Due to the long feudal fragmentation, which, as is known, dragged on until the middle of the 19th century, Germany entered the path of industrial development late in comparison with other Western European countries. Even such an industrial area as the Ruhr, at the beginning of the XIX century. was still mainly agricultural, with many handicraft enterprises. After the revolution of 1848, and especially after the unification of Germany, large-scale machine industry began to develop rapidly. On the eve of the First World War, Germany was already among the most industrialized countries.
The largest centers of industry developed in two main areas - the Ruhr (coal mining area), where heavy industry arose with a predominance of military, and in the old industrial region - Central German (Thuringia, Saxony - areas of large deposits of brown coal), where the textile industry, textile mechanical engineering, and later - the chemical industry. In the rest of Germany, industrial enterprises of various branches were concentrated mainly in large cities (Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen, Munich, etc.). In Germany, the role of heavy industry was rapidly growing. On the eve of World War I, Germany was second only to the United States in terms of its growth rate. The concentration of production increased and the process of ousting medium and small enterprises (especially in the coal, metallurgical, electrical, and chemical industries) accelerated. Despite the defeat in the First World War, the German monopolies, mainly with the help of American investments, quickly restored and increased their industrial potential. By the end of the 1920s, Germany again began to crowd out the leading capitalist countries in the markets. The coming to power of fascism and its policy of preparing for war contributed to the still greater growth of heavy industry. During these years, a number of new large enterprises of heavy industry (especially the military-chemical and other branches of the military industry) arose in the strategically more protected areas of the central part of Germany and in the south of the country. However, the Rhine-Westphalian and Upper Rhine-Main industrial regions continued to be the main centers of heavy industry, with the military and military-chemical industries predominating.
On the eve of World War II, almost 11 million people were employed in German industry, a third of them in large enterprises. Heavy industry employed two-thirds of all industrial workers.
The most developed branches of light industry were precision mechanics, textile, optical, food, forestry (including paper), printing, leather and footwear. In the food, clothing, woodworking industries, in the production of metal products, toys, musical instruments, the labor of artisans who worked in workshops or at home was widely used.
The self-employed population in 1939 was distributed among individual sectors of the economy as follows:
Industry and craft 42.1%
Agriculture and forestry... . 26.1%
Trade and transport...... 17.5%
Public service and services. . 10.4%
Home services............. 3.9%
The entire capitalist period of Germany's development is characterized by "a rapidly increasing population shift from the countryside to the city. If in 1871 the rural population was more than 1.5 times the urban population, then by 1939 the urban population was more than twice the rural population. In the period between the world wars (especially after 1933), the number of unproductive sections of the population (officials, military personnel, etc.) increased.
On the eve of World War II, Germany was economically a single entity.
After the defeat of Germany, the great powers decided not to violate the integrity of her economy, and in the first years after the war, economic ties were maintained between the individual parts of the country. However, in 1948, the Western occupation authorities forbade any economic relations with the eastern part of the country.
Industry of the GDR
The eastern regions of Germany, which became part of the GDR, were less industrially developed than the western ones, and suffered more during the war. The GDR had no coal, oil, or iron ore, and produced very little pig iron, which was necessary for the enterprises of the metal-working industry, medium and precision engineering that existed here. In this regard, a whole number of industries had to be re-created in the GDR. The nationalization of large industrial enterprises made it possible to move to a planned economy. As a result of the implementation of the two-year (1949-1951) and five-year (1951-1955) plans, old industrial enterprises were restored and expanded (chemical plants in Leine, Bitterfeld, a car building plant in Bautzen, electrical engineering enterprises in Berlin, machine-building enterprises in Magdeburg, enterprises of the textile industry and textile engineering in the districts of Karl-Marx-Stadt, Gera, etc.). Metallurgical plants were built in Eisenhüttenstadt ("Ost") and Kalbe ("West"), based on raw materials imported from the USSR and other socialist countries. Expanded steel production in Brandenburg. Maritime shipbuilding has been created almost anew in Rostock, Warnemünde, Wismar, and Stralsund. In Weimar, the production of combines was launched, in Nordhausen, Brandenburg and Schönebeck - tractors. The automotive industry is developing successfully in Zwickau and Eisenach. A number of thermal power plants operating on brown coal have been built (in Eisenhüttenstadt, Trattendorf, Fokerode); Europe's largest thermal power plant is being built in Lübbenau and a coking plant in Lauchhammer. At present, the construction of an even larger coking plant in Goyerswerde (“Schwarze pumpe”) is being completed, the first stage of which was put into operation in 1959.
Other branches of the chemical industry are also developing. The optical-mechanical plant "Carl Zeiss" in Jena is world famous.
Light industry also reached a high level, especially textile industry (in the districts of Karl-Marx-Stadt and Gera - the old centers of the textile industry). Currently, half of the processed fiber is artificial - viscose, staple, dederonidre. Cotton, natural silk, jute, part of linen and wool are imported from abroad.
In Leipzig, the capacity of the old enterprises of the printing industry increased, in Gotha - the world-famous cartographic publishing house Justus Pertheo. Significantly developed woodworking and production of high-quality porcelain (Meissen), crystal, musical instruments, toys (Ore Mountains).
In the food industry, sugar (Magdeburg and Halle) and fish (Rostock and Sassnitz) industries stand out.
In 1962, industrial production increased 3.6 times as compared with the production in these areas in 1936. In terms of industrial production, the GDR ranked fifth in Europe and tenth in the world. In terms of the rate of development, the GDR is ahead of the FRG. The main part of production (up to 90%) comes from the socialist sector of the economy. Over the years of its existence, the GDR has become a developed industrial state of the socialist type.
Among the socialist countries, the GDR is one of the largest suppliers of equipment, which goes primarily to the countries of Asia and Africa that have embarked on the path of independent development. Almost half of the GDR's trade (by value) is with the USSR. Trade ties between the GDR and the capitalist countries are also being strengthened. However, trade between the GDR and the FRG is developing insufficiently and with interruptions due to the fault of the ruling circles of the FRG, which prohibit firms from trading with the GDR.
According to the seven-year plan for the development of the economy (1959-1965), coordinated with the national economic plans of other socialist countries, further development of heavy industry and an increase in the material and cultural standard of living of the working people are planned.
During the years of the existence of the GDR, thanks to the rapid development of industry and the mechanization of agriculture, there have been significant changes in the distribution of the population by branches of the economy. So, in 1961, 47% of the economically active population was employed in industry, construction and handicrafts; in agriculture, forestry and water management 17.7%; in transport, trade and communications - 18.4%, while in 1939 for the whole of Germany the number of people employed in industry and crafts was 42.1% of the total active population, and in the regions of the GDR this figure was lower, since they were less industrialized. Every year the distribution of the population employed in industry also changes among districts, in connection with the creation of industry in formerly almost purely agricultural areas.
This level of economic development was achieved only thanks to the heroic efforts of the working people of the GDR and the friendly assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.
Industry of Germany
The main reserves of minerals (coal, iron ore, oil, etc.) and most of Germany's heavy industry enterprises remained within the boundaries of the Federal Republic of Germany. Large financial and industrial capital, which profited from the war and retained its positions in the country's economy despite the Potsdam decisions, succeeded with the help of American, as well as British and French capital, in the shortest possible time to restore, renovate and expand production capacities. At present, the German industry is equipped with the most modern equipment. Already in 1956, the industrial production of the FRG amounted to 213% of the level of industrial production in these regions in 1936, with a strong predominance of heavy industry. In terms of industrial production, the FRG has now taken second place in the capitalist world. It is quite successfully ousting one of its main competitors, England, from world markets. The FRG monopolies are playing an ever greater role in various international monopolist associations € 1957 The FRG is a member of the "common market", which ensures higher profits for the West German monopolists.
Foreign investments play the largest role in the oil refining, automotive and coal industries. At the same time, since 1952, the FRG itself resumed the export of capital. The power of the country's largest banking monopolies - the German, Dresden and Commercial banks - has increased significantly.
In the post-war period, the concentration of production continues in the old industrial regions (Rhine-Westphalian, where more than a third of all industrial production is concentrated, and the Upper Rhine-Main), while at the same time, production is curtailing in areas bordering the GDR and Czechoslovakia.
The main branches of heavy industry in Germany are mechanical engineering, which provides about a quarter of the entire industrial output of the country, metallurgical, coal, chemical, and electrical engineering. The military industry is developing again (including the aircraft industry and the construction of military ships). It would not be an exaggeration to say that from its very first steps the development of large-scale industry in Germany until 1945 and then in the FRG proceeded under the banner of militarism.
Of the branches of light industry, the textile industry (the Rhine-Westphalian region and the southern part of Germany) plays the most important role, as well as clothing, woodworking, paper, glass, porcelain, footwear, and food.
The competition of imported American goods, especially during the period of the Marshall Plan, the lack of funds and government attention to consumer industries led to the closure of many light industries, especially small enterprises and craft shops.
Changes in the structure of the population are closely connected with all the processes taking place in modern industry in the FRG (concentration of production, an increase in industrial capacity in some areas and underutilization in others). There is an active erosion of the middle stratum of the population and its replenishment of the ranks of the working class.
As you know, after the Second World War, the eastern and western lands of the former united Germany became two different states. – the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. That is why the political, social and economic life in these two countries from 1949 to October 1990 was markedly different. If the inhabitants of the FRG somehow came to their senses and restored everything that was lost due to the war, then the East Germans, under the strict guidance of their "senior comrades", in addition, built their own version of developed socialism.
Of course, with its own auto industry, which was an important component of engineering in particular and industry in general.
VEB Sachsenring Automobilwerke (Trabant)
After the capitulation of Nazi Germany, the city of Zwickau ended up in the zone of Soviet occupation. – the automotive "heart" of the Reich, in which the Audi-Horch factories worked and the headquarters of the Auto Union concern, which included these brands.
Both plants were transferred to the ownership of the new state and transformed into the People's Enterprise. By the way, the "socialist" form of government VEB (German: Volkseigener Betrieb – "People's enterprise") was characteristic of the vast majority of industrial enterprises and production associations of the GDR. Since the famous Sachsenring race track was located not far from Zwickau, the plant was named like that. – Sachsenring Automobilwerke.
The first car of the new enterprise was the pre-war subcompact DKW F8, which became known as the IFA F8. A cheap and clearly outdated machine began to be produced under the "folk" brand IFA (Industrieverband Fahrzeugbau – association of vehicle manufacturers) for a reason - post-war Germany found itself in a difficult economic situation, so both East and West Germans could afford only the most affordable (and primitive) cars. In the future, the model has undergone a slight modernization and received the IFA F9 index.
In the next model of the plant AWZ P 70 Zwickau, due to the banal lack of steel sheet, an interesting material was used - duroplast. The combination of a base in the form of phenol-formaldehyde resin and a filler (cotton waste) provided this unusual material with the possibility of stamping in a press production, by analogy with conventional metal body parts. Thanks to this, the duroplast body was very technologically advanced, in contrast to the artisanal technology of "home-made" using fiberglass.
However, the progressive body was combined with an outdated chassis even by the standards of the fifties, which forced the designers to develop a new "platform", as they would now say. As a power unit, a two-stroke (!) Air-cooled two-cylinder engine, which is very unusual by modern standards, was used - frankly, not an automotive concept. A tiny 500-cc heart gave out as much as 18 hp. - ridiculous by today's standards, but quite enough for a leisurely movement in the space of a poor post-war Europe. In addition, the P50 was a progressive car in its own way, because it had a front-wheel drive (!) layout with a transverse power unit. It was this car that received the famous name Trabant (German - "satellite") - just at that time an artificial Earth satellite was launched in the USSR.
Subsequently, the P50 / 600 replaced the next (and last) Trabant on the conveyor - the legendary P601 model. Due to its simplicity, unpretentiousness, reliability and extremely low price, this funny little car was in phenomenal demand both in the CMEA countries (Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia), and in many capitalist ones! Well, in the GDR itself, the queue for the coveted “trabi” stretched out for fifteen years of endless waiting time ... Interestingly, on average, one Trabant P601 served for almost three (!) Decades.
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In 1988, when the regimes in the USSR and the GDR began to “breathe in their last breath”, the production of the Trabant 1.1 modification with an internal combustion engine of “human design” was launched – forty-horsepower four-stroke gasoline engine from VW Polo. Well, even before the unification of Germany, Volkswagen acquired a plant in Zwickau in 1989, so in 1991 the veteran model was discontinued. However, in 1995, the Sashsenring plant even signed a protocol of intent to produce "trabi" with ... Uzbekistan! Alas, these plans were not destined to come true. – the plant in Zwickau became one of the enterprises for the assembly and production of various models of the VAG concern. Well, the Uzbeks eventually began to collect another German bestseller - Opel Kadett, better known as Daewoo Nexia.
Sashsenring currently produces bodies for VW on a daily basis, but out of 11,000 employees, only 1,500 remain at the plant. The company also creates components and assemblies for other automotive companies - for example, Daimler and GM. Volkswagen cars themselves are produced next door at another plant in Zwickau-Mosel.
VEB Automobilwerk Eisenach (Wartburg)
The factory in Eisenach can be considered one of the oldest: Fahrzeugefabrik Eisenach AG was founded at the end of 1896. For such a long period, this company produced cars of the Dixi, BMW and Wartburg brands. The plant was founded by a large industrialist and "uncrowned ruler of Thuringia" Heinrich Erhard. In 1898, he purchased a completed car license from the French company Société des Voitures Automobiles Decauville.
Until 1899, the Eisenach factory produced bicycles, steam boilers and parts for artillery guns. However, at the very end of the 19th century, the automobile page of the enterprise was opened. – the plant began producing the same licensed car, called the Wartburg. It is directly related to the area in which the plant is located, since that was the name of the mountain and the castle on it, which were located in the vicinity of Eisenach. The castle gained fame also because it was here that the German reformer Martin Luther was hiding from the Inquisition.
In 1904, there was, as they say now, a rebranding – the cars received the new Dixi brand. When the BMW concern acquired it, it was in Eisenach that they began to produce cars of this famous brand with a white and blue emblem.
Since the lands of Thuringia belonged to the zone of Soviet occupation after the Second World War, the company continued to produce BMW models 326 and 321, as well as the R-35 motorcycle. However, in 1951, by decision of the Düsseldorf court, the colors on the emblem were replaced with white and red, the plant was renamed VEB Automobilwerk Eisenach, and the cars themselves received a new name. – EMW stands for Eisenacher Motoren Werk (Eisenach Motor Works).
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After the merger of the company with the former DKW plant in Chemnitz, the brand of cars was changed again – now at Automobilwerk Eisenach (AWE). However, by 1955, Wartburg acquired a "historical-geographical" name for the second time, and even the silhouette of the castle appeared on the emblem.
The most famous and "long-playing" plant model in Eisenach was the Wartburg 353 – front-wheel drive four-door sedan with a two-stroke engine. There was also a version with a five-door station wagon body.
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The model was constantly “softly” improved, and in 1988 the outdated “two-stroke” was finally replaced by a “full-fledged” four-stroke Volkswagen 1.3-liter gasoline engine. At the same time as the technical part of the Wartburg was updated, it was slightly modernized, but after the unification of East and West Germany, the production of Wartburg was stopped, and the plant itself was declared bankrupt in 1991 and closed.
However, the building of the "oriental dining room" today houses the city's automotive museum (Automobilbau Museum Eisenach), which exhibits exhibits from Dixi to the last released Wartburg. And the automotive history of the city itself has not ended: just two days after the unification of Germany, the first Opel Vectra was produced in Eisenach. Today, Opel Eisenach GmbH is one of the most modern automotive companies in Europe, and the plant has 2,000 employees working in three shifts, assembling various models of Opel.
VEB Barkas-Werke (Barkas)
In 1961, on the basis of the Framo plant in Karl-Marx-Stadt (until 1953 and since 1990 – Chemnitz), the production of minibuses and delivery vans of the Barkas brand was created.
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By the standards of the 50s of the twentieth century, the design of the minibus was very progressive: a wagon layout, a load-bearing body made of metal, a torsion bar suspension and front-wheel drive. However, a two-stroke three-cylinder engine from the same Wartburg was used as a mover. Engine power at first was simply ridiculous for a car with a carrying capacity of 1 t – it was only 28 hp, but after a couple of upgrades by the beginning of the seventies it had grown to 45 hp.
Like the rest of the GDR cars, at the end of the 80s Barkas received a new (four-stroke and diesel!) "heart" of the Volkswagen brand, but after the reunification of Germany, the outdated minibus was out of work, and in April 1991 the production of Barkas was stopped, and the plant itself went bankrupt.
The fate of the equipment is interesting: in 1993 it was dismantled and prepared for shipment to Russia, since it was planned to create a plant for the production of minibuses near St. Petersburg. However, the Russian side turned out to be insufficiently solvent and was unable to purchase equipment for foreign currency. For this reason, instead of the distant Leningrad region, machine tools, dies and presses went to scrap metal. Now, on the site of Barkas-Werke in Chemnitz, there is a Volkswagen plant for the manufacture and assembly of engines for the concern's cars.
VEB Robur-Werke Zittau (Robur)
In 1946, the Phänomen enterprise in Zittau, nationalized by the state, was renamed VEB Kraftfahrzeugwerk Phänomen Zittau, and then in 1957 VEB Robur-Werke Zittau. It produced the Robur truck, quite famous in the countries of the socialist camp, with a carrying capacity of 2.5 tons. There were versions with both a gasoline engine and a diesel engine.
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By the mid-seventies, even the upgraded Robur with a payload increased to 3 tons was frankly outdated, but for a number of reasons the company was only able to master the next upgrade. Interestingly, there were many special vehicles based on Robur – firefighters, medical, military, vans with an isothermal body, etc. In the first half of the eighties, the plant's products even began to be delivered quite massively to the USSR.
The unification of Germany put an end to the prospects of the plant, which produces hopelessly outdated trucks and vans. Despite attempts to produce a more competitive and modern model LD3004, in 1995 the company was bought out by the Daimler-Benz concern, after which the production of Roburs was stopped, and the plant switched to the production of automotive parts.
- - to the Daimler-Benz concern. Despite timid attempts to modernize the truck and revive its former popularity, already in the mid-nineties the company completely switched to the production of only concern cars.multicar
Tiny funny-looking trucks are well known to almost everyone who was born and raised in the USSR: several thousand (!) Multicar-24 and Multicar-25 worked on the territory of 1/6 of the land.
The mechanical workshop of Arthur Ade was originally founded in Waltershausen in 1920 and was engaged in the production of agricultural machinery and special equipment. Since after the Second World War the city was in the zone of Soviet occupation, it was nationalized and became the People's Enterprise (VEB). The plant began to produce compact trucks from the early fifties, and in 1958 the car acquired its own name Multicar. In the future, the model was constantly improved.
It is interesting that Multicar is, perhaps, the only surviving automaker of the GDR, which not only did not stop its activities, but also continued to actively develop in a market economy. At the end of the nineties, the main founder was the company "Hako-Gruppe", which received a controlling stake in "Multicar Spezialfahrzeuge GmbH". Today, small Multicar trucks sell well in Germany and even serve in the Bundeswehr.
Today's post is dedicated to the museum, which, in my opinion, is the most interesting Dresden museum, despite the fact that even many Dresdeners do not know about its existence, and tourists are a rarity here. The reason for this is simple - the museum is located 10 kilometers from the city center and is not advertised at all in crowded places. But this museum is the largest and most interesting in Germany among the museums dedicated to the German Democratic Republic. About 40,000 exhibits of a state that has sunk into oblivion are collected on four floors, including 140 vehicles manufactured in the GDR. I am sure, after my posts from this place, many will include this museum in the list of places recommended for visiting. Personally, I have been here twice and I am sure that these were not my last visits. Well, for those who lived in the GDR, the museum is strongly recommended to visit.
The report from the museum will be in three parts, today the first.
01. Despite the fact that the museum is located ten kilometers from the city center, it is very easy to get here even with the help of public transport - the fourth tram goes here from the center, the stop of which is located directly opposite the entrance to the museum. The museum exposition is located in a typical GDR building from the 70s, which previously housed the VEB Kraftwerksanlagenbau.
02. Near the entrance to the museum, a Wartburg 311, produced in the GDR from 1955 to 1965, is exhibited.
03. In the lobby, guests are greeted by a half of a trabant - the car symbol of the GDR.
04. The museum ticket office is made in the form of a cab "Pike" - the famous Dresden tram.
Passing the ticket office, visitors take the elevator straight to the fourth floor and begin to view the museum from top to bottom. The exposition on the fourth floor is dedicated to the state institutions of the GDR, from schools to the post office and the army.
05. The first thing a visitor sees when leaving the elevator is a miniature of a Dresden street from the 1960s of the last century.
06. From this miniature, I learned, not without surprise, that there was a trolleybus in Dresden, which existed from 1947 to 1975.
07. Behind this miniature is a much larger model of Dresden streets and city objects.
08. On both of my visits there was no access here, the world of miniatures could only be viewed through the window.
09. A modeller was making something in the corner. Apparently, this part of the museum is available to visitors only on certain days.
11. Badges, medals, insignia.
12. In the next room is a school class.
13. A lot of school artifacts have been collected here.
14. Textbooks. A person who studied at the GDR school has something to shed a tear of nostalgia in this room.
15. Sheet for the schedule of lessons with greetings from the soldiers of the People's Army.
16. Bust of the leader next to the internal combustion engine.
17. And this is the next room with the post office. In the photo, the periodical of the GDR.
18. A computer on a postal worker's desk, made at the Dresden-based Robotron plant.
19. I also have a pennant with the symbol of Soviet-German friendship at home, as on the pennant on the right.
20. Political map of Germany.
21. But the contents of this showcase caused me an attack of nostalgia. After all, in my childhood I also had a PIKO railway with exactly the same locomotive and the same passenger cars, only their colors were red and white.
22. I also had the same steam locomotive with a tender, although it did not work for long, because I became interested in what it drives, and I slightly gutted its insides to understand the principle of operation. I didn’t understand the principle, but I couldn’t assemble it back, since then the trains had to be moved manually.
23. More boxes from PIKO toy trains.
24. Sugar cubes for German airlines Interflug. I remember that there was similar sugar in post-Soviet trains, maybe it still is, I haven’t ridden them for a hundred years.
25. I go down to the third floor. This floor is more interesting, its themes cover such areas as life, recreation, sports and culture in the GDR.
26. In one of the first rooms on the third floor, visitors are greeted by a GDR furniture wall with a home library typical of that time.
27. Engineer's office.
28. Design Bureau 1980s. The fall of the Berlin Wall is shown on TV.
29. Drawing board with drawings of panel high-rise buildings.
30. Several historical photographs. This image shows the center of Dresden in the 1960s. Almost all the buildings shown in the photo are still in their places. Even a luminous sign on the facade of the building with a picture of a glass has been preserved.
31. And this is a photograph of the area of panel high-rise buildings Marzahn, in Berlin. The area is currently famous for the fact that many immigrants from the post-Soviet space live in it, some of whom never leave the area, since it has everything necessary for life and knowledge of the German language is absolutely not required here.
32. The topic of the next exposition is "Rest", everything is very clear here.
33. Exhibition "Sport".
35. More musical equipment.
36. Cameras. There are just a huge number of them here.
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38. Video cameras.
39. Filmoscopes. As a child, I also had a similar device, only Soviet-made.
40. The corridors of the museum floors are decorated with historical photographs and artifacts from the GDR.
41. Corner modeler-designer.
42. Various devices for playing music, from turntables and old radios to tape recorders of the 1980s.
43. The exposition is impressive! Given the poor assortment of a socialist country, I believe that most of the devices for playing music released in the GDR over the years of its existence are collected here.
44. I am sure that here every resident of the GDR will be able to find something on which he listened to music from the time of his childhood until the early 1990s.
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47. Reel tape recorder. I still found the time of these hulks. When we lived in the GDR, we also had a similar device. It weighed as if it had been cast iron, but on the other hand, four hours of music could be recorded on a reel.
48. TV room, there is also a wide range from the very first GDR TV sets ...
49. ... and up to the latest models of the 1980s.
51. Warm lamp things of the distant past.
52. Pre-war Dresden is shown on TV.
53. Another room. Thanks to the soft light of nightlights, a very cozy atmosphere is created here. You can easily imagine yourself in the 1960s.
54. The most beautiful thing about these rooms is that they are not fenced off from visitors. Everywhere you can walk and look at the numerous details, carefully selected by museum workers. Bliss!
55. From these pictures you will never guess that they were taken in a museum, the expositions are so high quality and detailed.
56. Feeling as if you are in the most ordinary GDR apartment, only the owners have gone out somewhere. The effect of traveling back in time is amazing, and the museum is called the Zeitreise for a reason.
57. A Weltfunk radio made in Leipzig in 1952.
58. Another room, this is already the 1970s.
59. Black TV from the 1990s does not quite fit into the general surroundings.
60. During my first visit to the museum, this room had a slightly different, more authentic look.
61. Something relevant to the era is broadcast on TV.
63. Sewing.
64. Other household items.
65. Refrigerators, electric stoves, vacuum cleaners.
66. To the left of the photo is the Belarusian refrigerator Minsk 16, to the right of it are the products of the Saxon enterprise VEB DKK Scharfenstein - refrigerators Kristall 140 (bottom) and DKK 71 (top).
67. Washbasins and hygiene items.
68. Familiar box - our family also had the same hair dryer, which we brought from the GDR in 1990.
69. And in my GDR childhood, I had exactly the same glamorous pink pot.
70. We move to the next room - something is being celebrated here.
71. The amount of detail is impressive! It is thanks to such a study of expositions that it is interesting to come to the museum again - each time you notice a lot of things that did not come into view during the last visit.
72. There are so many different radios here that would be enough to create a separate museum of old radios.
73. And this is a more modern furniture wall from the 1980s. Such furniture is still in most households in the post-Soviet space. As I walked through the museum, I never ceased to be amazed at how much the people of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union had in common in the past. No wonder I get along so well with the East Germans - after all, we grew up in similar scenery among the same things, furniture and panel high-rise buildings.
74. Kitchen corner.
75. Press for making cookies from the company "Robotron". Curious device.
77. Another favorite subject of my GDR childhood is Trink fix drink. How I loved to eat it with a spoon! This sweet cocoa powder, when ingested, was wetted by saliva and turned into chocolate. As a child, I ate more of this powder than I drank a drink made from it. And then he kept his childhood treasures in these jars.
78. Another kitchen. Here, spiritual gatherings are planned.
79. GDR still life.
80. A carpet depicting a higher school for officers of the ground forces (Offiziershochschule der Landstreitkräfte Ernst Thälmann), located in Zittau and occupying a whole area on the outskirts of the city. After the school was disbanded, they began to resemble the streets of Pripyat. On the carpet you can recognize the silhouette of the canteen of the officer school, about which I also had a separate one.
This concludes the first part of the story about this amazing museum.
Read about what else was interesting on the third floor of the museum and what pleased the exposition on the second floor, which was dedicated to the theme of the socialist economy in the GDR, work and working conditions.
This country was a part of my childhood: ingenious designers for children, rubber figurines of Indians and of course a toy railway, which was assembled with concentration, with the same diligence and passion, and then both children and adults launched trains along it.
As for adults, for many of them this country was a longed-for dream: they wanted to work, serve and just live there. Beautiful high-quality things were brought from there, ranging from consumer goods to household appliances, vivid memories for life and nostalgia.
Nostalgia not only about the quality of "there" life, but also about the exemplary order, cleanliness, attitude to work.
I remember all this from my childhood and youth.
And the name of this wonderful country is the German Democratic Republic. GDR.
Anti-communists have long since gotten their hands on criticism of the USSR. But they rarely remember the GDR, or they don’t remember at all. And apparently not by accident.
Just as Hitler’s coming to power in this country, whose capital, Berlin, was considered a stronghold of the “Reds” at the end of the twenties of the last century, was not accidental: Germany, like no other country in the world, was ready to build a new society on the principles of socialism.
Socialism in this country was killed twice: The first time, when the West, together with the German bourgeoisie, opened the way to power for Hitler. The second time, when the Gorbachev elite betrayed the GDR.
About what kind of socialism was lost along with the death of the GDR in the publication of N.N. Platoshkin "Economic competition between the GDR and the FRG in the 50s: did socialism have a chance?" with a link to a source on the Internet.
It makes no sense to retell this brilliant, in my opinion, article. It's best to read it from beginning to end. Therefore, I present it here in full.
Based on the facts presented in this publication, the history of the fierce struggle between the two systems of socialism and capitalism does not look as simple as the opponents of socialism are trying to present to us. Even more ambiguous are the results of this struggle.
Capitalism won, but did it prove its advantages? And how clean was this victory?
These and many other questions inevitably arise not only after reading this publication, but especially if we compare the results of socialist construction in the GDR with the results of the reunification of western and eastern Germany.
Where is the famous chemical industry of the GDR now, where are its no less world-famous enterprises for the production of measuring instruments, why did millions of former citizens of the GDR find themselves out of work?
Let the citizens of Germany find out from their government where hundreds of millions of marks went and go, and now the euro from the taxes of the citizens of this country intended for "integration".
And in the end, if the German economy is so efficient, then why, for almost twenty-five years, has it not been able to achieve in the east of its country at least the same results that were achieved in the GDR under socialism in the conditions of post-war devastation and the almost complete absence of any -any resources?
Or the winners are not judged?
Economic competition between the GDR and the FRG in the 1950s: did socialism have a chance?
Platoshkin N.N.
1. Task: to catch up and overtake Germany
As is known, after N.S. Khrushchev (in reality, this period seems to begin from 1958, when Khrushchev concentrated the sole leadership of the country in his hands), the Soviet Union set itself the task of catching up and overtaking the United States in the shortest possible time in the production and consumption of basic industrial and agricultural goods.
This task was by no means voluntaristic, given that after 1925 (with the exception of the period of the Great Patriotic War) the economy of the USSR developed much faster than the economy of the United States. If in 1913 Russia smelted 7 times less steel than the USA (4.8 against 31.8 million tons), then already in 1938 this gap was sharply reduced (18 million against 28.8 million tons). This indicator is given here because it was steel smelting that was considered in the first half of the 20th century the main indicator of the country's industrial development. By 1941, the USSR already produced 10% of world industrial output, i.e. more in relative terms than modern Russia produces. In the 1950s, the average annual growth rate of the Soviet economy was twice that of the United States. Despite contemporary ridicule of Khrushchev about corn, Soviet agriculture grew at more than 7% a year from 1954-1959. This figure is still unsurpassed in national history.
Thus, Khrushchev's goal at that time seemed quite achievable (especially after the launch of the first satellite in 1957, which caused a shock in the United States). However, in both camps of the Cold War, many believed that the real competition between socialism and capitalism should unfold in the territory of a divided Germany. After all, if Russia has always seriously lagged behind the United States in all economic indicators, then the GDR and the FRG until 1945 constituted a single state and thus had equal starting conditions. Therefore, any economic successes and failures of these countries could be attributed precisely to the advantages or disadvantages of socialism (in the case of the GDR) or capitalism (in the case of the FRG). Moreover, the FRG in the 1950s had the highest rates of economic growth in the capitalist world.
In July 1958, the Fifth Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED; the ruling communist party of the GDR), under the influence of Khrushchev, set the task of surpassing the FRG in per capita consumption of basic industrial and food products by the mid-60s.
The question arises: did the GDR in 1958 have the economic preconditions for actually overtaking the FRG? To answer this question, it is necessary to analyze the main points of the socio-economic development of East Germany in the second half of the 50s, which were most closely connected with the very difficult international situation of that time.
2. Economic miracle: the GDR version
Considering the almost complete absence of foreign currency loans (the USSR provided them, but, of course, not in such volumes as the United States of Germany under the Marshall Plan), the high degree of destruction of industrial capacities as a result of the war, the burden of reparations (the FRG practically did not pay them) and expenses for the maintenance of Soviet troops (they were limited to 5% of the annual budget of the GDR only after 1953), the economic achievements of the GDR in the 50s can be called phenomenal. If the FRG (and its growth rates were many times higher than those of Great Britain and France) increased from 1950 to 1958. industrial output by 210%, then the GDR - by 241%. The average annual increase in industrial production in the GDR in 1950-58. was 10%, and in Germany - 8.5%. In 1957, the GDR overtook the FRG in terms of industrial growth in comparison with 1936. If we take the level of this year as 100%, then in 1957 the industrial potential of the GDR increased 2.4 times, and the FRG - 2.26 times . Moreover, the starting positions of both countries in 1950 were approximately the same: the GDR - 110.6% of the 1936 level, the FRG - 110.9%. Especially obvious was the increase in the pace of development of East Germany in comparison with West in the second half of the 50s. As early as 1956, industrial growth in the FRG was 7.9%, and in the GDR, 6.3%. But the very next year, the GDR broke into the lead - 7.4% against 5.7% in the FRG (and back in 1955, West Germany "gave up" an indicator unprecedented in the history of post-war capitalism - 15%!). In 1958, things were even sadder for the FRG: the industry of the GDR grew by 10.9%, while that of West Germany grew by only 3.1%.
However, these undeniably impressive figures concealed serious structural problems in the GDR economy.
After the division of Germany in its eastern part, enterprises of precision and heavy engineering, as well as the chemical industry, remained. However, with the loss of the Ruhr and the Silesian coal basin (Silesia became part of Poland in 1945), the industry of the GDR was deprived of ferrous metals and coal. On the territory of the GDR, only 2.3% of coal, 5.1% of iron ore, and 0.02% of the oil of all Germany were mined. Therefore, in the early 1950s, with a huge lack of financial resources, the GDR had to build its own metallurgical enterprises. This was not at all megalomania imposed from Moscow, as some historians believe, but a vital necessity in the conditions of the actual trade war between the West and the GDR.
However, by developing heavy industry and contriving to avoid inflation and a state budget deficit, the government of the GDR had to seriously limit the growth in the production of consumer goods. The unrest of the population in June 1953 was largely due to interruptions in the supply of certain products, as well as high prices in state trade for meat, butter, fabrics, clothing, leather shoes and utensils.
After 1953, the government of the GDR made a massive redistribution of investments from heavy industry in favor of industries that directly satisfied the needs of the population. The Soviet Union provided great assistance with food supplies, foreign currency loans, the abolition of reparations from January 1, 1954, and a reduction in the share of the GDR in financing Soviet troops on its territory.
However, the new direction of the state's investment policy made it impossible to radically re-equip the fixed assets of the fairly outdated industry of East Germany. Most of its enterprises remained at the technological level of 1939, while in the FRG the equipment in the industry (already much less affected by the war than the industry of the GDR) was updated twice after 1945.
In general, by the end of the 1950s, the economy of the GDR functioned as follows. First, it was necessary to obtain coke, iron ore and finished metal from abroad (their metallurgical enterprises still did not fully satisfy the needs of the economy) and to produce machine-building products from these raw materials and semi-finished products. Then it had to be sold in order to buy food (Germany had always been a food importer even before the war) and consumer goods. Accordingly, the GDR was very dependent (as, indeed, any industrial state to this day) on the exact fulfillment of obligations by its foreign economic partners. In the absence of foreign large-scale assistance, the GDR had to sell abroad equipment that it really needed for the urgent rearmament of its industry.
Of course, the Soviet Union supplied the GDR with rolled ferrous metals, coke and other raw materials. In 1957 alone, 928,000 tons of metallurgical coke, 1 million tons of oil, 652,000 tons of rolled steel and pipes, and 365,000 tons of apatite concentrate came from the USSR. But destroyed during the war years and rapidly developing in the 50s, the national economy of the USSR itself every year demanded more and more metal and coal. Attempts by the USSR and the GDR to induce Poland and Czechoslovakia to send more coke to the GDR were not always successful. The leadership of these countries preferred to either hold onto this scarce raw material or sell it for freely convertible currency. Under these conditions, the GDR, in turn, could not ship to the socialist countries, including the USSR, goods agreed in advance, primarily equipment, since there was nothing to produce it from.
3. Germany "holds" a competitor
In 1957, one very unpleasant thing for the GDR and the USSR became clear: East Germany was still very dependent on trade with the FRG, and the latter periodically demonstrated this clearly. The foreign trade turnover of the GDR in 1957 amounted to 13.7 billion rubles, with the socialist countries accounting for 73.5% and the FRG only 11.3%. But the volume of intra-German trade in the second half of the 1950s steadily increased, amounting to 1.6 billion rubles in 1958 (compared with 1 billion in 1955). West Germany supplied the GDR with coal, coke, rolled products and raw leather (for the production of shoes), and received lignite briquettes from the GDR (there was a lot of lignite coal, although of very low quality, in the GDR, but it was also the only one of the country's minerals), motor gasoline , paper, diesel fuel.
The moment of truth for the GDR came at the beginning of 1957, when, under the pretext of East Germany's increased debt in mutual trade (85 million rubles as of January 1, 1957), the West German authorities stopped deliveries of rolled ferrous metals to the GDR. As a result, many branches of industry in the GDR were unable to fulfill their planned targets. Thus, according to the results of the year, heavy engineering - the backbone of the GDR economy - produced only 98.2% of the plan. The plan for the production of electricity was not fulfilled either (there was not enough metal to replace worn-out equipment at some power plants), steel, rolled products, etc.
On the whole, the trade boycott of the FRG led in the first half of 1957 to a 16% reduction in coke production in the GDR. The blast furnaces at the country's largest metallurgical plant named after Stalin were commissioned. Only thanks to the emergency assistance of the USSR was it possible to save the industry of the GDR from a serious crisis.
All the above-described structural imbalances in the industry of the GDR were caused by two factors:
A sharp reduction, since 1953, of investments in the heavy and chemical industries, as well as in the electric power industry;
The absence of large-scale external borrowings, due to which the industry of the FRG was completely re-equipped after the start of the war in Korea.
Of course, initially the redistribution of funds in favor of the light and food industries was justified, but in the specific conditions of the industrially developed GDR, it dragged on too long. The country still objectively could not feed and clothe itself at the expense of internal resources. Consequently, it was necessary to increase exports, and the main export commodities of East Germany have always been industrial equipment and products of the chemical industry. But since these industries did not receive sufficient funds, their products became morally obsolete and every day became less and less competitive in the West. Accordingly, foreign exchange earnings were reduced, which could be used to purchase products and high-quality consumer goods. But some of them (for example, coffee and chocolate, traditional for consumption in Germany), even if they wanted to, could not be supplied by the Soviet Union. It turned out that the West Germans by the mid-50s were already getting a taste of the so-called. southern fruits (i.e. bananas, pineapples, etc.), while there was still not enough good coffee for the inhabitants of the GDR. Moreover, it is very interesting that these problems were well understood in the USSR, although it might seem to many there that the East Germans were "mad with fat." But if the Soviet workers and peasants in the 50s were unpretentious in the choice of consumer goods, and the absence of certain things was not perceived by them as hardships and hardships, then the Germans traditionally had a higher culture of consumption, and the absence of coffee was very sensitive for them. In addition, the GDR had before it the example of the FRG, and the survival of the German workers' and peasants' state really depended on whether it could provide its citizens with at least a standard of living comparable to that of the FRG.
From year to year, the GDR was forced to import (mainly from the USSR) a significant part of the food consumed in the country. 25% of grain, 11% of meat, 7% of butter and 8% of eggs were bought abroad. However, even before the war, Germany could not fully provide itself with food (this situation in Germany continues to this day).
4. GDR closes the gap
On the whole, it should be noted that under the most difficult conditions for it in the 1950s, the GDR achieved brilliant success in raising the living standards of the population. Meat consumption per capita more than doubled in 1957 compared to 1930 (from 22.1 to 45.4 kg), butter from 4.3 to 10.6 kg, eggs from 62 to 160 things. The situation was worse with industrial goods, especially with cotton fabrics and leather shoes, since the GDR depended here on imported raw materials. If in 1950 there were 0.34 pairs of shoes for every inhabitant of the GDR, then in 1957 - 0.97. There was an increase of more than three times, but the level of consumption still remained low. Each East German consumed 9 m2 of tissues in 1950, and 15 m2 in 1957. Per capita, an East German consumed about the same amount of meat, fats and sugar as a West German. Only for milk (86.6 liters against 118 in the FRG) and eggs (160 pieces against 172) per capita consumption in the FRG was slightly higher.
By 1958, the population of the GDR "ate" and the structure of consumption of basic products began to change. People began to eat less bread, sugar and margarine, more vegetables, fish, meat and delicacies.
In the GDR at the end of the 1950s, real wages grew at a significant pace, and the population's deposits in savings banks increased rapidly (from 1,275 million marks in 1950 to 8,562 million in 1957).
5. Abolition of the card system in the GDR
The state, sensing the changed structure of demand, decided to abolish cards for supplying the population with basic industrial and food products, which had actually existed in eastern Germany from the very beginning of World War II. The USSR provided a solid foreign currency loan of 340 million rubles to ensure this event and increased the export of grain, meat and fats to the GDR. The card system of the GDR, in comparison, for example, with a similar distribution mechanism in the USSR, had its own characteristics. First of all, the inhabitants of the GDR were supplied according to high standards. Per capita, an East German consumed about the same amount of meat, fat, and sugar on ration cards as a West German (without ration cards). In addition, the prices for rationed products (so-called ration prices) were very low. Meat cost 2.45-3 marks per kilogram, butter - 4.12 marks, sugar - 1.09 marks, milk - 0.27 marks (per litre). In Germany, the price of these products were much higher. The prices for bread were also low in the GDR (0.5 marks per kg, against 0.8 in the FRG) and potatoes, which were sold to the population without cards.
By 1958, 65% of meat, 77% of butter, 94% of sugar, 68% of milk and 16% of eggs were sold on cards. In addition, citizens of the GDR could purchase the same goods in public and private stores at commercial prices, which, however, were much higher than rations. So, butter cost 11.95 marks per kilogram, sugar - 2.90, milk - 1.2, eggs (piece) - 0.45. 203 thousand tons of meat, 36 thousand tons of butter and 17 thousand tons of sugar were sold through commercial trade.
The meaning of the abolition of the card system was to establish new products, the so-called, on the products that were previously sold on cards. uniform prices, which were higher than rations, but lower than commercial ones. In particular, the price of meat increased sharply - up to 6.71 marks per kg (in the FRG - 5 marks) and milk (up to 0.43 marks per liter, in the FRG - 0.83 marks). For eggs and butter, prices were 2.7 times higher than rations. The total increase in prices amounted to 2.8 billion marks, from which the reduction in commercial prices - 1.4 billion marks had to be deducted.
In order to compensate for the rise in prices, the government of the GDR reduced the prices of those food products for which there was the most noticeable gap with the FRG in per capita consumption: cocoa, chocolate, cheese, rice, spices and some types of confectionery. The prices for some manufactured goods (ladies' perlon stockings, children's outerwear, etc.) were also reduced by 15-20%. On the whole, however, the reduction in prices was expressed by a not very large figure - 190 million marks.
Therefore, workers and employees were paid special compensations (14 marks per month), which fully corresponded to the rise in the price of the average family food allowance. Lost from the reform were the inhabitants of the capital of the GDR, Berlin, who (with an eye on West Berlin) were supplied by cards at special, higher standards.
In total, the government of the GDR spent 3 billion marks on compensation (they covered 80% of the population). Part of the funds (about 500 million) was supposed to be withdrawn by raising taxes on private entrepreneurs.
The USSR as a whole considered the abolition of cards to be a progressive step, primarily from the point of view of its influence on the minds of the population of the FRG. However, according to the calculations of Soviet specialists, the GDR lacked goods worth about 1 billion marks to fully satisfy the demand of the population. There was a shortage of coffee and cocoa, but the situation with manufactured goods was frankly alarming. If in the FRG in 1954 24.7 m2 of cotton fabrics were consumed per capita, then in the GDR in 1956 it was only 11.6 m2. The GDR could not solve this problem on its own, since it had neither cotton nor leather for shoes.
In this regard, the government of the GDR turned to the USSR with a request to supply consumer goods worth 220 million marks in 1958, and in exchange the GDR was ready to reduce imports of meat from the Soviet Union by 20 thousand tons, and butter - by 6 thousand tons. In addition, the GDR asked for permission to postpone the agreed deliveries to the USSR of certain manufactured goods (fabrics, tulle, garments) by 29 million rubles.
The USSR provided the necessary assistance and persuaded other countries of the socialist camp to throw significant masses of consumer goods onto the GDR commodity market. So, the Chinese supplied silk fabrics, carpets and blankets, Czechoslovakia - washing machines, cars, furniture and motorcycles, Bulgaria - canned vegetables and woolen fabrics. It must be said that the socialist countries were reluctant to do this. After all, the standard of living of the population of the GDR was already in 1958 the highest among the countries of socialism, and the Poles or Hungarians did not want to further raise it at a loss. In addition, in many Eastern European countries (especially in Poland), both among the population and among the leadership, under the influence of the recent war, anti-German sentiments were still strong.
In general, the abolition of the cards (it was carried out in 1958) was a success, and this undoubted success was achieved mainly by the forces of the GDR itself. Of course, the USSR actively helped, but in terms of the volume of assistance, this assistance, of course, could not be compared with the injections of the entire Western world into the economy of the FRG. It is striking how attentive and friendly Moscow's attitude was towards the needs of the East Germans. Those same Germans, many of whom 10 years ago burned down Soviet cities and killed Soviet citizens. This approach of the Soviet leadership contrasted sharply, for example, with the nationalism of the Polish "reformer" W. Gomulka, who actually sabotaged the unified foreign trade strategy of the socialist camp, using precisely anti-German populist slogans.
6. East Germany in the late 50s: did life become better ... than in Germany?
It should be noted that from the very beginning of the economic competition with the FRG in 1958, the leadership of the GDR assessed its possibilities quite realistically. The State Planning Committee of the republic compiled a list of 45 basic products and consumer goods, in which it was supposed to compete with the FRG. From this list, in about 15 positions, the GDR already in 1958 surpassed the FRG in per capita consumption (sugar, butter, animal fats, bread, edible potatoes, vegetables, rice, underwear, furniture, etc.). For another 16 items, it was planned to catch up and overtake the FRG by 1961-62. (milk, meat, eggs, fruits, cotton and silk fabrics, shoes, outerwear, carpets, TVs, motorcycles, etc.). For the remaining 14 types of products (coffee, cocoa, wines, southern fruits, woolen fabrics, cars, washing machines and refrigerators), the GDR did not hope to catch up with its Western neighbors by 1962, but intended to reduce its backlog by several times. Basically, all goods of the third group were not produced in the GDR, and in order to increase their imports, it was necessary to increase the production of engineering products for export.
In 1960-1963 it was supposed to increase the import of meat by 190 thousand tons, butter - by 55 thousand. Since 1964, it was planned to completely abandon the purchase of these products abroad.
On the whole, the task set by the Fifth Congress of the SED in 1958 was economically solvable, provided certain important prerequisites were in place. First, calm foreign policy conditions and normal relations with the FRG were required. Secondly, it was necessary to significantly increase the export of industrial equipment to the West in order to obtain foreign exchange funds for the import of goods of the third group. As an option for resolving the second condition, one could also consider reducing the export of consumer goods, primarily to socialist countries. Thirdly, it was necessary to change the structure of domestic consumption. Thus, according to the absolutely correct opinion of the Soviet side, it would be possible to significantly reduce the consumption of meat by more actively accustoming the Germans to fish (this was done in the FRG). However, the government of the GDR did not pay much attention to this aspect, and the plan for catching fish from year to year was not fulfilled (in 1958, the population did not receive 49,000 tons of fish compared to the plan). True, a lot of canned fish was imported from the USSR, but they were quite expensive and therefore were reluctantly bought by the population.
7. West Germany strikes back
It should be emphasized that in the FRG, too, they feared very much that the decisions of the Fifth Congress of the SED might be carried out. That is why, using the aggravation of the situation around Berlin in 1958-1960, the German government actually broke the trade agreement with the GDR at the end of 1960 in order to hinder the growth of the East German economy (it amounted to more than 8% in 1960). The FRG began to practice economic warfare against the GDR as early as the first half of 1960. West German firms deliberately delayed the shipment of 28 thousand tons of metal to the GDR under the 1959 trade agreement and began to drag out negotiations on concluding an appropriate agreement for 1960. As a result, in 5 months In 1960, instead of 99 thousand tons of thick rolled sheet, East Germany received only 59.2 thousand tons. As a result, downtime began in the chemical industry and interruptions in the supply of electricity. The plan for the production of transformers in the first quarter of 1960 was fulfilled by only 10%, and refrigerators (so important in the economic competition with the FRG) - by only 16.9%. [in the author's doctoral dissertation it is shown that the Berlin crisis was provoked by the West precisely out of fear of the defeat of the FRG in an economic situation with the GDR. VC. ]
In addition to the trade war waged by the West against the GDR, in 1960 the recruitment of qualified specialists in East Germany intensified in order to prevent the emerging economic breakthrough of the GDR. Meanwhile, contrary to the widespread point of view, the GDR did not always lose its population in favor of its western neighbor. Just at the end of the 1950s, due to the improved attitude of the population of the GDR towards their own state, the outflow of the population to the FRG began to decline. In 1956, 279,000 people moved from the GDR to the FRG, and in 1957, 261,000. Of course, this was much less than in the crisis year of 1953 (391 thousand), but this state of affairs could not be tolerated further, since it was primarily young and educated people who left for the West. By 1958, political motives had long ceased to play a decisive role in the emigration of the vast majority of "refugees" from the GDR. People were attracted by higher earnings and material well-being. For the German economy, the "refugees" from the GDR gave much more than American "aid" (in fact, they were loans) under the "Marshall Plan". The cost of "human capital" from the GDR in Germany in the "golden decade" of the 50s was 2.6 billion marks annually (savings in education and training of personnel). In 1960, the share of refugees and migrants (not only from the GDR, but also from other countries of Eastern Europe) amounted to 30.7% of all wage laborers in the FRG (in 1950 - 28%).
However, the growth in the well-being of the population of the GDR (and it had been continuous since 1953) by 1958 made it possible to hope for a turn for the better in the situation of competition with the FRG and in the migration field. In 1958, "only" 204 thousand inhabitants left the country, and in 1959 - 144 thousand. In the first quarter of 1959, 27,000 people left for the FRG, and 15,000 moved to the GDR from there. The absolute population loss, therefore, amounted to 12 thousand people, which was three times less than the same indicator in the first quarter of 1958. In some districts (Karl-Marx-Stadt, Gera and others) at the end of 1958 for the first time in the history of the a balance was established between the inflow and outflow of the population. Such a favorable situation was explained not only by the stable economic development of the GDR, but also by the mini-recession that began in the FRG (where the economic growth rates dropped sharply). Because of this factor, a significant number of unemployed miners from the Ruhr moved to the GDR.
[in the 1960s the flow of migrations as a whole decreased, but its direction changed to the opposite. “In the 1960s. every year 2,000 West Germans move to East Germany. The latter were said [in the FRG] to be doing so not for political reasons, but this myth was dispelled in March 1968 when Wolfgang Killing moved to the GDR, who was a popular West German actor, famous in the USA for playing the role of an East German in the film Alfred Hitchcock's "The Torn Curtain" (1966) starring Paul Newman. Keeling, who fought for the Third Reich on the Russian front, happened to be in Los Angeles during the racial riots in Watts over the filming of "The Torn Curtain" and said he was horrified by America. He stated that he was leaving West Germany, because the United States stands behind her, and they, according to him, are "the most dangerous enemy of mankind today", and as evidence he referred to the crimes "against blacks and the people of Vietnam". Mark Kurlansky "1968. The year that shook the world." M. 2008. S. 209.]
8. The gap is shrinking
The leadership of the GDR in 1959-1960 consistently reduced the gap with the FRG in per capita consumption of goods. So in 1960, sales of coffee to the population increased by 36%, wines by 32%, cocoa by 11% (as we remember, the lag in these products was the most significant). At the end of 1960, the GDR firmly surpassed the FRG in per capita consumption of meat (57.1 kg versus 54.5), butter (13.6 kg versus 7.8), sugar (32.5 and 27.3). Even more revealing was the leadership of the GDR in the consumption of "modern" products such as fish (14.3 kg versus 12.2) and vegetables (66.3 kg versus 42.1). The gap with the FRG also narrowed in terms of “elite” products such as cheese (3.9 kg versus 4.4), coffee (1.1 kg versus 2.4) and cocoa (0.9 kg versus 1.5).
Particularly impressive were the successes of the GDR against the backdrop of the greatly increased consumer demand of the population after the abolition of cards. In 1960, 38% more televisions were sold to residents, 91% more refrigerators, and 16% more cars. The gap with the FRG has steadily narrowed in terms of durable goods as well. If in 1959 there were 11.1 televisions per 100 East German families, then a year later - already 18.5 (in Germany - 22.5). However, for passenger cars, the backlog has been quite serious so far (8 cars per 100 families in the FRG and 1.6 in the GDR). However, until recently, no passenger cars were produced in the GDR at all. It can be stated that at the beginning of 1960 the GDR was fulfilling its indicators of economic competition with the FRG, and the gap narrowed even somewhat faster than expected.
9. The external background of the intra-German confrontation and forced collectivization in the GDR
However, in 1960 the international situation intervened in the plans of the leadership of the GDR. The leader of East Germany, Walter Ulbricht, suspected (and, in general, not without reason) that at the forthcoming summit meeting in Paris in the spring of 1960 between the USSR, the USA, France and Great Britain, Khrushchev could “surrender” the GDR in exchange for the creation of a peaceful and neutral but capitalist Germany. That is why in the GDR it was decided to carry out an accelerated collectivization of agriculture in order to eliminate the last capitalist sector of the economy. The cooperative agriculture itself was indisputably an economically progressive step (it is not for nothing that the former cooperatives in other legal forms still form the basis of the agrarian sector of East Germany and are much more efficient than the state-subsidized individual farmers of the western part of united Germany). However, the haste caused by the international situation (all collectivization was carried out in the three spring months of 1960) turned out to be unforeseen expenses for the budget of the GDR.
The state shouldered an additional financial burden: the new cooperatives urgently needed inventory, outbuildings, fertilizers and just working capital. If in 1959 7.9 billion marks were allocated for the development of agriculture in the GDR, then in 1960 it was already 9.1 billion, or 19.2% of all budget allocations. Initially, it was planned to complete the complete collectivization only in 1963, so all plans had to be urgently revised. According to the calculations of the Ministry of Agriculture of the GDR, in view of the "urgency" of collectivization, only in 1961 it was required to additionally give the agricultural sector 4,000 tractors, 2,100 grain harvesters and 660 potato harvesters. And for all this (and much more) it was necessary to urgently find 36.8 thousand tons of already in short supply of rolled steel. It was necessary to reduce the production of equipment for the light and food industries, which had a negative effect on the aspirations to catch up with the FRG in terms of consumption of the population.
The mass formation of agricultural cooperatives (SHPC) caused a sharp increase in the purchasing power of the population, as members of the cooperatives received significant material benefits (for example, peasants who joined type III agricultural cooperatives - they resembled Soviet collective farms in terms of the degree of socialization - were generally exempted from mandatory state deliveries, decreased by 25% income tax), and in many cases a de facto government-guaranteed average wage.
10. The Berlin crisis of 1961 and the end of the competition between the two systems
In the first half of 1961, the economic development of the GDR was generally something of an emergency, as it proceeded against the backdrop of a sharp aggravation of the situation around Berlin. On September 30, 1960 (picturing, among other things, collectivization), the German government denounced the trade agreement between the two German states on December 31, 1960. Until now, many German historians consider this measure insignificant, referring to the fact that three-quarters of the trade turnover of the GDR accounted for the socialist camp. However, the sanctions were very tangible, since Germany at that time in many respects still remained a single economic mechanism. In 1960, East Germany imported 94% of free-cutting steel and 68% of cold-drawn products from Germany. Such a commodity nomenclature (at least in terms of quality) did not actually exist in the socialist countries, and the USSR could not replace the losses. And without high-quality rolled products and special steel grades, the GDR could not begin the long-planned repair of the country's power equipment. In turn, energy became the bottleneck of the entire national economic complex. Due to the sanctions of the FRG in 1960, the already planned power capacities were not put into operation, and in some cities of the GDR (Halle, Magdeburg, Dresden) power outages began. Thus, there was not enough electricity, despite the fact that, compared to 1950, its production in the GDR doubled (and tripled compared to 1936).
In addition, as mentioned above, in fact, the FRG disrupted deliveries to the GDR long before the formal denunciation of the trade agreement. In the first half of 1960 alone, 5,400 tons of drawn steel sheet, 6,722 tons of seamless pipes, and 14,200 tons of sheet with special acceptance were deliberately underdelivered from West Germany.
In November 1960, Ulbricht and Khrushchev seriously discussed the scenario of a total economic blockade of the GDR by the West. In the USSR, special gold and foreign exchange reserves began to be formed for the purchase of goods on Western markets in the interests of the GDR. Moreover, to some extent, Khrushchev himself provoked anxious moods among the leadership of the GDR. He constantly promised the whole world to sign a peace treaty with the GDR at the end of 1961, which caused sharp protests from the Western powers (they did not recognize the GDR). Therefore, according to the Soviet embassy in the GDR, the “German friends” proceeded from the complete cessation of trade with the FRG precisely at the end of 1961. The aggravation of the international situation in 1961 forced the GDR to reduce intra-German trade in order to better prepare for a total Western boycott. In 1962, even if trade with the FRG continued, the GDR planned to reduce both exports and imports with this country by 25% (trade was carried out through clearing). Moreover, it was planned to reduce imports at the expense of precisely rolled products in order to maintain the volume of purchases of consumer goods.
The sharply complicated international situation again led in 1961 to an increase in the resettlement of East Germans in the FRG. Moreover, Western radio stations (especially controlled by the Americans RIAS in West Berlin [see about its role in provoking the pogroms in Berlin in 1953. V.K.]) deliberately escalated the situation. In particular, the inhabitants of the GDR were told how to protect themselves from radiation in the event of an impending atomic war with the help of table salt (such propaganda led, as a side effect, to a massive purchase of salt in East Germany, and the resulting shortage was naturally dumped by the same RIAS on the leadership of the GDR: they say, where is there to compete with Germany in cocoa, if there is not even salt in East Germany!). Fearing a nuclear war (and, judging by the memoirs of the then German Defense Minister F.-J. Strauss, the United States was seriously planning a nuclear strike on East Germany, hoping that a nuclear war with the USSR would be limited to Europe), many East Germans fled to Germany through West Berlin . In the middle of 1961, the engineering industry of the GDR lacked more than 5,000 skilled workers, because of which the industry was underfulfilled by the annual production plan.
The light industry, despite some delay in 1960 in imports of cotton and wool from the USSR, still fit into the ambitious schedule of competition with the FRG (only children's clothing enterprises in the GDR produced 26% more in 1960). However, even there, in the middle of 1961, an acute shortage of labor force began to take shape (about 2,000 people were missing). The USSR and the GDR began seriously discussing plans to send about 20,000 Soviet workers to the GDR for temporary work. First of all, the Soviet leadership was against this for political reasons: the production standards in the USSR were higher, and the German workers could appear as lazy compared to the Soviet colleagues who worked nearby.
The USSR tried to compensate for the pressure of the West by putting up with the short supply from the GDR of a number of goods important for the Soviet national economy, which, under the conditions of a planned economy, was extremely painful. On July 1, 1961, 76 passenger cars and 170 pieces of metal-cutting machines were not received from the GDR. Meanwhile, in 1960, the USSR imported 44% of all metal-cutting machine tools and forging and pressing equipment from the GDR.
Berlin Crisis 1958-1961 actually ended with the establishment of a normal border regime in the divided capital of Germany on August 13, 1961. After that, the economy of the GDR got the opportunity to develop again in a normal, rather than emergency, mode, which was typical for the entire 1960 and the first half of 1961. The GDR continued to increase its performance in competition with the FRG (for example, per capita consumption of coffee and wine increased in 1958-1962 gg twice, and in terms of meat consumption, the GDR was ahead of the FRG until the reunification of Germany). However, after the stabilization of the GDR (and in fact, the complete partition of Germany) in August 1961, the topic of competition with the FRG lost its relevance. After all, now both German states no longer sought to unite the entire country in their own image and likeness, but tuned in to long-term coexistence in different systems of geopolitical coordinates of that bipolar era.
Thus, it can be stated that if it were not for the Berlin crisis of 1958-1961, which ended with the construction of a separation wall in the capital of Germany, the GDR could well have by the mid-1960s. bypass Germany in the consumption of basic (though not all) goods per capita.
In any case, the lessons of that time do not seem to have lost their relevance. After all, economic pressure measures will be applied in today's globalized world, despite the rhetoric of free trade. The crisis in South Ossetia caused US and EU economic sanctions against Russia, which are designed precisely to change our country's independent foreign policy.
An attempt at a new look at the economic competition between the GDR and the FRG // Federalism. 2009. No. 1. pp.119-134.
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WUA RF, f.0742, op.3, p.27, d.39, l.18
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WUA RF, f.0742.op.6, p.47, d. 39, l.73
SaxonPorsche
Many citizens of the GDR could admire the Trabant car only on the pages of the catalog, because sometimes it took years to wait in line to purchase it. In the people, this car was ironically called the “Saxon Porsche”. In fact, this car was made according to the Western model. The Lloyd LP 300, which was produced at that time in Bremen, was taken as a sample. With the help of the received copy of the car in the GDR, they tried to appease the consumer need of citizens in the vehicle.
Jeans from the East
Denim fabrics have long been a symbol of the capitalist west in the east of Germany. Despite this, in 1978 the GDR bought a million jeans from the American brand Levis. East Germans literally pulled them out of the hands of sellers. Whereas jeans made in the GDR, such as "Wisent" or "Shanty", lingered in warehouses. The fabric from which they were sewn was "false" to the touch, and it was difficult to achieve a fashionable worn effect.
Levi's jeans
Fashionable dederon
In 1972, dederon was the latest in East German fashion. Dresses, stockings and aprons were sewn from this synthetic fabric. The chemical composition of this synthetic fiber corresponded to the nylon used in the West of the country. However, the leadership of the GDR insisted on a socialist version of the fabric, the name of which, "dederon", echoed the name of the country in German - Deutsche Demokratische Republik or DDR.
Socialist lemonade
While West Germans quenched their thirst for Coca Cola, the GDR offered its citizens two socialist counterparts to the popular drink: Club Cola and Vita Cola. Both versions had a similar taste to the American version of Coca Cola, although, of course, they did not manage to completely follow the taste of the original. Visitors from the West of Germany noticed the difference, especially in the case of Vita Cola, which had a bitter taste.
East Germanhamburger
In 1982, the Center for Rationalization and Research on Catering in the GDR introduced the so-called "grilletta". Thus, the GDR copied another symbol of the Western lifestyle - the hamburger. The grilletta recipe is very similar to the hamburger familiar to everyone: cut the bun, put the cutlet inside and add a little ketchup. And since the latter was in short supply, a substitute sauce had to be dispensed with.
socialist chocolate
This package contains sweet tiles. However, the cocoa content in these sweets, which were passed off as a chocolate bar, is only 7%. To cover the shortage of chocolate in the country, sugar, fat and a mixture of hazelnuts and peas were added to the bar. East German confectionery factories, unlike their West German competitors, were also forced to overcome shortages all the time.
socialistmusic
Under the Amiga record label, the GDR released albums by some popular western musicians like The Beatles, despite the fact that the government in east Berlin considered western rock music "garbage". However, the albums that were released in the German East were only a weak parody of the original. These recordings contained parts from various musicians' albums. Therefore, it is not surprising that the black market for records from the West flourished in the GDR.
"The Beatles" popular group of the West of Germany
East German « pop-gymnastics"
Aerobics enjoyed increasing popularity among sports-minded East Germans. However, the term "aerobics" itself was banned, because it had a capitalist origin. Instead, the citizens of the GDR were engaged in "pop-gymnastics." Even the aerobics sports program of the West German ZDF TV channel “In Great Shape” very quickly received an eastern counterpart, “Medicine by Notes”.
Lastcomputer "production" of the GDR
The computer model "KC compact" from the GDR was also a copy of the Western counterpart - "Amstrad PC". Since East German technology was hopelessly behind West German advances, engineers from the GDR preferred to copy Western models. Shortly before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, mass production of the KC compact began. But since it was only an East German copy, they were gathering dust on store shelves.
Nostalgia for the GDR
East Germans could only buy Western-produced food at Intershop stores, and then with hard currency that was hard to get. Today, however, goods from the GDR sell excellently - at the expense of (nostalgia for the GDR). However, now many products have only East German packaging, while their content has been replaced by Western quality counterparts that meet all standards. For example, the sale of chocolate in a package of "socialist chocolate" has quadrupled.
