dated August 19, 1914, which prescribed measures to combat enemy armored vehicles:
“The fighting that has been taking place recently in the troops of the front entrusted to me has shown that the Germans successfully use machine guns mounted on armored vehicles. Such machine guns, attached to small cavalry detachments, taking advantage of the abundance of highways and the speed of their movement, appeared on the flanks and in the rear of our location, shelling with real fire not only our troops, but also the convoys.
In order to protect the troops of the North-Western Front from shelling them with machine guns, I order teams of mounted sappers to be sent forward to damage those highways that can serve the enemy for movement with the aim of both attacking at the front and threatening the flank and rear of our troops. In this case, it is necessary to choose such sections of the highway that do not have detours.
Damage to the highway should be done in those ways that will best suit local conditions, and it is possible to recommend cutting through the highway bed with narrow transverse ditches, piling trees cut off on the side of the road on the highway, throwing broken bottles and pieces of glass on the highway, piling up large stones, etc. When digging trenches, they should be masked, i.e. make them obstacles not expected for enemy vehicles moving at full speed.
In addition to damage to the highway, it is necessary to remove the flooring from wooden bridges and hide them nearby, in case our troops need to move.
In general, with all the damage to highways and bridges, it should be possible to quickly correct the obstacles produced by our troops if it is necessary to move both our military units and convoys.
As an active tool against cars with machine guns, with columns of detachments moving along the highway, it is necessary to have artillery to fire at cars. It is especially useful to have such specially assigned artillery platoons in flank columns and on roads running parallel and near our front.
Zhilinsky's order is a serious document, but it is worth paying attention to the fact that it only once, at the very beginning, uses the term "armored vehicles". The text also refers to "cars" and "cars with machine guns", from which it can be assumed that not all German machine gun vehicles were armored.
It should also be noted that apart from this document and indistinct reports in the Russian press, researchers have not yet found any other information about the actions of German armored cars in East Prussia in the summer and autumn of 1914 - neither in Russia nor in Germany. From the surviving illustrative material, only one photograph of a captured German armored vehicle is known, captured by units of the 1st Army in the battles in East Prussia in the period August 14-20, 1914. However, the picture shows not an armored car, but a converted from a car and partially armored railway railcar, judging by by design features, a very outdated model. It is still not possible to establish the brand of the car. It is curious that many German historians consider the armored rubber not German, but Austrian, moreover, lost on another sector of the front.
Here, perhaps, is all the evidence that has been found so far.
The evolution of armored vehicles in Germany
At the beginning of the XX century. the armies of almost all the leading powers of Europe began to experiment with the use of armored vehicles. The Prussian army first got acquainted with the Daimler all-wheel drive armored car made in Austria in 1905. The German command did not show interest in the progressive, but expensive design, but ordered a very primitive armored car from the Daimler company on the chassis of a Mercedes car ( Mercedes) for military testing. It will be discussed below. At the same time, the German designer Heinrich Ehrhardt introduced the Rheinmetall light cannon to the military, mounted on the chassis of the Ehrhardt-Decauville passenger car and designed to combat balloons.
G. Erhardt, the actual owner of the Rhine Metal and Engineering Plant (Rheinischen Metallwaren- und Maschinenfabrik AG) in Düsseldorf and car factory Ehrhardt-Automobil-Werke AG in the town of Zella-St. Blasius, decided to "cross" an artillery gun with a car. A year later, at the IX and X international automobile exhibitions held in Berlin, he presented the Ehrhardt car equipped with a 50-mm Rheinmetall model L / 30 gun in unarmored and armored versions. The armored car "Erhardt" for combating balloons of the VAK model (VAK - Ballonabwehrkanone, i.e. "anti-balloon gun") was distinguished by its innovative design. At the same time, the Adam Opel company demonstrated an Opel-Darracq semi-armored car equipped with a machine gun. Both machines also did not arouse the interest of the German military circles. Ehrhardt later recalled in his memoirs:
“In 1906, at the Berlinskaya Street that was opened at that time, car exhibition I showed a car with a cannon to destroy balloons protected by armor from infantry fire and grenade fragments. However, my project was called an unnecessary game and was rejected.
Despite the first failures, Erhardt did not give up, showing enviable perseverance in translating his ideas into reality. In 1908, a truck with a 65-mm L / 35 model gun was manufactured at its factories, and in 1911 small-scale production of such vehicles began. In 1909, the joint development of the Friedrich Krupp AG and Daimler factories saw the light of day - an all-wheel drive vehicle with a 77-mm L / 27 anti-aerostatic gun. Two years later, Ehrhardt also installed a 77-mm Rheinmetall gun on the chassis of an all-wheel drive truck. Since 1913, both competitors have established small-scale production of guns on partially armored and unarmored automobile chassis. These vehicles were intended to combat air targets and were not armored vehicles in the full sense of the word. However, they are not mentioned in this article by chance - we will return to them later. It is curious that the Main Artillery Directorate of the Russian Army became interested in the novelties, even negotiations were held with the Germans on the purchase of these machines, however, to no avail.
As for conventional armored vehicles, the first sample entered the Royal Prussian Army on October 12, 1905. It was a rather primitive vehicle with two machine guns in the rear, made on a 40-strong Mercedes light chassis (Mercedes) at the Steel Wagon Factory in Remscheid ( Stahlwagenfabrik Remscheid). A year later, two French-made machines of the SHZhV (C.G.V.)3 brand were purchased. In 1909, all three vehicles took part in the Neumark maneuvers as part of the 5th Guards Infantry Brigade of the Prussian Army. Later they were sent to one of the fortresses in East Prussia. An ordinary Bussing truck also took part in these maneuvers, in the back of which two machine guns were installed.
In the report on the testing of armored vehicles (obsolete by that time design) in the field, their ability to quickly overcome significant distances was noted. But they also paid attention to the shortcomings - first of all, the military was not satisfied with their cross-country ability. The War Department identified the tactical use of armored vehicles as part of the cavalry units and called for new tests, showing interest in more advanced designs. The test department of the transport troops of the Prussian army, where at that time all available vehicles were concentrated, requested the Ministry of War to develop a plan for the introduction of armored vehicles into the army and put forward requirements for them. Among the priority requirements, the ministry has identified: a reservation capable of protecting vehicles from rifle and machine-gun fire; the possibility of shooting in all directions: equipping with solid rubber tires instead of pneumatics and the ability to move off-road. Some automobile factories promptly responded to this call and began to develop new types of armored cars.
However, on March 12, 1910, the General Inspectorate of the Department of Military Communications decided to immediately stop all work in this direction. The reason for this was the final conclusion of the inspectors that the possibility of using armored vehicles in a future war
"very limited."
It was noted:
"... Armored vehicles can be of military importance only in exceptional cases for the protection of borders and for the protection of mountain roads and bridges during the retreat."
The offensive doctrine reigned in the German army at that time, therefore, according to these conclusions, in armored vehicles oh no need.
The final verdict of the General Inspectorate was issued at the end of 1911. It spoke of the unreliability of automotive equipment, the loss of speed and maneuverability due to excessive weight with sufficient armor, which makes armored cars an easy target for enemy artillery. The conclusion of the inspection put an end to the further development of a new type of weapon:
"The era of armor is in the past, because its severity limits the speed of the machine, while not providing sufficient protection."
They even decided to sell all the armored vehicles available in the troops. There were no buyers for obsolete vehicles, but, for example, a new armored car manufactured by Protos was sold to Mexico.
Thus, the German military command lost all interest in armored vehicles. In the annual reports of the Prussian General Staff and the General Inspectorate of the Department of Military Communications until 1914, practically nothing was even reported about the development of armored business in other countries, despite the fact that reports about testing new armored vehicles abroad (in particular, in Austria and Italy) acted continuously.
Historians give many reasons for the refusal of the German command from armored vehicles. The conservatively minded German generals did not see tactical use in armored vehicles, underestimating their importance in offensive and defensive operations, completely relying on the classic Prussian military doctrine erected into a dogma during the Franco-Prussian war of 1970-1871. However, in other European armies, the development of armored vehicles left much to be desired: in peacetime no one wanted to spend huge amounts of money on the new kind weapons with a dubious prospect. Even the introduction of road transport in the armies of the European powers ran into resistance from certain military circles, although the Germans showed more initiative in this matter than other countries.
In Germany, there were other, specific reasons for abandoning armored cars. The German army and navy were at that time in the stage of active re-equipment, which required not only colossal funds, but also the strictest rationing of high-quality metal. Kaiser Wilhelm's desire to suppress British naval superiority at all costs forced the German iron and steel industry to supply high-quality armor almost exclusively for the construction of warships. The production of the latest models of artillery pieces also increased sharply. The development of artillery played a partly positive role in military motoring. It was the Germans, even before the war, who were among the first to adopt guns for firing at air targets mounted on automobile chassis.
Fighting on the roads of East Prussia
On August 4, 1914, the offensive of the 1st and 2nd Russian armies began in East Prussia, where there was a developed network of dirt highways, while both sides widely used road transport. It should be noted that the formation of the German automobile units was structurally different from those in the Russian Imperial Army. In our army, separate automobile companies and headquarters automobile teams were formed, mainly consisting of medium and light trucks, as well as cars. The Germans, on the other hand, formed headquarters and stage automobile fleets and small stage automobile and ammunition-automobile columns. In the German military convoys intended to supply the army in the field, mainly heavy slow-moving vehicles with a carrying capacity of 4-5 tons were involved, many of them with trailed carts.
The East Prussian operation was of a maneuverable nature with the massive participation of cavalry. From the very beginning of the Russian offensive, the advanced Cossack patrols undertook successful raids on the rear and flanks of the enemy, while they often attacked German convoys, seizing and destroying enemy vehicles. In those days, the pages of Russian periodicals were full of messages and drawings about the capture of German cars. The Germans hastily tried to take various measures to protect their convoys.
Among such measures, according to the then press, was the patrolling of roads by armored vehicles. But what kind of armored vehicles could the German army use? There is still no exact answer to this question. According to some reports, in East Prussia in the summer of 1914, the Germans used the remaining three "antediluvian" armored cars "ShZhV" and "Mercedes" produced in 1905-1906. But it is unlikely that these obsolete machines could play a significant role in the hostilities. The famous German historian Erich Petter in the late 1920s, having studied almost all the archival documents of the Royal Prussian Army in Koenigsberg and Berlin (most of them burned down during the assault on these cities by the Soviet Army in 1945), in his dissertation on the topic “Development and the use of German armored vehicles in the First World War ”was the first to highlight this issue in detail. However, he could not cite a single fact of the use of armored cars in 1914. Nothing concrete was found in the German press of that time, and only slurred rumors and speculation were published in our periodicals. However, the order of General Zhilinsky, quoted above, is a document that cannot be ignored.
In the absence of other archival documents, we will try to turn to the illustrative material of those years. During the First World War, the Germans published large numbers of postcards depicting their own and other people's equipment. Numerous books and pamphlets of a propaganda nature also constantly printed military photographs. If the fact of successful operations of armored vehicles on the Eastern Front in 1914 had taken place, then the German propagandists would certainly have noted it.
Only after reading the reports of the Russian press, the German reporters picked up the rumors and tried to elevate them to the rank of reality. Notes about the supposedly successful attacks of German armored cars in the German press appeared much later than in the Russian one, and were illustrated with drawings depicting unrealistic vehicles - French semi-armored cars of the 1909 model or completely fantastic samples invented by artists. In Russian publications, even drawings were not found.
Another source is German propaganda postcards of the time depicting partially armored cars"Mercedes". However, the vehicles depicted on them are identified as semi-armored vehicles from the fleet of Kaiser Wilhelm II, which, with all desire, cannot be attributed to combat models.
It can be concluded that in East Prussia in 1914 the Germans could use in small numbers only ordinary powerful and fast cars with machine guns, or the so-called “surrogate armored cars” armored directly in the artisanal way in the troops. They were taken for armored vehicles. The sphere of their actions was the roads of the front line at a considerable distance from the enemy. The tactics of a lightning raid and a quick retreat were used. This conclusion is confirmed by the surviving photographs of that time. Some of them show cars with rear-mounted machine guns capable of firing at both air and ground targets. Probably, such vehicles proved to be quite good, since later the first combat vehicle of the German army was made according to this scheme.
On July 8, 1915, the Germans formed the 1st automobile machine-gun platoon, which included only one combat vehicle - developed back in 1914, but ready only a year later, an unarmored all-wheel drive 70-horsepower Daimler. The machine was equipped with two rear machine guns, and the third was in reserve. In addition, the platoon had two cars without weapons. The platoon was sent to the Russian front, but practically did not participate in hostilities. In less than four months, this unit was disbanded due to its absolute incompetence.
According to other scanty reports and photographs that have survived to this day, the Germans successfully used the so-called "trap trucks" in East Prussia. Two machine guns were installed in the back of a light truck and a team of huntsmen was housed. Such on-board vehicles with an awning, outwardly not similar to combat vehicles, followed at the tail of an automobile convoy or moved along the roads separately, sometimes accompanied by motorcyclists. During the attack of the Russian cavalry, the team threw back the awning and tailgate and met the enemy with heavy machine-gun fire, and the huntsmen left the car and, under cover of the terrain, fired with rifles. This tactic proved to be very effective. Most likely, it was these "traps" that became the reason for reports of German armored vehicles. It is possible that many of them were partially booked, but to ensure surprise, the armor was masked. An indirect confirmation of this version can be considered the creation of the first Russian "surrogate armored cars", the design of which, obviously, was adopted from the Germans.
In August 1914, an officer of the Training Automobile Company, Staff Captain I.N. Bazhanov armored the Italian truck "SPA" (S.P.A.) with shields from captured cannons. The armor of this car was disguised, and outwardly the armored car did not differ much from an ordinary truck. In September 1914, in the workshops of the 8th automobile company, two similar armored cars were built on the chassis of American Case cars. These examples can be considered a Russian response to the German initiative - the enemy cavalry also staged raids on the roads in the rear of the Russian army.
"Motor gun" in East Prussia
At the beginning of this article, it was not by chance that they were mentioned german cars with guns designed to fight against air targets. Unlike the armored car business, the Germans had priority in the development and use of this type of weapon.
By the beginning of the war, the German army had at its disposal no more than a dozen different vehicles equipped with cannons for combating balloons (VAK). They were also called "motor guns" (Motorgeschutz). In 1914, by order of the German military ministries for automobile factories"Daimler" and "Erhardt" began mass production of all-wheel drive automobile chassis for installation on them of ready-made rapid-fire 77-mm guns "Krupp" and "Rheinmetall". The first order was issued for 80 "motor guns" - 40 units for each firm. Artillery units began to receive the latest weapons in the summer of 1914 and were actively used to fight not only balloons, but also airplanes.
In connection with the expansion of the scope of combat use, these vehicles received the official name "anti-aircraft gun" (K-Flak - Kraftwagen-Fliegerabwehrkanone). Most of them were sent by the German command to the Western Front, and only one semi-armored vehicle was assigned to the Eastern Front - to the 18th East Prussian Field Artillery Regiment, operating jointly with the 52nd Field Artillery Regiment as part of the 1st Field Artillery Brigade, which was part of the 1st -th division of the 1st army corps of the 8th army of the Royal Prussian troops. Senior Lieutenant Adami was appointed commander of the vehicle, while the “motor gun” itself was considered one of the best in the world at that time. It was a rare variant - a Daimler chassis with a 77-mm Rheinmetall L / 27 cannon, which had a rate of fire of 25 rds / min. The fact is that Erhardt cars were inferior to Daimler cars in terms of their technical characteristics and quality, despite the fact that their design was initially based on the Daimler license. And the guns were exactly the opposite: the Rheinmetall gun was considered much better and more reliable than the similar Krupp system. Thus, the best semi-armored anti-aircraft self-propelled gun that the Germans had at that time was sent to the East.
The East Prussian operation involved 54 Russian airplanes and 56 German ones. The Germans concentrated their airplanes and two airships at the airfield near Konigsberg. For their protection, the car of Senior Lieutenant Adami was sent to the airfield. However, the enemy did not undertake air attacks on the airfield. Soon, the "anti-aircraft gun" was seconded to the 3rd Upper Alsace Infantry Regiment and transferred to the front to fight the advancing troops of the Russian army. The cannon car successfully participated in daily battles on the front roads. He acted especially effectively during counterattacks to support the German infantry, firing at the advancing columns of Russian troops almost point-blank and quickly changing positions. Our soldiers have not yet seen such a weapon and had no experience in fighting it, and its appearance on different sectors of the front could well create the illusion that the Germans had more than one “armored car”. It was the world's first documented experience of using a self-propelled anti-aircraft gun against ground targets, and a very successful one at that. True, it did not last long. The episode described by both opponents deserves special attention. To begin with, it is worth quoting German sources.
A 1938 edition of the Military Science Department of the German Air Force, devoted to the development and use of German anti-aircraft guns in the First World War, reported:
“The use of anti-aircraft guns on the Eastern Front at the beginning of the war was limited to one “motor gun”. After the announcement of mobilization, it defended the Königsberg airfield. Since there was almost no activity of enemy aircraft, the gun team received permission to fire at ground targets. In battles near the towns of Gumbinen, Druskeniki and in other sectors of the front, the gun constantly fired at enemy infantry from short distances and in battles with mixed success repeatedly ensured a safe withdrawal from positions.
On September 28, during the offensive of the 1st Army Corps in the area of the Neman River, the gun came to the aid of the advanced infantry line near Koptsiovo, which was in a difficult situation. At the same time, it was fired upon by the Cossacks. The commander of the gun, Senior Lieutenant Adami, and the driver were killed, the car ran off slippery road into the ditch. The team drove the enemy. However, with a forced withdrawal from the battle, all attempts to evacuate the gun were unsuccessful. There was nothing left but to destroy it, only fragments fell into the hands of the enemy.
In the German Airways Ministry's 1943 work "The German Air Force from its founding to the end of the World War in 1918" we read almost word for word the same lines with minor changes and additions. The word "Cossacks" was changed to "cavalrymen" and it was added that two German soldiers were wounded. The death of senior lieutenant Adami in the battle near Koptsiovo on September 28, 1914 was also recorded in the honorary list of German military officers published in 1926 by the German Officers' Union and in other early German sources.
Now let's turn to Russian evidence about the capture by the Russian army of the village of Koptsovo, Suvalk province, on September 15, 1914. Sergievsky:
“On one of the streets of Koptsiovo, I saw a German truck with an anti-aircraft gun mounted on it. This car rushed about for a long time along the highway, which we had already intercepted from both sides, and, finally, was captured in the very place by our arrows of the 3rd regiment while trying to break through Koptsovo to the north.
Russian archival data fully confirm Sergeyevsky's memoirs. So the Germans for the first time lost their powerful newest "motor gun", which had a high moral value for the Russian army. Lieutenant A.V., who committed the seizure of the car Svetovidov, who commanded a platoon of the 3rd Finnish Infantry Regiment, was awarded the Order of St. George 4th degree for this feat.
Comparing the data of all sources, one can see how shamelessly the military historians of Nazi Germany lied. It is not known for what reason they noted the participation of the Cossacks in that battle and embellished the narrative with the false fact of the destruction of the car by their own soldiers, and yet in 1915 photographs of a car with a gun taken in Koptsovo were repeatedly published in the Russian press, even in the journal Nature and People. They clearly show that the trophy did not have any damage. The Germans, who were so fond of reprinting materials from foreign sources, could not help but see these pictures. However, the Russian press during the First World War did not describe the “motor gun” quite accurately, calling it a “armored car”, sometimes confusing the caliber of the gun (75 mm instead of 77 mm) and incorrectly indicating that the vehicle was equipped with a “Krupp gun”. But these are the usual "innocent" mistakes of journalists.
It should be noted that the use of "motor guns" by the German army on the Russian front throughout the war was limited. On August 1, 1915, their number on the segment of the front north of the Pilica River was only three units. By the end of 1916, the Germans had no more than 12 vehicles operating on the Eastern Front, and, for example, only in the Battle of the Somme on the Western Front in the same year, the Germans used 77 "motor guns". By this time, they were reduced to separate automobile air defense batteries - two self-propelled guns each. Another car - an unarmored "Erhardt" model 1913 with a 77-mm Rheinmetall gun - was captured by our troops in 1915.
As for the trophy from Koptsiovo, it was sent to the Putilov factory for study and repair. According to unverified reports, the car was later used in the Russian Imperial Army. The experience of the enemy came in handy. In the summer of 1914, the process engineer of the Putilov plant F.F. Lander designed a three-inch anti-balloon gun. The installation, sighting device and scattering mechanism for the gun were developed by an officer of the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) captain V.V. Tarnovsky. This artillery system was called the "three-inch anti-aircraft gun of the Lender / Tarnovsky system." In August 1914, the GAU ordered 12 such guns from the Putilov plant, which were supposed to be installed on cars. In December, tests began on the first four guns mounted on the chassis of Russo-Balt armored trucks. At the same time, the formation of an air defense force began in the Russian army. car battery, originally called the Separate Battery for firing at the air fleet. It is possible that the engineers of the Putilov plant used in their work some technical solutions of German designers.
Long life of the myth
So, having considered all the available documents and evidence and analyzing specific episodes, we can conclude that in the battles in East Prussia in August-September 1914, armored cars were practically not used by the Germans. However, there were reports about them not only in the Russian press, but also in the documents of the Military Department. And in the future, this topic was actively supported by both journalists and some military circles in Russia. Moreover, the hype around German armored cars was constantly growing and often reached curiosities.
For example, in 1915, the Russian, and after it the allied press, was covered in a photograph
"a armored car captured from the Germans."
In fact, the picture reflected the moment of evacuation to the rear of a cannon armored car from the 1st automobile machine-gun company of the Russian Imperial Army. This car was built at the Izhora plant in 1914 on the chassis of the German truck "Mannesmann-Mulag" (Mannesmann-MULAG) release in 1913. From the beginning of November 1914, she participated in continuous battles. Soon the engine of the armored car failed. On December 1, 1914, the company commander, Colonel A.N. Dobzhansky reported:
"Big, made on old car, finally blew up.
The gun was removed from the armored car and sent to the rear for repairs, where it was unarmored. It can be assumed that the reporter who noted this episode was misled by the German inscription on the radiator of the car, but, most likely, in pursuit of a sensation, he did not disdain forgery.
Non-existent German armored vehicles continued to "intimidate" the Russian public and high-ranking military. In 1916, a teacher at the Alexander Military School, Colonel V.V. Bunyakovsky suggested
"to combat armored vehicles, passive and active measures."
Some of them today seem a little naive and, by and large, unsuitable for combating armored fighting vehicles. The first of these measures
“... come down to preparing for a quick barrage of paths and approaches convenient for their movement, leaving teams to perform the required work, which, at the same time, are obliged, as far as possible, to interfere with the servants of cars with rifle fire, to remove obstacles to their movement […].
It is best to arrange barriers to roads and approaches in such a way that this would be a surprise for enemy vehicles and could serve not only to delay their movement, but also to disaster. For this purpose, it is useful: to stretch a thick wire firmly attached to the abutments; dig up roads with ditches, arranging a light flooring with bringing it under the view of the surrounding area; to lay self-explosive land mines, marking their location with noticeable signs, etc.
Measures of active struggle are reduced to the action of artillery fire on armored vehicles and the production of unexpected, from the closest distance, attacks by infantry ambushes with the aim of capturing them or overturning them.
For the success of the fight with artillery fire, on the approach and when carrying out security service on the spot, you should have on duty platoons of artillery or armored cannon vehicles with observers sent ahead, equipped with means of quick communication (on the spot - telephones or motorcycles; on the march - horse orderlies or motorcycles )…
If there are cannon automobile platoons that do not have given time special tasks, then the fight against enemy vehicles can be entrusted to them ...
It is useful to supply infantry units assigned to carry out attacks on armored vehicles with slings to overturn them and explosive composition to destroy them. They should take measures to prevent the enemy from detecting ambushes in advance, arranging the latter in places where vehicles have to move slowly, or near barriers designed to delay their movement.
Only in February 1916 did the Germans form their first armored machine gun platoon. In the summer of 1916, German armored cars were involved in the Romanian front, but they did not participate in combat contacts with the Russian army. Measures to combat German armored vehicles were developed, but concrete examples so far have not been able to find it. In the actions of the enemy on the Eastern Front, even in 1917, when there were already three German armored car platoons, not a single more or less serious attack with their use was noted. The facts of direct confrontation between the armored vehicles of the belligerents are also unknown.
The myth of German armored cars continued to live under the new government. Former Major General of the Russian Army L.A. Radus-Zenkovich in 1920 published a "critical-historical study" of the Gumbinen operation in August 1914, in which he personally participated, being the chief of staff of the 27th Infantry Division. His essay is considered one of the most worthy works on this subject. However, it also contains an echo of the myth of German armored cars:
“The Russians were weaker than the Germans both in the number of bayonets and in the number of light guns […]; in addition, the Russians did not yet have heavy artillery, armored units and aviation units that met the requirements, with which the Germans were well equipped.
At the same time, not a single specific fact of the use of armored cars by the Germans and, moreover, armored units, was not noted in the text. Recall that in the battles near Gumbinen, one “motor gun” was actively operating in the German army. Could it be that the success of Senior Lieutenant Adami's only car gave rise to this myth? Meanwhile, he is alive and well, still roams through various military-historical publications and even serves as material for works of art.
Possible causes of myth-making and the reaction of the enemy
After analyzing all the known information about the German armored cars of 1914, the question involuntarily arises: what are the reasons for the massive myth-making on this topic? Why did the Russian military circles, with the support of the press, constantly inflate this myth, making “a molehill out of a molehill”? One can even think about the defeatist moods of Russian society, but in 1914 they were out of the question. In addition, it all started with the order of the commander of the North-Western Front, cavalry general Ya.G. Zhilinsky - a man who was not noticed in the absence of patriotism.
To answer this question, we must go back to 1910, when the Training Automobile Company was formed in St. Petersburg. General Zhilinsky, who then held the post of head of the Main Directorate of the General Staff, and his closest associates, head of the Department of Military Communications, Lieutenant General F.N. Dobryshin and the commander of the Training auto company, Captain P.I. Sekretev promoted the motorization of the Russian army with all possible forces. They were supported by the automotive enthusiast, Minister of War, General of the Cavalry V.A. Sukhomlinov. However, many high-ranking officials of the War Ministry in every possible way prevented the development of motorization of the army, considering the new initiative to be unnecessary and expensive fun, citing the fact that in other European armies no special attention was paid to automobile business. Nevertheless, Russia, which did not have a developed automobile industry, was able by 1914 to motorize its army at a fairly high level, ahead of almost all of Europe in this direction, with the exception of Germany. The decisive role in this undertaking was undoubtedly played by Zhilinsky, Dobryshin and Secretev.
By the beginning of the war, the Training Automobile Company under the leadership of Colonel P.I. Secreteva trained a large number of well-trained military motorists - specialists in various fields. However, the idea of introducing armored vehicles into the army ran into stubborn resistance from the conservative generals of the "old school". However, not a single army in the world before 1914 dared to introduce armored units into its composition, limiting itself only to timid experiments with single vehicles.
And yet, the persistence of enthusiasts of the motorization of the Russian army was not in vain. A few days after the start of the war, on August 17, 1914, Minister of War V.A. Sukhomlinov suggested to the Colonel of the Life Guards of the Jaeger Regiment A.N. Dobrzhansky to form
"armored machine gun battery".
Two days later, Sukhomlinov's resolution was
"the foundation was laid for the existence of armored vehicles and the formation of the 1st machine-gun automobile company"
It was on the very day when Zhilinsky issued the repeatedly mentioned order to take measures to combat enemy armored vehicles! On September 22, 1914, Dobzhansky was appointed its commander. The formation of the company took place in just a month and a half, and it was provided by the Training Author of Colonel Secretev. On October 19, 1914, after a parting prayer on the Semyonovsky parade ground, the company went to the front and entered the operational subordination of the headquarters of the 2nd Army. This is how the first armored car military unit in the world was created! The company received its baptism of fire in the battles near Lodz on November 9-10, 1914 as part of the Lovichsky detachment of Lieutenant General V.A. Slyusarenko.
In the autumn of 1914, the War Department allocated colossal funds for the purchase of armored cars in England and France and their construction on domestic factories. On December 21, 1914, the formation of separate automobile machine-gun platoons began. A great merit in the development of a new kind of troops belonged, undoubtedly, to the above-mentioned motorization enthusiasts of the Russian army, who were supported by the head of the Officers' Rifle School, Major General N.M. Filatov.
It should be recognized that the effect of the insignificant actions of German combat vehicles in East Prussia, not so much tactical as psychological, took place. But not quite the one that the Germans were counting on. The rapid growth of armored vehicles in the Russian army is a confirmation of this. Reports of German armored cars undoubtedly gave an additional impetus to the development of Russian armored business. Probably, precisely in order to convince the conservative circles of the Russian command of the need to introduce armored units into the army, reports of enemy armored cars were deliberately exaggerated. The development by the Russian command of measures to combat enemy armored vehicles also pursued this goal to a certain extent. Thus, the myth about numerous German armored cars in the press, inflated at the suggestion of supporters of the active motorization of the army, can be considered part of the plan to develop a new kind of troops in the Russian Imperial Army.
A typical example of the use of "horror stories" about German armored cars in order to develop a new kind of troops is the report of Bylinsky. In the spring of 1915, staff captain V.R. Bylinsky turned to the headquarters of the 10th Army with a report in which he wrote:
“Engaging in battle with the enemy, well-armed with armored cannon and machine-gun batteries on cars, and not having similar weapons in their army, they immediately carried from their disastrous actions big losses, morally, the losses from the loss of spirit in the troops, conscious of their absolute helplessness, were incalculable […].
The complete absence in the area of the 1st and 10th armies, where I had been in service since the beginning of the campaign, of any armored vehicles, prompted me to form my own design and at my own expense a separate auto-cannon-machine-gun platoon [...] " .
Bylinsky's initiative was supported - he was given two captured Mercedes cars and seconded to Petrograd to the Obukhov plant to build armored cars and form an "unscheduled" machine-gun platoon. Enlisting the support of an influential supporter of the motorization of the army, Major General of the retinue of His Imperial Majesty Prince V.N. Orlov, he soon received a third car - german truck"Lloyd" (Lloyd) issue 1911 August 23, 1915 25th machine gun platoon under the command of Bylinsky was sent to the 5th Army on the Northern Front.
By order of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of June 7, 1916, machine-gun automobile platoons were combined into armored automobile divisions at the rate of one division per army. At the same time, the platoon was renamed into a department. On the Caucasian front, the platoon organization of armored vehicles was retained. On September 1, 1916, 12 linear armored automobile divisions of the Russian army, as well as the Belgian and British armored divisions, operated in Russia; The Spare Armored Division was located in Petrograd. At the beginning of 1917, a division was added to them special purpose. Armored cars are very widespread in the Russian army. Until October 1917, the organization of units, the tactics of combat use and the number of armored vehicles in many ways exceeded the performance of the armies of other countries.
As for the Germans, it was only on October 27, 1914, when the 1st automobile machine-gun company of the Russian Army had already arrived at the front, that the Prussian War Ministry ordered the Transport and Technical Test Commission to develop an action plan for the construction of armored vehicles and the formation of armored units. The Orzhey test commission and the A2 Department (Infantry Department) were also connected to this. On November 3, by joint efforts, requirements for armored vehicles consisting of 16 points were formulated. After their approval by the War Department, the Büssing, Daimler and Erhardt factories placed an order for the manufacture of three armored vehicles. Only a year later, on December 10, 1915, the armored cars were ready and adopted by the German army. Finally, on February 21, 1916, under the General Command of the Guards Corps, the 1st armored machine-gun platoon was formed (on November 16, it was renamed into a squad) and sent to the Western Front as part of the 7th Army. There was only one Daimler armored car in the platoon, the rest of the vehicles still required fine-tuning.
On June 19, 1916, the platoon was fully staffed - the captured Belgian Minerva armored vehicle was added to the three German armored cars. Its organizational structure, as well as all subsequent platoons, practically repeated the structure of those in the Russian army. The experience of the formation and combat use of Russian armored vehicles was also useful to the enemy. However, due to the meager number of armored vehicles, only a platoon organization existed until the end of the war. The Germans had nothing to form companies and divisions from.
German armored car units throughout the war were often transferred from one front to another, where they were mainly engaged in front-line patrols and security. Participation in battles happened only sporadically. Most of all, the German armored vehicles had to "fight" with the technical problems of their vehicles. Often, German armored vehicles were used for propaganda purposes. This was the case on the Eastern Front, where their presence served not least to raise the morale of the German army, which suffered significant damage from the actions of Russian armored cars.
Only by the end of 1917 did the Germans form three more armored machine-gun platoons and concentrate them in the East. But even in this case, their main function remained patrolling and outposts. By the middle of 1918, they had only eleven such platoons, equipped for the most part with captured armored cars. Some of them were used to a limited extent on the territory of Russia, where they suffered their first losses in battles with the Red Army. Two Erhardt armored vehicles (one model M1915, the other model M1917, both from the 1st squad) were captured in 1918 in battles on the Kharkov-Rostov front line. These were the only losses of German armored vehicles during the entire period of the First World War.
Quotations from German sources translated by the author. We used illustrations from the author's archive, as well as those provided by Mikhail Blinov, Maxim Kolomiets, Vadim Rogge and Rainer Strasheim.
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- Here and below: the dates relating to Russia are given according to the Julian calendar, and to Germany - according to the Gregorian.
How to protect a soldier from bullets, fragments and shrapnel? Is it possible to quickly transfer a machine gun or a gun for a couple of tens of kilometers without using horses? As a means of solving these problems, cars began to be used at the beginning of the 20th century. By that time, they had already outgrown the stage of a barely rolling box on wheels. With speed, carrying capacity and cross-country ability, the car was already doing well.
Thus, the military found a mobile base. And so that the servants and the driver did not die, it was decided to cover them with armor sheets. This is how the armored car appeared. Some armored cars of the pre-tank period are described below.
Austro Daimler Panzerwagen
One of the first armored vehicles in history. Designed and assembled in Austria-Hungary in 1905. Its design was ahead of its time, because the designer of the armored car was a representative of the famous dynasty, engineer Paul Daimler.
He embodied a number of features of the device, which later became classic: an all-wheel drive base, a one-piece armored body, a spherical armored turret with a loophole for a 7.7-mm Maxim machine gun (later there were two of them). The thickness of the forehead and sides of the hull was 3.5 mm, the turret was 4 mm. The armor plates were curved, providing the armored car with a streamlined bulletproof shape. Daimler had the right to be proud of his offspring, the matter remained small - a successful demonstration and subsequent purchase for the imperial army.
Cross on promising development put the noise of the engine of an armored car. He scared the horses of several dignitaries present at the trials. Emperor Franz Joseph himself was discouraged and angry. Declaring that such machines have no place in the war, he left Daimler no chance.
"Minerva"
Over Belgium one of the first in 1914 the thunder of the Great War was heard. An officer of the Belgian General Staff, Lieutenant Charles Ankar, went to the front line in his personal car. To protect his life and health, he booked it. The authorities found Ankara's experience promising. Several more Minervas were quickly sheathed with armor plates, armed with 8-mm Hotchkiss machine guns and thrown into battle.
They performed well during the maneuverable period of the First World War, proving to be an unpleasant surprise for the Germans. But with the beginning of the positional war, it became more difficult for the Minerva to act. As a result, the Belgian armored car division was "donated" to Emperor Nicholas II and transferred to the Russian front.
After the end of the First World War, the Minerva was repeatedly modified and continued to be in service in Belgium even in 1935.
Rolls-Royce Armored Car
Today, Rolls-Royce cars are more of a luxury than a means of transportation. Not much is known about the military career of this car: in 1914, he also had a chance to defend himself with armor and arm himself. An example for the British was the Belgian Minerva. The base for the armored car became Rolls-Royce car 40/50 HP Silver Ghost - the famous "Silver Ghost".
It was sheathed with armor plates 8–9 mm thick, placing a fighting compartment at the stern. The tower had a cylindrical shape with beveled walls for greater bullet resistance. An open area was also located there, sufficient in area to transport several soldiers and equipment. The Rolls-Royce was armed with a 7.7 mm Vickers heavy machine gun, and it was driven by an excellent 6-cylinder engine. The first three cars were ready and delivered to Europe in December 1914.
By that time, the war on the continent had already acquired a positional character, in which the functionality of armored cars was limited. Nevertheless, they happened to take part in the battles on the territory of the United Kingdom in 1916, during the Easter Rising in Dublin. The Rolls-Royces operated alongside makeshift armored cars from the steam boilers of the Guinness brewery mounted on three-ton trucks. The last Rolls-Royce armored cars were operated in the UK as early as 1944.
Bussing A5P
As a rule, the way to the theater of operations for the armored cars of the First World War lay through winning the tender. However, there were also exceptions. Faced with the first armored vehicles of the Entente armies in 1914, the Germans undertook to give a symmetrical response to the enemy. The Bussing company lost to competitors, but the prototype made by its engineers nevertheless received a start in life.
Büssing A5P was a fairly large all-wheel drive vehicle. In addition to the symmetrical design with steering both forward and aft, this armored car differed from most others in its ability to deliver dense fire. In the armor of the "Bussing" 10 hatches were provided for machine-gun fire. Moreover, only three machine guns were fixed permanently, with the rest the crew members (10 people) had to move between the loopholes.
All three assembled Büssing A5Ps saw action on the Western Front. When Romania entered the war on the side of the Entente in the fall of 1916, armored cars were sent there. These grotesque creations of the First World War were destined to survive it, and the last Büssing armored car was lost in the Ukrainian steppes during the Russian Civil War.
"Russo-Balt type C"
The first serial Russian armored car was designed and put into production in an amazingly short time. On August 17, 1914, Minister of War V. A. Sukhomlinov gave the green light, and already in mid-October, Emperor Nicholas II wrote in his diary: “ At 11 o'clock. on the Palace Square, I imagined a newly formed automobile company with 47-mm cannons and machine guns with steel shields. She's going on a hike."
Contrary to the saying, the creators of the armored car, although they hurried, did not at all make the enemy laugh - they stunned him. 5 mm chromium-nickel armor reliably protected the front and rear parts of the Russo-Balts, and the 3.5 mm thick sides also took a hit. The secret of resistance was the special arrangement of armor plates at obtuse angles, designed by Colonel A. N. Dobzhansky and engineer Staff Captain A. Ya. Grauen.
The armament of the Russo-Balts was a formidable trio of 7.62-mm Maxim machine guns. At the same time, the need for fire support for larger caliber guns became obvious. Steel-lined trucks with guns were a half-measure, so the Garford became a serial cannon armored car.
"Austin"
Minister of War Sukhomlinov, having given a start to the Russo-Balt type C project, believed to expand car park the army is also due to purchases from the allies in the Entente. In the autumn of 1914, the Austin armored cars of the 1st series, developed in Britain, were ordered, and by the end of the year, they arrived in Russia.
These two-machine-gun horizontally armored fighting vehicles demonstrated unreliable transmission and weak protection. Despite this, in March 1915, a batch of Austins of the 2nd series was purchased.
In November 1915, the commander of the Reserve Armored Company, Captain Khaletsky, made a number of comments on their design. : “a) One side exit from the car; b) a small interior room ...; c) Difficulty in reversing<…>g) lack of space for carrying a spare wheel”. It is difficult to say for sure whether it was nit-picking or justified criticism. In August 1916, the Russian military department ordered another 60 Austin armored cars (3rd series) and the same number of chassis for the assembly and production of cars on their own. By the way, the latter had dual steering - Khaletsky was heard.
"Garford-Putilovets"
The idea of creating a full-fledged heavy cannon armored car was implemented by the head of the Officers' Rifle School, Major General N. M. Filatov. A suitable base for this project was the American Garford five-ton trucks. In December 1914, 33 vehicles of this type arrived in Petrograd. Assembly work began at the Putilov plant in January.
The dimensions of the Garfords allowed the use of thicker armor (6.5 mm, or a quarter of an inch), the sheets of which were located mostly vertically. Given the location of the engine and fuel tanks above the "chauffeur" and the commander of the armored car on the left and right, the reliability of protection was of fundamental importance. Slow but powerful armored cars were armed with a 76-mm anti-assault gun of the 1910 model of the year and three Maxim machine guns.
The assembled vehicles were completed by auto-machine-gun platoons, reinforcing the Austin duet. Each "Garford" was assigned a sonorous given name: "Svyatogor", "Gromoboy", "Beast", "Dragon" ... Armored cars went through the First World War, Civil War and small wars of the 20s-30s.
ABAnsaldo
Italy entered World War I in May 1915 on the side of the Entente. By that time, Joe Ansaldo and Co. had already developed a machine-gun armored car for the army. A 60-horsepower engine allowed him to reach speeds of up to 70 km / h, the body was made of chromium-nickel steel. Arsenal AB (Automobile Blindato) Ansaldo consisted of three machine guns located in a two-level tower. The crew of the armored car consisted of 6 people.
"Ansaldo" participated in the battles on the border with Austria-Hungary, and later in battles with German troops. At the end of January 1916, its creators also sent an official purchase proposal to the Russian Main Artillery Directorate (GAU). The characteristics of the armored car were advertised very figuratively: “... lined with special armor, impenetrable at a distance of 100 meters by a bullet of an Italian rifle of 1891. The motor and wheels are completely protected by shields.. At the same time, the Italians requested drawings of machine guns and all sorts of data on Russian artillery shells, ostensibly for altering the design of an armored car for them.
Ansaldo did not have a chance to fight on the Russian front of the First World War. But these machines were destined for a much more exotic odyssey. After the Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939, they participated in the African Campaign of the Italian Army.
Archer machine gun
In the summer of 1915, the Russian military department was offered to adopt the Archer submachine gun (by the name of the designer, the French engineer J. Archer).
The French praised the armored car very much, and its characteristics were quite good: a four-cylinder engine with a capacity of 16 liters. s., highway speed up to 60 km / h, armor - 7 mm chromium-nickel steel. As the armament of this car, a single machine gun was used, located at the stern.
The creator of the automobile troops of the Russian Empire, Major General P.I. Secretev, immediately got acquainted with this proposal and was categorical: “... The Archer car does not close people from shrapnel fire, its engine is weak for Russian roads, arming it with one machine gun is not enough, moving backward is difficult ... The launch system is complex and not very reliable.”
The material was republished from the worldoftanks.ru portal as part of a partnership.
Sources:
- Documents of the Russian State Military Historical Archive (RGVIA).
- Kirilets S. V., Kaninsky G. G. Georgievich. Automobiles of the Russian Imperial Army. "Automobile Academy" of General Secretev. M., 2010.
- Kolomiets M.V. Armor of the Russian army. Armored cars and armored trains in the First World War. M., 2008.
- Popova S. S. Military misadventures of the Belgians in Russia // Military History Journal. 1996. No. 2, pp. 46–52.
