NOU VPO Far Eastern Institute of International Business
Faculty of Organizational Management
TEST
In the discipline "National History"
SUBJECT: "Peasant war led by E. Pugachev"
Completed by: student gr. 319-M
Panorevinko Yu.S..
Code 09-м-07
Checked by: Ph.D., Associate Professor
Gridunova A.N.
Khabarovsk2010
Introduction…………………………………………………………….…………………3
Decrees of Catherine II on the peasant issue in the 60s……….5
Reasons, driving forces, features of the peasant war led by E. Pugachev, its results……………………………6
Conclusion………………………………………………………13
References……………………………………………………………………...14
INTRODUCTION
Peasant War 1773-1775 under the leadership of E.I. Pugachev was the most powerful armed uprising of the working masses of feudal Russia against the regime of serfdom exploitation and political lawlessness. It covered a vast territory in the southeast of the country (Orenburg, Siberian, Kazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Voronezh, Astrakhan provinces), where 2 million 900 thousand male residents lived, mostly consisting of peasants of various categories and nationalities. The uprising was a consequence of the deepening crisis situations in the socio-economic life of the country, accompanied by increased feudal and national oppression of the working masses and aggravation of class relations.
The deep antagonism between the oppressed population of the country and the ruling elite manifested itself in various forms of class action. The culmination of the people's struggle was Pugachev's speech, which quickly grew into a wide peasant war. Its main events took place in the Southern Urals. The reasons for this should be sought in the socio-economic and political history of the region.
Objectively, the uprising was directed against Russian statehood. The ideal was seen in a Cossack-peasant, “free” state with its peasant king, to make everyone eternal Cossacks, to grant land, freedom, land, forests, hay, and fishing grounds. As they say, “bestow with a cross and a beard”, exemption from recruitment and extortion, execute nobles, landowners and unrighteous judges.
This topic has been sufficiently studied and covered by such historians as Yuri Aleksandrovich Limonov, Vladimir Vasilyevich Mavrodin, Viktor Ivanovich Buganov.
However, the topic that I chose for the test has not lost its relevance even after 230 years since the beginning of the uprising. Even now, in our time, problems related to the correctness of leadership and the meaningfulness of the actions of our government continue to arise, which leads to protests, rallies, and demonstrations in defense of our rights, freedoms and interests. There will probably never be a government that would satisfy the interests of all segments of the population. Especially in Russia, where the tax burden often exceeds the income of the bulk of the population living below the poverty line.
An attempt to understand what the prerequisites were that pushed such a large number of people, different in their class composition and interests, geographically scattered, will be my course work, in which, having examined all the facts and events step by step, we can conclude what was the reason and why the uprising did not lead to victory rebels.
Decrees of Catherine II on the peasant issue in the 60s.
In the early 60s of the 18th century. The situation in the country was determined by several main factors. First of all, it is worth noting the growth of peasant unrest. Catherine II was forced to admit that at the time of her coming to power, up to one and a half thousand landowner and monastic peasants “defied obedience” (“almost all of the factory and monastery peasants were in clear disobedience to the authorities and in some places the landowners began to join them”). And all of them, as the empress put it, “had to be moderated.” Among the peasants, various kinds of false manifestos and decrees became especially widespread, by virtue of which the peasants refused to work for their former masters.
The policy of “enlightened absolutism” did not improve the situation of numerous state peasants. Ferocious laws that brought whips and whips, prison and exile, hard labor and conscription to the people, constituted the most characteristic shadow side of this policy. All this could not but cause constant protest by the oppressed masses, the end result of which was open armed uprisings by the peasants.
Serfdom already reached its apogee at the beginning of the reign. In the 60s, a series of decrees were issued that deprived peasants of any minimal rights: they were prohibited from owning real estate, taking contracts and farming out, acting as guarantors, trading without special permission, and leaving their place of residence without written permission. In 1765, landowners received the right to send peasants to hard labor, and peasants were forbidden to complain about landowners; their complaints were considered a false denunciation, and the one who filed it was subject to severe punishment.
Reasons, driving forces, features of the peasant war led by E. Pugachev, its results.
The continuous strengthening of serfdom and the growth of duties during the first half of the 18th century caused fierce resistance from the peasants. Its main form was flight. The fugitives went to the Cossack regions, to the Urals, to Siberia, to Ukraine, to the northern forests.
They often created “robber gangs” that not only robbed on the roads, but also destroyed landowners’ estates, and destroyed documents on the ownership of land and serfs.
More than once the peasants openly rebelled, seized the landowners' property, beat and even killed their masters, and resisted the troops that pacified them. Often the rebels demanded that they be transferred to the category of palace or state peasants.
Unrest among working people became more frequent, striving to return from factories to their native villages, and, on the other hand, seeking improved working conditions and higher salaries.
The frequent repetition of popular uprisings and the fierceness of the rebels testified to the trouble in the country and the impending danger.
The spread of imposture indicated the same thing. The contenders for the throne declared themselves either the son of Tsar Ivan, or Tsarevich Alexei, or Peter II. There were especially many “Peter III” - six before 1773. This was explained by the fact that Peter III eased the situation of the Old Believers, tried to transfer the monastic peasants into state peasants, and also by the fact that he was overthrown by the nobles. (The peasants believed that the emperor suffered for caring for the common people). However, only one of the many impostors managed to seriously shake the empire.
In 1773, another “Peter III” showed up in the Yaitsky (Ural) Cossack army. The Don Cossack Emelyan Ivanovich Pugachev declared himself to them.
The uprising of E. Pugachev became the largest in Russian history. In Russian historiography of the Soviet period it was called the Peasant War. The Peasant War was understood as a major uprising of the peasantry and other lower strata of the population, covering a significant territory, leading in fact to the split of the country into a part controlled by the government and a part controlled by the rebels, threatening the very existence of the feudal-serf system. During the Peasant War, rebel armies are created, waging a long struggle with government troops. In recent years, the term “Peasant War” has been used relatively rarely; researchers prefer to write about the Cossack-peasant uprising under the leadership of E.I. Pugacheva. However, most experts agree that of all the peasant uprisings in Russia, it was Pugachev’s uprising that can most justifiably claim the name “Peasant War.”
What were the reasons for the uprising and war?
Dissatisfaction of the Yaik Cossacks with government measures aimed at eliminating their privileges. In 1771, the Cossacks lost their autonomy and were deprived of the right to traditional trades (fishing, salt mining). In addition, discord was growing between the rich Cossack " senior" and the rest of the "troops".
Strengthening the personal dependence of peasants on landowners, the growth of state taxes and landowner duties, caused by the beginning of the development of market relations and the serfdom legislation of the 60s.
Difficult living and working conditions for working people, as well as assigned peasants in the factories of the Urals.
Inflexible national policy of the government in the Middle Volga region.
The socio-psychological atmosphere in the country, heated up under the influence of the peasantry’s hopes that, following the liberation of the nobles from compulsory service to the state, their emancipation would begin. These aspirations gave rise to rumors that the “manifesto on peasant freedom” had already been prepared by the tsar, but the “evil nobles” decided to hide it and made an attempt on the life of the emperor. However, he miraculously escaped and is just waiting for the moment to appear before the people and lead them to fight for Truth and the return of the throne. It was in this atmosphere that impostors appeared, posing as Peter III.
Deterioration of the economic situation in the country due to the Russian-Turkish war.
In 1772, there was an uprising on Yaik with the aim of removing the chieftain and a number of elders. The Cossacks resisted the punitive troops. After the rebellion was suppressed, the instigators were exiled to Siberia, and the military circle was destroyed. The situation on Yaik has become extremely tense. Therefore, the Cossacks enthusiastically greeted “Emperor” Pugachev, who promised to reward them with “rivers, seas and herbs, cash salaries, lead and gunpowder and all freedom.” On September 18, 1773, with a detachment of 200 Cossacks, Pugachev set out for the capital of the army - Yaitsky town. Almost all of the military teams sent against him went over to the side of the rebels. And yet, having about 500 people, Pugachev did not dare to storm the fortified fortress with a garrison of 1000 people. Having bypassed it, he moved up the Yaik, capturing small fortresses along the way, the garrisons of which joined his army. Bloody reprisals were carried out against nobles and officers.
On October 5, 1773, Pugachev approached Orenburg, a well-fortified provincial city with a garrison of 3.5 thousand people with 70 guns. The rebels had 3 thousand people and 20 guns. The assault on the city was unsuccessful, and the Pugachevites began a siege. Governor I.A. Reinsdorp did not dare to attack the rebels, not relying on his soldiers.
A detachment of General V.A. was sent to help Orenburg. Kara numbering 1.5 thousand people and 1200 Bashkirs led by Salavat Yulaev. However, the rebels defeated Kara, and S. Yulaev went over to the side of the impostor. Pugachev was also joined by 1,200 soldiers, Cossacks and Kalmyks from Colonel Chernyshev’s detachment (the colonel himself was captured and hanged). Only Brigadier Korfu managed to safely lead 2.5 thousand soldiers to Orenburg. Pugachev, who had set up his headquarters in Berd, five miles from Orenburg, was constantly receiving reinforcements: Kalmyks, Bashkirs, mining workers of the Urals, and assigned peasants. The number of his troops exceeded 20 thousand people. True, most of them were armed only with edged weapons, or even spears. The level of combat training of this heterogeneous crowd was also low. However, Pugachev sought to give his army a semblance of organization. He established the “Military Collegium” and surrounded himself with guards. He assigned ranks and titles to his associates. The Ural artisans Ivan Beloborodov and Afanasy Sokolov (Khlopusha) became colonels, and the Cossack Chika-Zarubin became “Count Chernyshev.”
The expansion of the uprising seriously worried the government. Chief General A.I. is appointed commander of the troops sent against Pugachev. Bibikov. Under his command there were 16 thousand soldiers and 40 guns. At the beginning of 1774, Bibikov's troops began an offensive. In March, Pugachev was defeated at the Tatishchev Fortress, and Lieutenant Colonel Mikhelson defeated the troops of Chiki-Zarubin near Ufa. Pugachev's main army was practically destroyed: about 2 thousand rebels were killed, over 4 thousand were wounded or captured. The government announced the suppression of the rebellion.
However, Pugachev, who had no more than 400 people left, did not lay down his arms, but went to Bashkiria. Now the Bashkirs and mining workers became the main support of the movement. At the same time, many Cossacks moved away from Pugachev as he moved away from their native places.
Despite setbacks in clashes with government forces, the ranks of the rebels grew. In July, Pugachev led a 20,000-strong army to Kazan. After the capture of Kazan, Pugachev intended to move to Moscow. On July 12, the rebels managed to occupy the city, but they were unable to capture the Kazan Kremlin. In the evening, Michelson's troops, who were pursuing Pugachev, came to the aid of the besieged. In a fierce battle, Pugachev was again defeated. Of his 20 thousand supporters, 2 thousand were killed, 10 thousand were captured, and about 6 thousand fled. With two thousand survivors, Pugachev crossed to the right bank of the Volga and turned south, hoping to rebel the Don.
“Pugachev fled, but his flight seemed like an invasion,” wrote A.S. Pushkin. Having crossed the Volga, Pugachev found himself in areas of landownership, where he was supported by a mass of serfs. It was now that the uprising acquired the character of a genuine peasant war. All over the Volga region, noble estates burned. Approaching Saratov, Pugachev again had 20 thousand people.
Panic began in the capital. In the Moscow province they announced a gathering of militia against the impostor. The Empress declared that she intended to stand at the head of the troops heading against Pugachev. Chief General P.I. Panin was appointed to replace the deceased Bibikov, giving him the broadest powers. A.V. was called from the army. Suvorov.
Meanwhile, the rebel troops were no longer as powerful as they were a year ago. They now consisted of peasants who did not know military affairs. In addition, their detachments acted more and more separately. Having dealt with the master, the man considered the task completed and hurried to manage the land. Therefore, the composition of Pugachev’s army changed all the time. Government troops followed in her footsteps. In August, Pugachev besieged Tsaritsyn, but was overtaken and defeated by Mikhelson, losing 2 thousand people killed and 6 thousand prisoners. With the remnants of his followers, Pugachev crossed the Volga, deciding to return to Yaik. However, the Yaik Cossacks accompanying him, realizing the inevitability of defeat, handed him over to the authorities.
Transported by Suvorov to Moscow, Pugachev was interrogated and tortured for two months, and on January 10, 1775 he was executed along with four comrades on Bolotnaya Square in Moscow. The uprising was suppressed.
The peasant war under the leadership of Emelyan Pugachev ended in the defeat of the rebels. It suffered from all the weaknesses inevitably inherent in peasant uprisings: unclear goals, spontaneity, fragmentation of the movement, and the lack of truly organized, disciplined and trained military forces.
The spontaneity was reflected primarily in the absence of a well-thought-out program. Not to mention the ordinary rebels, even the leaders, not excluding Pugachev himself, did not clearly and definitely imagine the system that would be established if they won.
But, despite the naive monarchism of the peasants, the anti-serfdom orientation of the Peasant War is clear. The slogans of the rebels are much clearer than in previous peasant wars and uprisings.
The leaders of the uprising did not have a unified plan of action, which was clearly reflected during the second offensive of government troops in January-March 1774. The rebel detachments were scattered over a vast territory and often acted completely independently, isolated from each other. Therefore, despite their heroism, they were separately defeated by government forces.
However, this does not detract from the enormous progressive significance of the uprising. The Peasant War of 1773–1775 dealt a serious blow to the feudal-serf system, it undermined its foundations, shook the centuries-old foundations and contributed to the development of progressive ideas among the Russian intelligentsia. What subsequently led to the liberation of the peasants in 1861.
The peasant war, in principle, could have been won, but it could not create a new, fair system that its participants dreamed of. After all, the rebels did not imagine him otherwise than in the form of a Cossack freeman, impossible on a national scale.
Pugachev's victory would mean the extermination of the only educated layer - the nobility. This would cause irreparable damage to culture, undermine the state system of Russia, and create a threat to its territorial integrity. On the other hand, the Peasant War forced the landowners and the government, having dealt with the rebels, to moderate the degree of exploitation. Thus, wages were significantly increased at Ural factories. But an unbridled increase in duties could lead to the massive ruin of the peasant economy, and after it - to the general collapse of the country's economy. The ferocity and massive scale of the uprising clearly showed the ruling circles that the situation in the country required change. The consequence of the peasant war was new reforms. Thus, popular indignation led to the strengthening of the system against which it was directed.
The memory of the “Pugachevism” has firmly entered the consciousness of both the lower classes and the ruling strata. The Decembrists tried to avoid Pugachevism in 1825. The associates of Alexander II remembered it when they made the historic decision to abolish serfdom in 1861.
CONCLUSION.
The Peasant War suffered defeat, which was inevitable for peasant actions in the era of feudalism, but it dealt a blow to the foundations of serfdom. The reasons for the defeat of the Peasant War were rooted in the spontaneity and fragmentation of the movement, in the absence of a clearly realized program of struggle for a new social system. Pugachev and his Military Collegium were unable to organize an army to successfully fight government forces. The ruling class and the state opposed the spontaneous action of the people with the regular army, the administrative and police apparatus, finance, and the church; They also received significant support from the emerging Russian bourgeoisie (manufacturers, manufacturers, merchants). After the Peasant War, the government of Catherine II, in order to prevent new peasant uprisings, strengthened the local state apparatus, strengthening its punitive capabilities. To ease the severity of the peasant issue, certain measures were taken in the field of economic policy. The regime of noble reaction, established after the Peasant War, was unable, however, to suppress the peasant movement in the country, which especially intensified at the end of the 18th century. Under the influence of the Peasant War, the formation of anti-serfdom ideology in Russia took place.
The uprising prompted the government to improve the system of governing the country and completely eliminate the autonomy of the Cossack troops. The Yaik River was renamed the river. Ural. It showed the illusory nature of ideas about the advantages of patriarchal peasant self-government, because spontaneous peasant uprisings took place under the leadership of the community. The peasants' speech influenced the development of Russian social thought and the spiritual life of the country. The memory of the “Pugachevism” and the desire to avoid it became one of the factors in the government’s policy and, as a result, pushed it later to soften and abolish serfdom.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
Peasant wars (2)
Abstract >> Historical figuresKazakov. It reached its apogee in peasant war under leadership E.I. Pugacheva. On Yaik, where in September... part of the Russian population. Participants peasant wars IN peasant war under leadership Pugachev, various...
Buganov V.I., Pugachev. – M.: Moscow worker, 1983/ Buganov V.I., Pugachev.
Muratov Kh. I. Peasant war under the leadership of E. I. Pugachev. – M./Buganov V.I., Politizdat, 1970
Eidelman N. Ya. Your eighteenth century. – M./ Eidelman N. Ya. Artist. Lit., 1991
Peasant war under leadership Emelyan Pugacheva (or just...
Test on the discipline “National History”
Peasant war led by S.T. Razin
Krasnoyarsk 2010
Introduction.
Prerequisites for the Peasant War.
Stepan Timofeevich Razin.
Peasants' War 1670-1671
Execution of Stepan Razin.
Conclusion.
Bibliography
Introduction
In the first half of the 16th century. steppes along the river The Don was populated by runaway peasants and slaves, as well as small townspeople. These were people from the Moscow state and partly from Polish Ukraine, who fled from feudal-serf oppression and called themselves “Cossacks.”
The Cossacks lived and traded in groups (kurens, yurts) of 10–20 people, which represented military partnerships. They were engaged in hunting, fishing and partly trade, but their main trade was war - raids for zipun and yasyr (for booty and prisoners). The Cossack lived “freely” and valued his freedom.
The moral character of the Cossacks is characteristic. They respected brave, strong and dexterous warriors, despised cowards, did not tolerate theft, and executed people for murder and treason. Among the Don Cossacks there was a developed sense of camaraderie, mutual benefit in battle, concern for the honor and glory of the Great Don Army, and adoration of the “quiet Don Ivanovich.”
The introduction of the Council Code of 1649, the search and reprisal of fugitive peasants, the ruin of many villagers and townspeople led to their outflow to the outskirts of the country, primarily to the Don. The Don Cossack freemen have always attracted fugitive peasants from the southern and central regions of the Russian state. Here they were protected by the unwritten law “there is no extradition from the Don.” The peasants were satisfied with the Cossack order: the absence of landowners and governors, the equality of the Cossacks (although home-based, wealthy brothers already stood out from among them, using the labor of poor villagers, golytby), the resolution of all important issues in circles - general meetings, the election of officials - atamans and esauls, their assistants. The government, needing the services of the Cossacks for the defense of the southern borders, paid them a salary and put up with the self-government that existed there. Initially, the Cossacks carried out raids for food and capturing prisoners, but in 1670 one of the campaigns led by (an experienced, already proven ataman at that time) S.T. Razin escalated into war.
In this work, we will actually look at the campaign that led to the uprising, the peasant war led by S.T. Razin. Let's get acquainted with the personality of Stepan Razin in more detail, highlight the main stages of the war and summarize what the popular uprising of 1670-1671 led to.
Prerequisites for the Peasant War
Movement of peasants, serfs, Cossacks and urban lower classes in the 17th century. in pre-revolutionary Russian historiography these events were called a “rebellion”, in Soviet historiography they were called a “peasant war”. The reasons for the speech are related to the deterioration of the situation of our sections of the population due to various circumstances. The adoption of the Council Code of 1649 led to the final enslavement of the peasants. applied not only to landowners, but also to other categories of peasants, and to a large extent to the majority of the townspeople. In addition, the government in the mid-17th century. issued a number of specific decrees that negatively affected the situation. These are, for example, increasing taxes on salt, issuing copper money, increasing taxes on the maintenance of the army, the so-called Streltsy money. The situation of the lower social classes also worsened significantly as a result of the active foreign policy pursued by the first Romanovs. Ideological and spiritual and church schism.
The authorities’ desire to limit the Cossack freemen and integrate them into the state system added to the tension. The situation on the Don also worsened due to the growth of the Golutven Cossacks, who, unlike the “domovity” (rich Cossacks), did not receive a salary from the state. The harbinger of a social explosion was the uprising of 1666 under the leadership of the Cossack Vasily Us, who managed to reach from the Don to Tula, where the surrounding counties joined him. They mostly took part in the unrest of the 1660s, and the peasants who joined them tried to protect the interests not of their entirety, but of their own. If they were successful, the peasants wanted to become free Cossacks or servicemen. The Cossacks and peasants were also joined by those from the townspeople who were dissatisfied with the liquidation of “white settlements” in cities free from taxes and duties according to the Council Code of 1649. In the spring of 1667, a detachment of six hundred “golytba” men, led by S.T., appeared near Tsaritsyn. Razin. Having brought the Cossacks from the Don to the Volga, he began a “campaign for zipuns,” robbing caravans of ships carrying government goods. After wintering, in the Yaitsky town (modern 1669, with rich booty on the Don, Razin’s fame as a successful ataman was strengthened. Thousands of Cossacks flocked to the fearless ataman. In the Don he created, preparations began for a campaign no longer “for the zipuns,” but “against” the boyars Razin's new campaign to the Volga begins in the spring of 1670.
Stepan Timofeevich Razin
Razin, Stepan Timofeevich (about 1630-1671) - leader 1670-1671, leader of a large protest movement of peasants, serfs, Cossacks and urban lower classes in the 17th century.
Born around 1630 in the village of Zimoveyskaya on the Don (or in Cherkassk) in the family of a wealthy Cossack Timofey Razin, probably the middle son of three (Ivan, Stepan, Frol). The first document about him is his request for leave to travel to the Solovetsky Monastery in 1652.
In 1658 he was among the Cherkasy Cossacks sent to Moscow to the Ambassadorial Prikaz. In 1661, together with Ataman F. Budan, he negotiated with the Kalmyks about concluding peace and joint actions against the Tatars. In 1662 he became an ataman; in 1662-1663 his Cossacks fought against the Turks and Crimeans and took part in the Battle of Molochny Vody on the Crimean Isthmus. He returned to the Don with rich trophies and prisoners.
In 1665, the governor and prince. Yu.A. Dolgorukov hanged Razin’s elder brother Ivan for leaving without permission with the Cossacks to the Don during the Russian-Polish War. Stepan decided not only to avenge his brother, but also to punish the boyars and nobles. Gathering a “band” of 600 people, he set off in the spring of 1667 from the Zimoveysky town near Tsaritsyn up the Don, along the way robbing government plows with goods and the houses of rich Cossacks. The enterprise was called a “campaign for zipuns” and was a violation of the promise given by the Don Cossacks to the Moscow authorities to “stop theft.” "Vataga" quickly grew to 2 thousand people. on 30 plows. Having captured Yaik by cunning, Razin executed 170 people who saw in his army a “horde of thieves” and replenished the “band” with sympathizers from the local population.
Having established a camp between the rivers Tishini and Ilovnya, he reorganized the “army”, giving it the features of a regular one, divided into hundreds and dozens, led by centurions and tens. Anyone who met his “band” and did not want to go with her was ordered to be “burned with fire and beaten to death.” Despite the cruelty, he remained in people's memory as generous, friendly, and generous to the poor and hungry. He was considered a sorcerer, they believed in his strength and happiness, and called him “father.”
In 1667-1669, Razin made a Persian campaign, defeating the fleet of the Iranian Shah and gaining experience in the “Cossack war” (ambushes, raids, outflanking maneuvers). The Cossacks burned villages and hamlets of the Dagestan Tatars, killed residents, and destroyed property. Taking Baku, Derbent. Reshet, Farabat, Astrabat, Razin took prisoners, among them was the daughter of Meneda Khan. He made her a concubine, then dealt with her, proving the ataman’s prowess. This fact was included in the text of the folk song about Stenka Razin, but already at that time legends about the “bewitched by a bullet and a saber” destroyer of other people’s property, about his strength, dexterity and luck, were spreading everywhere.
In August-September 1669, having returned to the Don, he built himself a fortress on the island - the town of Kagalnik. On it, Razin’s “gang” and he himself distributed the spoils of war, inviting him to join the Cossack army, enticing him with wealth and prowess. The Moscow government's attempt to punish the obstinate people by stopping the supply of grain to the Don only added to Razin's supporters.
We must pay tribute to S.T. Razin, to this day they remember him and his services to the people. Stepan Timofeevich Razin “laid down... his head in the struggle for freedom,” wrote V.I. Lenin. The people have not forgotten their great son. He responded to the sad news of the death of his intercessor with many songs and tales. In simple and sincere words, the Cossack “golytba” mourned the death of her beloved chieftain.
Stepan Razin is one of the first heroes of the class and revolutionary struggle, immortalized in Soviet monumental art, and this primacy is a tribute of respect and gratitude of the people's power to the leader of the Peasant War, whose short and stormy life was devoted to the struggle for a better life for all the oppressed. In the person of Razin, the victorious proletariat erected a monument to all those from whom they took the baton of the struggle for people's happiness, for social justice.
To this day, the rumor about Stenka Razin has not subsided. His personality is immortalized in paintings, engravings, songs, and legends. How many streets and villages are named after him. There is no end to the books and articles written about him and the uprising under his leadership.
Peasant War 1670-1671
Near the town of Kagalnitsky, on an island in the river. Razin's detachment was located along the Don, three kilometers long, surrounding itself with an earthen rampart. Cossacks were released outside the town “with strong guarantees”; communication with the outside world was limited. Government agents reported to Moscow, “that in all the De Don and Khoper towns there are Cossacks, who are lazy people, and many people walking from the Volga come to him, Stenka.” According to these reports, by the end of November, Razin’s detachment already had 2,700 half-hearted Cossacks, most of whom were runaway peasants and slaves.
The Moscow government sought to discover the intentions of the Don Cossacks, for which it sent a tenant, Gerasim Evdokimov, to them with a letter from the tsar. Razin came to the circle and asked the newcomer who sent him. Evdokimov replied that “he was sent from the great sovereign, with a gracious letter from his great sovereign. And he, Stenka, told him that he did not come with a letter, but came to them as a spy, and taught him, Gerasim, to scold and beat him, and, having beaten him half to death, he put him in the water of the Don River” (drowned. - E.R.) . It was an open challenge thrown at the tsarist government, and at the same time a call for the oppressed masses to fight against their oppressors.
Ataman Kornilo Yakovlev “taught him (Razin. - E.R.) to say that he did this is unbecoming; and he, Stenka, taught him, Cornil, to threaten the same death and told him: you control your army, and I control my army.” This was the actual demarcation of the golutvenny and homely Cossacks. However, the latter in this situation felt the preponderance of forces on the side of the poor and refrained from speaking out against Razin.
At the beginning of 1670, Stepan Timofeevich and his atamans discussed a plan for a campaign against Moscow through Tambov. Despite the measures taken to maintain military secrets, rumors penetrated the people and reached the royal governors. In May, the Tambov governor wrote to the Discharge Order: “He, Stenka, wants to go to you, the great sovereign, to Moscow to confess with all his army, and de, sir, to that Stenka Razin to Moscow, mime Tanbov.” This option was probably discussed by Razin’s atamans.
But another plan was adopted. As Stepan Timofeevich subsequently reported at the Cossack circle, the atamans decided to expand the main base of the campaign against the boyars and nobles and secure their rear by capturing Tsaritsyn and Astrakhan, introducing the Cossack system there. Only then was it planned to move up the Volga to conquer the initial area of attack on Moscow. The Volga route seemed easier, and besides, it was possible to use a flotilla of plows, in the use of which the Cossacks had rich experience.
First stage of the hike- the struggle to expand the main base and provide the rear.
In the spring of 1670, Razin’s detachment moved to Tsaritsyn. The infantry sailed on 80 plows, many of which were equipped with two cannons - at the bow and at the stern. Stepan Timofeevich walked along the shore with the cavalry. A detachment of Vasily Us joined Pashin-gorod, and Razin’s forces increased to 7 thousand people.
On the night of April 13, the Cossacks approached Tsaritsyn and surrounded it from the bank and from the river. The garrison was preparing to resist. The city was well fortified. Around the fortress walls there was a deep ditch, in front of which there were gouges (logs dug vertically into the ground, arranged in several rows so that it was impossible to crawl between them or get over them). At the approaches to the gouges, “garlic” was usually installed - thick boards with sharp iron knitting needles stuffed on them. “Garlic” was carefully disguised - sprinkled with earth, grass or leaves. This obstacle was intended mainly against cavalry.
The defectors told Razin that the archers would not offer resistance, and that the residents would help take over the city. At this time, the ataman learned that a strong detachment of archers was sailing to help Tsaritsyn, who could be supported by the Edisan Tatars, who were roaming 30 km from the city. Therefore, the ataman decided first of all to attack the Tatar uluses, excluding the possibility of joint actions by enemy forces, and then to capture Tsaritsyn.
With part of the Cossacks, Razin went against the Tatars. While he was smashing the uluses, the Cossack detachment blockading the city actually captured Tsaritsyn. Only a small handful of archers, led by the governor, resisted, taking refuge in the fortress tower, which was taken in battle.
In June, a significant detachment of Moscow riflemen approached Tsaritsyn, whose command did not know the actual situation. The Cossacks took advantage of this and, 7 km above the city, suddenly attacked the archers from the shore and from the plows. The stunned enemy put up unorganized resistance and was destroyed.
The Cossacks destroyed the enemy piecemeal, not giving him the opportunity to unite his forces (Tatar uluses, the city garrison, a detachment of archers moving to strengthen the garrison). As can be seen, Razin had comprehensive information about the enemy, which was supplied to him by the population and, probably, by equestrian reconnaissance. The tsarist commanders acted blindly, having no information about the Cossacks, as they found themselves in a hostile environment of rebellious townspeople and the peasantry. Ataman Razin correctly assessed the situation and acted promptly, skillfully and decisively. The first successes were of great moral significance. They contributed to the activation of the oppressed masses.
In Tsaritsyn, Razin introduced the Cossack system. The inhabitants were organized into hundreds and tens. The highest body was the circle that discussed and decided city affairs. The appointed ataman Procopius Shumlivy was in charge of military and civil affairs. The organization of the social and political structure of the rebels represented a new moment in the armed uprising of the oppressed masses. With such political measures, Stepan Timofeevich consolidated the military successes of the rebels.
Already from Tsaritsyn, Razin began sending out letters (“charming letters”, “sheets”), in which he called on the oppressed masses to rebel against the “traitors” governors, boyars, nobles and merchants. He wrote: “Who wants to serve God and the sovereign, and the great Army, and Stepan Timofeevich... and at the same time you should bring out the traitors (boyars, nobles, governors and officials).” The distribution of “sheets” contributed to the expansion of the uprising.
Having received a report about the movement from Astrakhan to Tsaritsyn of a large detachment of archers led by the governor Prince Lvov, Razin set out to meet him, having up to 9 thousand infantry and cavalry. He himself sailed on plows with the infantry, the cavalry was led along the shore by atamans Vasily Us and Parfen Eremeev. In the battle near Cherny Yar, most of the archers went over to the side of the Cossacks and killed the “initial” people. Lvov was saved by Razin.
The forces of the rebels increased to 12 thousand people, whom Razin led to Astrakhan, where the garrison was unreliable and among the population “fears and suspicions began, they did not know who was friend and who was foe, and on whom they could rely.” “We also heard here and there about various rebellious conspiracies, mostly secret.”
Astrakhan was an even stronger fortress in comparison with Tsaritsyn. It was surrounded on all sides by water. It was armed with about 400 guns. Voivode Prozorovsky entrusted the defense of the most important points to foreigners. The approaches from the Volga were guarded by a flotilla with the flagship "Eagle" (the first Russian ship of the flotilla of the Khvalis Sea that was being created). The governor gave the archers a salary, borrowing money from the metropolitan and the monastery. But all these measures did not protect Astrakhan, the population and garrison of which sympathized with Razin and waited for him as a deliverer from the arbitrariness of the governor and clerks.
On the night of June 22, 1670, the Cossacks began to storm the fortress, concentrating significant forces against the Ascension Tower, where Prozorovsky sent his reserves. Taking advantage of this, the Cossacks, with the help of residents, climbed over the wall in another place and attacked the defenders from the rear. The archers killed the “initial” people and went over to the side of the Cossacks. The powerful fortress ended up in the hands of the rebels.
The Cossack system was also introduced in Astrakhan. Razin appointed Vasily Us, Sheludyak and Tersky as atamans of the city. He sent the Astrakhan treasury under the protection of his brother Frol to the Don, which continued to be the main base of the uprising.
The lower reaches of the Volga with strong fortresses were in the hands of the rebels, who now had significant forces and means at their disposal. The composition of the Cossack army changed, replenished with archers, working people and peasants. It turned into a peasant army.
The base of the uprising expanded, the rear for the offensive up the Volga was provided. It was possible to begin solving the second strategic task.
Second stage of the hike- the struggle to create a starting area in the Volga region for an attack on Moscow.
On July 20, 1670, 200 plows (up to 8 thousand infantry) set sail from Astrakhan and moved up the Volga, 2 thousand cavalry walked along the shore. The flotilla included two barges: one, upholstered in red velvet, in which Tsarevich Alexei Alekseevich (who died a year earlier) was supposedly located; the second, upholstered in black velvet, is with the disgraced Patriarch Nikon (he was actually exiled by the Tsar to the Ferapontov Monastery). Alexey and Nikon were declared victims of boyar tyranny, and the restoration of their rights was supposed to ensure the establishment of a fair order in the country. Agitation against the “traitors” boyars was carried out on behalf of the tsar and the church. These were the primitive ideological foundations of the anti-serfdom struggle.
Razin's campaign up the Volga contributed to the expansion of the uprising, which took on the character of a large peasant war. The peasants rebelled against the landowners and created their own armed detachments. The oppressed peoples of the Volga region also rose up. The total number of rebels was subsequently determined to be 200 thousand people. But these forces were scattered, did not have a unified plan for armed struggle, experienced military leaders and modern weapons.
The rebels easily captured Saratov, then took Samara and, on the outskirts of Simbirsk, defeated significant forces of the governor Baryatinsky, who retreated to Tetyushi. On September 4, Razin’s army besieged Simbirsk.
On September 5, with the help of the townspeople, the rebels managed to take possession of a new fort (fortified settlement). Voivode Miloslavsky with the archers and “good people” of the city “sat down under siege” in the Kremlin. Razin decided to take the fortress at any cost, although it was wooden, but well armed and with a strong garrison. The struggle became protracted.
At the same time, Stepan Timofeevich was concerned about expanding the uprising. For this purpose, separate detachments were sent to the Volga region and the Don.
On September 27, the Don Cossacks, led by Frol Razin, besieged Korotoyak, but significant forces of government troops who arrived to its rescue forced the rebels to retreat. However, residents of Ostrogozhsk, Chuguev, Zmiev, Izyum and some other cities of Sloboda Ukraine joined the uprising.
From Saratov, Razin sent a detachment of Ataman Fedorov, who moved to Penza and further to Konobeevo and Shatsk. Two detachments set out from near Simbirsk: Kharitonov - to Korsun, Saransk, Temnikov and Osipova - to Alatyr, Vasilsursk, Murashkino. The rebel peasants of Russian, Mordovian and Chuvash villages and villages joined the detachments and ultimately made up their bulk.
The uprising spread throughout the Volga region. However, Razin did not take advantage of the favorable moment, when the enemy was in confusion and the troops were scattered, when the attack on Moscow could contribute to the concentration of the forces of the rebels and their further morale. Instead, the main rebel army found itself shackled by the garrison of the Simbirsk Kremlin. The leader of the peasant war lost almost a month here, which the reaction took advantage of. This was one of the major political and strategic mistakes of S. T. Razin.
Third stage of the hike- a turning point in the struggle in favor of government troops and the defeat of the rebels.
Kazan, Nizhny Novgorod and Arzamas were the main strongholds of the government in the fight against the uprising of peasants and peoples of the Volga region. The main reserves were in Moscow. But even in the capital there was deep fermentation among the lower social classes.
On August 1, 1670, a decree of the tsar was announced, calling on stewards, solicitors, Moscow nobles and policemen, tenants and children of boyars to serve “for the great sovereign and for their homes.” The tsar appointed Prince Dolgorukov as the commander of the army, which consisted of military men of the hundredth and regimental service. The new regiments were considered more reliable than the archers, who had already gone over to the side of the rebels many times.
The tsar reviewed the 60,000-strong army, which took a whole month to organize. Only on September 1, Dolgorukov set out from Moscow and then went to Arzamas, which had been turned into a punitive stronghold. Despite the presence of large forces, the governor was not active and the actions of his troops were defensive in nature.
Razin at this time continued to besiege the garrison of the Simbirsk Kremlin. Three attacks by the rebels were repulsed. Attempts to light the wooden fortress were unsuccessful.
At this time, near Kazan, Voivode Baryatinsky gathered forces and on September 15 set out for Simbirsk. Along the way, he defeated two rebel detachments, which helped strengthen the morale of his troops.
On October 1, 1670, Baryatinsky’s detachment was 2 km from Simbirsk, located on the bank of the river. Sviyaga. Razin took the Don Cossacks and attacked the enemy. The enemy repelled two persistent attacks, and the Cossacks were forced to retreat. Baryatinsky entered the Kremlin, strengthening its garrison.
On the night of October 4, Razin launched a fourth assault. But Baryatinsky sent one regiment across the river. Sviyag and ordered him to make “shouts”, depicting the approach of fresh forces. The enemy’s trick was successful, since during the night assault the atamans of the rebels did not organize reconnaissance and protection of their rear.
There were large rebel forces in the Volga region. Some units had artillery. However, there was no centralized leadership of the rebels, as a result of which their military actions were fragmented. The enemy had the opportunity to destroy the rebels piece by piece.
The army of governor Dolgorukov went on the offensive as soon as it became known that the main forces of the rebels were defeated near Simbirsk. The first target of the enemy's actions was the village of Murashkino - one of the large, well-fortified centers of the peasant uprising. The village's fortifications consisted of a rampart with towers and a deep ditch. There were 13 arquebuses on the shaft.
Peasant detachments met the enemy on the outskirts of the village (5 km from it), but the ensuing battle proceeded disorganized due to the lack of a unified command, military discipline and lack of training of the personnel of the peasant army. Under the pressure of Dolgorukov's well-armed regiments, the peasants began to retreat, and then fled, abandoning 21 guns. The voivode ordered the village to be burned and the prisoners executed.
The second major center of the uprising in this area was the village of Lyskovo, where the Cossack system was organized. Dolgorukov inflicted the same reprisal on the Lyskovites, after which he went to Nizhny Novgorod, where there was also “shakability for theft.”
The governor sent a strong detachment of government troops south from Arzamas in the direction of Temnikov. A 7,000-strong peasant detachment operated in this area, the chieftain of which was the peasant woman Alena. Despite the unification of Alena’s detachment with the detachment of Ataman Sidorov, the punitive forces managed to defeat the rebels here too. Captured Alena was tortured and then burned in a log house.
On November 12, governor Baryatinsky approached Ust-Uransk from Simbirsk. Large rebel forces took up a position along the river bank. Kandaratki. There were Alatyr residents, Korsun residents, Kurmysh residents, Arzamas residents, Saratov residents and Penza residents. The peasant army numbered 15 thousand people and 12 guns. It consisted of infantry, cavalry and had an outfit.
There is information about the tactics of the ensuing battle in the report of Baryatinsky, who wrote: “And regiments stood against regiments from morning until lunch for less than half a mile. And he waited for them to cross the crossing to me, but they did not come to me for the crossing... having examined the places, he ordered the foot regiments and orders with a convoy with everything and with cannons to advance on them. And we, having swept the Kandaratka River with nets, crossed. And they... the infantry was brought up at the river, and the battle was great and there was cannon and musket fire and incessant fire, and I, with all the cavalry regiments, attacked their cavalry regiments. And a great battle broke out, and... he beat those thieves, and the convoy took and 11 cannons, and their two-gun arquebus was torn apart, and 24 banners. And he split everyone apart, and they ran their separate ways...”
The infantry of the peasant army with a detachment was located in the center of the position, the cavalry provided the flanks. Baryatinsky's foot regiments with a regimental outfit crossed the river. Kandaratka, pinning down the rebel infantry. At the same time, the government cavalry regiments launched flank attacks and shot down the peasant cavalry. In the peasant army, apparently, no reserve was allocated and therefore there were no forces to restore the situation. In addition, the defensive actions of the rebels had a negative impact on their morale. The rebels were defeated.
Razin with the remnants of the Don Cossacks went to the Don and tried to gather strength for a new campaign. However, the situation has changed radically. From active offensive operations in the Volga region, peasant detachments were forced to go on the defensive in conditions of organizational and technical superiority of the enemy. This meant the defeat of the rebels, which allowed the government to go on the offensive in the southern direction. Reitar and dragoon regiments were sent to the Don.
In the Don Army, the homely Cossacks, led by Ataman Yakovlev, began to gather their forces to fight the Golytba. The advantage was in favor of supporters of the tsarist government. At the assembled circle, the Cossacks decided not to join Razin.
In April 1671, Cherkassy Cossacks took and burned the town of Kagalnitsky, capturing Stepan Timofeevich and his brother Frol.
The last stronghold of the second peasant war, Astrakhan, was taken by government troops only on November 27, 1671.
Execution of Stepan Razin
After the Simbirsk defeat, Stepan Timofeevich lost in the eyes of the Cossacks the former attractiveness of the ataman-“sorcerer”, from the bullets and cannonballs of the “charmed” one. Kornila Yakovlev and his “homely” Cossacks managed to capture him and handed him over to the government.
Stepan was brought to Moscow in shackles on a special cart with a gallows, to the crossbar of which he was chained. Behind the cart, wearing an iron collar and also chained, was Stepan’s brother Frol. The Razins were mercilessly tortured in the Zemsky Prikaz, where there were excellent masters of their craft: the brothers were raised on the rack, beaten with a whip, thrown onto hot coals, burned with iron, cold water was poured drop by drop onto the shaved crown... Stepan held on steadfastly, even encouraged him, who was wilting. , Frola. The chieftain was subjected to a cruel and painful execution: the executioner cut off his right arm first at the elbow, then his left leg at the knee. Frightened by what he saw, Frol, who faced the same fate, said “word and deed,” promising to hand over Stenka’s treasures. The last words of the formidable chieftain were a shout addressed to his brother: “Be silent, dog!” And after that his wild head rolled onto the platform. The body was cut into pieces and strung on stakes, and the entrails were thrown to the dogs. It was impossible to bury Razin, devoted to the church curse - anathema, according to Christian custom, and therefore his mortal remains were buried in a Tatar cemetery unknown where and when...
Conclusion
The rebellious oppressed classes of the Russian state were defeated in the second peasant war. However, the revolutionary war had a positive historical significance. It was an expression of popular protest against serfdom, against the arbitrariness of governors and clerks who oppressed and robbed the population in cities and villages. Although open armed struggle took place under tsarist slogans, it undermined the foundations of the autocratic system and contributed to the preservation of the spirit of protest among the people against serfdom and the enforced slavish obedience. Despite mass executions and atrocities, the governors failed to uproot the roots of the revolutionary sentiments of the peasants.
The lack of clear political goals of the struggle, the absence of organizing forces, the spontaneity of the uprising and the lack of consciousness of the masses, the strategic mistakes of the leadership - these are the main reasons for the defeat of the rebels.
With regard to the peasant army, it should be noted that the dedication and generally high moral qualities of those who fought could not compensate for poor weapons, the lack of a clear organization, military discipline and experienced military leaders.
The tsarist government had large armed forces. City officials and even Moscow archers revealed political “shakyness” and weak combat capability. The new regiments (dragoons, reiters, soldiers) turned out to be more stable in comparison with the hundred units, i.e. old, service.
The external political situation allowed the government to throw large forces against the rebels, and there was enough time to collect and organize them. Razin's strategic mistake as the leader of the uprising was that he did not try to take the enemy by surprise, but acted methodically, consistently capturing strongholds upstream of the Volga. The loss of time near Simbirsk was one of the reasons that determined the turning point in the course of the war.
Stepan Timofeevich Razin, politically and militarily, was one of the talented “... representatives of the rebellious peasantry.” He skillfully called upon the masses to rise up against their oppressors, created the basis for a wide deployment of military operations on the Don and Volga, outlined the main milestones of the war plan and ensured the achievement of a number of major tactical successes, which, however, did not lead to a positive strategic result. In pursuit of continuous tactical achievements, the leader of the uprising lost time and missed the favorable moment to solve the main problem.
Bibliography
(1) See Supplement to Historical Acts (DAI), vol. IX, no. 106.
(2) The Peasant War under the leadership of Stepan Razin, vol. 1. M., 1954, p. 165.
(3) Ibid.
(4) V.I. Lenin. Soch., vol. 1, p. 137.
(5) The Peasant War under the leadership of Stepan Razin, vol. I, p. 109.
The Cossacks write petitions to Orenburg and St. Petersburg, send so-called “winter villages” - delegates from the army with a complaint against the atamans and local authorities. Sometimes they achieved their goal, and especially unacceptable atamans changed, but on the whole the situation remained the same. In 1771, the Yaik Cossacks refused to go in pursuit of the Kalmyks who had migrated outside Russia. General Traubenberg and a detachment of soldiers went to investigate direct disobedience to the order. The result of the punishments he carried out was the Yaitsky Cossack uprising of 1772, during which General Traubenberg and the military ataman Tambov were killed. Troops under the command of General F. Yu. Freiman were sent to suppress the uprising. The rebels were defeated at the Embulatovka River in June 1772; As a result of the defeat, the Cossack circles were finally liquidated, a garrison of government troops was stationed in the Yaitsky town, and all power over the army passed into the hands of the commandant of the garrison, Lieutenant Colonel I. D. Simonov. The reprisal carried out against the caught instigators was extremely cruel and made a depressing impression on the army: never before had Cossacks been branded or had their tongues cut out. A large number of participants in the performance took refuge in distant steppe farms, excitement reigned everywhere, the state of the Cossacks was like a compressed spring.
No less tension was present among the heterodox peoples of the Urals and Volga region. The development of the Urals and the active colonization of the lands of the Volga region, which began in the 18th century, the construction and development of military border lines, the expansion of the Orenburg, Yaitsky and Siberian Cossack troops with the allocation of lands that previously belonged to local nomadic peoples, intolerant religious policies led to numerous unrest among the Bashkirs, Tatars, Kazakhs, Mordvins, Chuvash, Udmurts, Kalmyks (most of the latter, having broken through the Yaitsky border line, migrated to Western China in 1771).
The situation at the fast-growing factories of the Urals was also explosive. Starting with Peter, the government solved the problem of labor in metallurgy mainly by assigning state peasants to state-owned and private mining factories, allowing new factory owners to buy serf villages and granting the unofficial right to keep runaway serfs, since the Berg Collegium, which was in charge of the factories , tried not to notice violations of the decree on the capture and deportation of all fugitives. At the same time, it was very convenient to take advantage of the lack of rights and hopeless situation of the fugitives, and if anyone began to express dissatisfaction with their situation, they were immediately handed over to the authorities for punishment. Former peasants resisted forced labor in factories.
Peasants assigned to state-owned and private factories dreamed of returning to their usual village labor, while the situation of peasants on serf estates was little better. The economic situation in the country, almost continuously waging one war after another, was difficult; in addition, the gallant age required the nobles to follow the latest fashions and trends. Therefore, landowners increase the area under crops, and corvée increases. The peasants themselves become a hot commodity, they are pawned, exchanged, and entire villages simply lose out. To top it off, Catherine II issued a Decree of August 22, 1767, prohibiting peasants from complaining about landowners. In conditions of complete impunity and personal dependence, the slave position of the peasants is aggravated by the whims, caprices or real crimes occurring on the estates, and most of them were left without investigation or consequences.
In this situation, the most fantastic rumors easily found their way about imminent freedom or about the transfer of all the peasants to the treasury, about the ready decree of the tsar, whose wife and boyars were killed for this, that the tsar was not killed, but he is hiding until better times - all of them fell on the fertile soil of general human dissatisfaction with their current situation. There was simply no legal opportunity left for all groups of future participants in the performance to defend their interests.
The beginning of the uprising
Emelyan Pugachev. Portrait attached to the publication of “The History of the Pugachev Rebellion” by A. S. Pushkin, 1834
Despite the fact that the internal readiness of the Yaik Cossacks for the uprising was high, the speech lacked a unifying idea, a core that would unite the sheltered and hidden participants in the unrest of 1772. The rumor that the miraculously saved Emperor Peter Fedorovich (Emperor Peter III, who died during the coup after a six-month reign) appeared in the army, instantly spread throughout Yaik.
Few of the Cossack leaders believed in the resurrected tsar, but everyone looked closely to see if this man was able to lead, to gather under his banner an army capable of equaling the government. The man who called himself Peter III was Emelyan Ivanovich Pugachev - a Don Cossack, a native of the Zimoveyskaya village (which had already given Russian history Stepan Razin and Kondraty Bulavin), a participant in the Seven Years' War and the war with Turkey of 1768-1774.
Finding himself in the Trans-Volga steppes in the fall of 1772, he stopped in the Mechetnaya Sloboda and here from the abbot of the Old Believer skete Filaret learned about the unrest among the Yaik Cossacks. Where the idea of calling himself a tsar came from in his head and what his initial plans were is not known for certain, but in November 1772 he arrived in the Yaitsky town and at meetings with the Cossacks called himself Peter III. Upon returning to Irgiz, Pugachev was arrested and sent to Kazan, from where he fled at the end of May 1773. In August, he reappeared in the army, at the inn of Stepan Obolyaev, where he was visited by his future closest associates - Shigaev, Zarubin, Karavaev, Myasnikov.
In September, hiding from search parties, Pugachev, accompanied by a group of Cossacks, arrived at the Budarinsky outpost, where on September 17 his first decree to the Yaitsk army was announced. The author of the decree was one of the few literate Cossacks, 19-year-old Ivan Pochitalin, sent by his father to serve the “tsar”. From here a detachment of 80 Cossacks headed up the Yaik. Along the way, new supporters joined, so that by the time they arrived at the Yaitsky town on September 18, the detachment already numbered 300 people. On September 18, 1773, an attempt to cross the Chagan and enter the city ended in failure, but at the same time a large group of Cossacks, among those sent by Commandant Simonov to defend the town, went over to the side of the impostor. A repeated rebel attack on September 19 was also repulsed with artillery. The rebel detachment did not have its own cannons, so it was decided to move further up the Yaik, and on September 20 the Cossacks set up camp near the Iletsky town.
Here a circle was convened, at which the troops elected Andrei Ovchinnikov as the marching ataman, all the Cossacks swore allegiance to the great sovereign Emperor Peter Fedorovich, after which Pugachev sent Ovchinnikov to the Iletsky town with decrees to the Cossacks: “ And whatever you wish, all benefits and salaries will not be denied to you; and your glory will never expire; and both you and your descendants will be the first under me, the great sovereign, to obey". Despite the opposition of the Iletsk ataman Portnov, Ovchinnikov convinced the local Cossacks to join the uprising, and they greeted Pugachev with ringing bells and bread and salt.
All Iletsk Cossacks swore allegiance to Pugachev. The first execution took place: according to complaints from the residents - “he did great harm to them and ruined them” - Portnov was hanged. A separate regiment was formed from the Iletsk Cossacks, led by Ivan Tvorogov, and the army received all the artillery of the town. The Yaik Cossack Fyodor Chumakov was appointed head of the artillery.
Map of the initial stage of the uprising
After a two-day meeting on further actions, it was decided to send the main forces to Orenburg, the capital of a huge region under the control of the hated Reinsdorp. On the way to Orenburg there were small fortresses of the Nizhne-Yaitsky distance of the Orenburg military line. The garrison of the fortresses was, as a rule, mixed - Cossacks and soldiers, their life and service were perfectly described by Pushkin in The Captain's Daughter.
And already on October 5, Pugachev’s army approached the city, setting up a temporary camp five miles away. The Cossacks were sent to the ramparts and managed to convey Pugachev’s decree to the garrison troops with a call to lay down their arms and join the “sovereign.” In response, cannons from the city rampart began firing at the rebels. On October 6, Reinsdorp ordered a sortie; a detachment of 1,500 people under the command of Major Naumov returned to the fortress after a two-hour battle. At the military council assembled on October 7, it was decided to defend behind the walls of the fortress under the cover of fortress artillery. One of the reasons for this decision was the fear of soldiers and Cossacks going over to Pugachev’s side. The sortie carried out showed that the soldiers fought reluctantly, Major Naumov reported that he had discovered “there is timidity and fear in his subordinates”.
Together with Karanai Muratov, Kaskyn Samarov captured Sterlitamak and Tabynsk, from November 28, the Pugachevites under the command of Ataman Ivan Gubanov and Kaskyn Samarov besieged Ufa, from December 14, the siege was commanded by Ataman Chika-Zarubin. On December 23, Zarubin, at the head of a 10,000-strong detachment with 15 cannons, began an assault on the city, but was repulsed by cannon fire and energetic counterattacks of the garrison.
Ataman Ivan Gryaznov, who participated in the capture of Sterlitamak and Tabynsk, gathered a detachment of factory peasants and captured factories on the Belaya River (Voskresensky, Arkhangelsky, Bogoyavlensky factories). In early November, he proposed organizing the casting of cannons and cannonballs at nearby factories. Pugachev promoted him to colonel and sent him to organize detachments in the Iset province. There he took the Satkinsky, Zlatoust, Kyshtymsky and Kaslinsky factories, the Kundravinskaya, Uvelskaya and Varlamov settlements, the Chebarkul fortress, defeated the punitive teams sent against him, and by January he approached Chelyabinsk with a detachment of four thousand.
In December 1773, Pugachev sent ataman Mikhail Tolkachev with his decrees to the rulers of the Kazakh Junior Zhuz, Nurali Khan and Sultan Dusali, with a call to join his army, but the khan decided to wait for developments; only the riders of the Sarym Datula clan joined Pugachev. On the way back, Tolkachev gathered Cossacks into his detachment in the fortresses and outposts on the lower Yaik and headed with them to the Yaitsky town, collecting guns, ammunition and provisions in the associated fortresses and outposts. On December 30, Tolkachev approached the Yaitsky town, seven miles from which he defeated and captured the Cossack team of foreman N.A. Mostovshchikov sent against him; in the evening of the same day he occupied the ancient district of the city - Kureni. Most of the Cossacks greeted their comrades and joined Tolkachev’s detachment, the Cossacks of the senior side, the garrison soldiers led by Lieutenant Colonel Simonov and Captain Krylov locked themselves in the “retransference” - the fortress of the St. Michael the Archangel Cathedral, the cathedral itself was its main citadel. Gunpowder was stored in the basement of the bell tower, and cannons and arrows were installed on the upper tiers. It was not possible to take the fortress on the move.
In total, according to rough estimates by historians, by the end of 1773 there were from 25 to 40 thousand people in the ranks of Pugachev’s army, more than half of this number were Bashkir detachments. To control the troops, Pugachev created the Military Collegium, which served as an administrative and military center and conducted extensive correspondence with remote areas of the uprising. A. I. Vitoshnov, M. G. Shigaev, D. G. Skobychkin and I. A. Tvorogov were appointed judges of the Military Collegium, I. Ya. Pochitalin, the “Duma” clerk, and M. D. Gorshkov, the secretary.
The house of the "Tsar's father-in-law" Cossack Kuznetsov - now the Pugachev Museum in Uralsk
In January 1774, Ataman Ovchinnikov led a campaign to the lower reaches of the Yaik, to the Guryev town, stormed its Kremlin, captured rich trophies and replenished the detachment with local Cossacks, bringing them to the Yaitsky town. At the same time, Pugachev himself arrived in Yaitsky town. He took over the leadership of the protracted siege of the city fortress of the Archangel Cathedral, but after a failed assault on January 20, he returned to the main army near Orenburg. At the end of January, Pugachev returned to the Yaitsky town, where a military circle was held, at which N.A. Kargin was chosen as military chieftain, A.P. Perfilyev and I.A. Fofanov were chosen as chief officers. At the same time, the Cossacks, wanting to finally unite the tsar with the army, married him to a young Cossack woman, Ustinya Kuznetsova. In the second half of February and early March 1774, Pugachev again personally led attempts to take possession of the besieged fortress. On February 19, a mine explosion blew up and destroyed the bell tower of St. Michael's Cathedral, but the garrison each time managed to repel the attacks of the besiegers.
Detachments of Pugachevites under the command of Ivan Beloborodov, which grew up to 3 thousand people during the campaign, approached Yekaterinburg, along the way capturing a number of surrounding fortresses and factories, and on January 20, they captured the Demidov Shaitansky plant as their main base of operations.
The situation in besieged Orenburg by this time was already critical; famine had begun in the city. Having learned about the departure of Pugachev and Ovchinnikov with part of the troops to the Yaitsky town, Governor Reinsdorp decided to make a foray to Berdskaya Sloboda on January 13 to lift the siege. But the unexpected attack did not happen; the Cossack patrols managed to raise the alarm. The atamans M. Shigaev, D. Lysov, T. Podurov and Khlopusha who remained in the camp led their detachments to the ravine that surrounded the Berdskaya settlement and served as a natural line of defense. The Orenburg corps were forced to fight in unfavorable conditions and suffered a severe defeat. With heavy losses, abandoning cannons, weapons, ammunition and ammunition, the half-encircled Orenburg troops hastily retreated to Orenburg under the cover of the city walls, losing only 281 people killed, 13 cannons with all the shells for them, a lot of weapons, ammunition and ammunition.
On January 25, 1774, the Pugachevites launched the second and final assault on Ufa, Zarubin attacked the city from the southwest, from the left bank of the Belaya River, and Ataman Gubanov - from the east. At first, the detachments were successful and even broke into the outskirts of the city, but there their offensive impulse was stopped by grapeshot fire from the defenders. Having pulled all available forces to the breakthrough sites, the garrison drove first Zarubin and then Gubanov out of the city.
In early January, the Chelyabinsk Cossacks rebelled and tried to seize power in the city in the hope of help from the troops of Ataman Gryaznov, but were defeated by the city garrison. On January 10, Gryaznov unsuccessfully attempted to take Chelyaba by storm, and on January 13, General I. A. Dekolong’s two-thousand-strong corps, which arrived from Siberia, entered Chelyaba. Throughout January, fighting unfolded on the outskirts of the city, and on February 8, Delong decided it was best to leave the city to the Pugachevites.
On February 16, Khlopushi's detachment stormed the Iletsk Defense, killing all the officers, taking possession of weapons, ammunition and provisions, and taking with them convicts, Cossacks and soldiers fit for military service.
Military defeats and expansion of the Peasant War area
When news reached St. Petersburg about the defeat of the expedition of V. A. Kara and the unauthorized departure of Kara himself to Moscow, Catherine II, by decree of November 27, appointed A. I. Bibikov as the new commander. The new punitive corps included 10 cavalry and infantry regiments, as well as 4 light field teams, hastily sent from the western and northwestern borders of the empire to Kazan and Samara, and besides them - all garrisons and military units located in the uprising zone, and remnants of Kara's corps. Bibikov arrived in Kazan on December 25, 1773, and the movement of regiments and brigades immediately began under the command of P. M. Golitsyn and P. D. Mansurov to Samara, Orenburg, Ufa, Menzelinsk, and Kungur, besieged by Pugachev’s troops. Already on December 29, the 24th light field command, led by Major K.I. Mufel, reinforced by two squadrons of Bakhmut hussars and other units, recaptured Samara. Arapov, with several dozen Pugachevites who remained with him, retreated to Alekseevsk, but the brigade led by Mansurov defeated his troops in battles near Alekseevsk and at the Buzuluk fortress, after which in Sorochinskaya they united on March 10 with the corps of General Golitsyn, who approached there, advancing from Kazan, defeating the rebels near Menzelinsk and Kungur.
Having received information about the advance of the Mansurov and Golitsyn brigades, Pugachev decided to withdraw the main forces from Orenburg, effectively lifting the siege, and concentrate the main forces in the Tatishchev Fortress. Instead of the burnt walls, an ice rampart was built, and all available artillery was collected. Soon a government detachment consisting of 6,500 people and 25 cannons approached the fortress. The battle took place on March 22 and was extremely fierce. Prince Golitsyn in his report to A. Bibikov wrote: “The matter was so important that I did not expect such insolence and control in such unenlightened people in the military profession as these defeated rebels are.”. When the situation became hopeless, Pugachev decided to return to Berdy. His retreat was covered by the Cossack regiment of Ataman Ovchinnikov. With his regiment, he staunchly defended himself until the cannon charges ran out, and then, with three hundred Cossacks, he managed to break through the troops surrounding the fortress and retreated to the Nizhneozernaya fortress. This was the first major defeat of the rebels. Pugachev lost about 2 thousand people killed, 4 thousand wounded and prisoners, all the artillery and convoys. Among the dead was Ataman Ilya Arapov.
Map of the second stage of the Peasant War
At the same time, the St. Petersburg Carabineer Regiment under the command of I. Mikhelson, previously stationed in Poland and aimed at suppressing the uprising, arrived on March 2, 1774 in Kazan and, reinforced by cavalry units, was immediately sent to suppress the uprising in the Kama region. On March 24, in a battle near Ufa, near the village of Chesnokovka, he defeated the troops under the command of Chika-Zarubin, and two days later captured Zarubin himself and his entourage. Having won victories in the territory of the Ufa and Iset provinces over the detachments of Salavat Yulaev and other Bashkir colonels, he failed to suppress the uprising of the Bashkirs as a whole, since the Bashkirs switched to guerrilla tactics.
Leaving Mansurov's brigade in the Tatishchevoy fortress, Golitsyn continued his march to Orenburg, where he entered on March 29, while Pugachev, having gathered his troops, tried to break through to the Yaitsky town, but having met government troops near the Perevolotsk fortress, he was forced to turn to the Sakmarsky town, where he decided to give battle to Golitsyn. In the battle on April 1, the rebels were again defeated, over 2,800 people were captured, including Maxim Shigaev, Andrei Vitoshnov, Timofey Podurov, Ivan Pochitalin and others. Pugachev himself, breaking away from the enemy pursuit, fled with several hundred Cossacks to the Prechistenskaya fortress, and from there he went beyond the bend of the Belaya River, to the mining region of the Southern Urals, where the rebels had reliable support.
At the beginning of April, the brigade of P. D. Mansurov, reinforced by the Izyum Hussar Regiment and the Cossack detachment of the Yaitsky foreman M. M. Borodin, headed from the Tatishchevoy fortress to the Yaitsky town. The Nizhneozernaya and Rassypnaya fortresses and the Iletsky town were taken from the Pugachevites; on April 12, the Cossack rebels were defeated at the Irtetsk outpost. In an effort to stop the advance of the punitive forces towards their native Yaitsky town, the Cossacks, led by A. A. Ovchinnikov, A. P. Perfilyev and K. I. Dekhtyarev, decided to move towards Mansurov. The meeting took place on April 15, 50 versts east of the Yaitsky town, near the Bykovka River. Having gotten involved in the battle, the Cossacks were unable to resist the regular troops; a retreat began, which gradually turned into a stampede. Pursued by the hussars, the Cossacks retreated to the Rubezhny outpost, losing hundreds of people killed, among whom was Dekhtyarev. Having gathered people, Ataman Ovchinnikov led a detachment through the remote steppes to the Southern Urals, to connect with Pugachev’s troops, who had gone beyond the Belaya River.
On the evening of April 15, when in the Yaitsky town they learned about the defeat at Bykovka, a group of Cossacks, wanting to curry favor with the punitive forces, tied up and handed over the atamans Kargin and Tolkachev to Simonov. Mansurov entered the Yaitsky town on April 16, finally liberating the city fortress, besieged by the Pugachevites since December 30, 1773. The Cossacks who fled to the steppe were unable to make their way to the main area of the uprising; in May-July 1774, the teams of Mansurov’s brigade and the Cossacks of the senior side began a search and defeat in the Priyaitsk steppe, near the Uzenei and Irgiz rivers, the rebel detachments of F. I. Derbetev, S. L Rechkina, I. A. Fofanova.
At the beginning of April 1774, the corps of Second Major Gagrin, which approached from Yekaterinburg, defeated Tumanov’s detachment located in Chelyab. And on May 1, the team of Lieutenant Colonel D. Kandaurov, who arrived from Astrakhan, recaptured the town of Guryev from the rebels.
On April 9, 1774, the commander of military operations against Pugachev, A.I. Bibikov, died. After him, Catherine II entrusted the command of the troops to Lieutenant General F. F. Shcherbatov, as the senior in rank. Offended that he was not appointed to the post of commander of the troops, having sent small teams to nearby fortresses and villages to carry out investigations and punishments, General Golitsyn with the main forces of his corps stayed in Orenburg for three months. Intrigues between the generals gave Pugachev a much-needed respite; he managed to gather scattered small detachments in the Southern Urals. The pursuit was also suspended by the spring thaw and floods on the rivers, which made the roads impassable.
Ural mine. Painting by Demidov serf artist V. P. Khudoyarov
On the morning of May 5, Pugachev’s detachment of five thousand approached the Magnetic Fortress. By this time, Pugachev’s detachment consisted mainly of weakly armed factory peasants and a small number of personal egg guards under the command of Myasnikov; the detachment did not have a single cannon. The start of the assault on Magnitnaya was unsuccessful, about 500 people died in the battle, Pugachev himself was wounded in his right hand. Having withdrawn the troops from the fortress and discussed the situation, the rebels, under the cover of the darkness of the night, made a new attempt and were able to break into the fortress and capture it. 10 cannons, rifles, and ammunition were taken as trophies. On May 7, detachments of atamans A. Ovchinnikov, A. Perfilyev, I. Beloborodov and S. Maksimov arrived at Magnitnaya from different directions.
Heading up the Yaik, the rebels captured the fortresses of Karagai, Peter and Paul and Stepnaya and on May 20 approached the largest Trinity. By this time, the detachment numbered 10 thousand people. During the assault that began, the garrison tried to repel the attack with artillery fire, but overcoming desperate resistance, the rebels broke into Troitskaya. Pugachev received artillery with shells and reserves of gunpowder, supplies of provisions and fodder. On the morning of May 21, Delong's corps attacked the rebels resting after the battle. Taken by surprise, the Pugachevites suffered a heavy defeat, losing 4,000 people killed and the same number wounded and captured. Only one and a half thousand mounted Cossacks and Bashkirs were able to retreat along the road to Chelyabinsk.
Salavat Yulaev, who had recovered from his wound, managed to organize resistance to Mikhelson’s detachment in Bashkiria at that time, east of Ufa, covering Pugachev’s army from his stubborn pursuit. In the battles that took place on May 6, 8, 17, and 31, Salavat, although he was not successful in them, did not allow his troops to inflict significant losses. On June 3, he united with Pugachev, by which time the Bashkirs made up two-thirds of the total number of the rebel army. On June 3 and 5 on the Ai River they gave new battles to Mikhelson. Neither side received the desired success. Retreating north, Pugachev regrouped his forces while Mikhelson retreated to Ufa to drive away the Bashkir detachments operating near the city and replenish supplies of ammunition and provisions.
Taking advantage of the respite, Pugachev headed towards Kazan. On June 10, the Krasnoufimskaya fortress was taken, and on June 11, a victory was won in the battle near Kungur against the garrison that had made a sortie. Without attempting to storm Kungur, Pugachev turned west. On June 14, the vanguard of his army under the command of Ivan Beloborodov and Salavat Yulaev approached the Kama town of Ose and blocked the city fortress. Four days later, Pugachev’s main forces arrived here and began siege battles with the garrison settled in the fortress. On June 21, the defenders of the fortress, having exhausted the possibilities of further resistance, capitulated. During this period, the adventurer merchant Astafy Dolgopolov (“Ivan Ivanov”) came to Pugachev, posing as an envoy of Tsarevich Pavel and thus deciding to improve his financial situation. Pugachev unraveled his adventure, and Dolgopolov, by agreement with him, acted for some time as a “witness to the authenticity of Peter III.”
Having captured Osa, Pugachev transported the army across the Kama, took the Votkinsk and Izhevsk ironworks, Yelabuga, Sarapul, Menzelinsk, Agryz, Zainsk, Mamadysh and other cities and fortresses along the way, and in early July approached Kazan.
View of the Kazan Kremlin
A detachment under the command of Colonel Tolstoy came out to meet Pugachev, and on July 10, 12 versts from the city, the Pugachevites won a complete victory. The next day, a detachment of rebels camped near the city. “In the evening, in view of all the Kazan residents, he (Pugachev) himself went to look out for the city, and returned to the camp, postponing the attack until the next morning.”. On July 12, as a result of the assault, the suburbs and main areas of the city were taken, the garrison remaining in the city locked itself in the Kazan Kremlin and prepared for a siege. A strong fire began in the city, in addition, Pugachev received news of the approach of Mikhelson’s troops, who were following on his heels from Ufa, so the Pugachev detachments left the burning city. As a result of a short battle, Mikhelson made his way to the garrison of Kazan, Pugachev retreated across the Kazanka River. Both sides were preparing for the decisive battle, which took place on July 15. Pugachev's army numbered 25 thousand people, but most of them were weakly armed peasants who had just joined the uprising, Tatar and Bashkir cavalry armed with bows, and a small number of remaining Cossacks. The competent actions of Mikhelson, who struck first of all at the Yaik core of the Pugachevites, led to the complete defeat of the rebels, at least 2 thousand people died, about 5 thousand were taken prisoner, among whom was Colonel Ivan Beloborodov.
Announced publicly
We congratulate you with this named decree with our royal and fatherly
the mercy of all who were formerly in the peasantry and
subject to the landowners, to be loyal slaves
our own crown; and rewarded with an ancient cross
and prayer, heads and beards, liberty and freedom
and forever Cossacks, without requiring recruitment, capitation
and other monetary taxes, ownership of lands, forests,
hayfields and fishing grounds, and salt lakes
without purchase and without rent; and free everyone from what was previously done
from the villains of the nobles and the bribery-takers of the city-judges to the peasants and everything
taxes and burdens imposed on the people. And we wish you the salvation of souls
and calm in the light of life for which we have tasted and endured
from the registered villains-nobles, wandering and considerable disaster.
And what is our name now by the power of the Most High Right Hand in Russia?
flourishes, for this reason we command with this personal decree:
which formerly were nobles in their estates and vodchinas, - of which
opponents of our power and troublemakers of the empire and despoilers
peasants, to catch, execute and hang, and to do the same,
what they did to you, peasants, without Christianity in them.
After the destruction of which opponents and villainous nobles, anyone can
to feel the silence and calm life that will continue until the century.
Given July 31st day 1774.
By the grace of God, we, Peter the Third,
Emperor and Autocrat of All Russia and so on,
And on and on and on.
Even before the start of the battle on July 15, Pugachev announced in the camp that he would head from Kazan to Moscow. Rumors of this instantly spread throughout all the nearby villages, estates and towns. Despite the major defeat of Pugachev's army, the flames of the uprising engulfed the entire western bank of the Volga. Having crossed the Volga at Kokshaysk, below the village of Sundyr, Pugachev replenished his army with thousands of peasants. By this time, Salavat Yulaev and his troops continued fighting near Ufa; the Bashkir troops in the Pugachev detachment were led by Kinzya Arslanov. On July 20, Pugachev entered Kurmysh, on the 23rd he freely entered Alatyr, after which he headed towards Saransk. On July 28, in the central square of Saransk, a decree on freedom for peasants was read out, supplies of salt and bread, and the city treasury were distributed to residents “driving around the city fortress and along the streets... they abandoned the mob that had come from different districts”. On July 31, the same solemn meeting awaited Pugachev in Penza. The decrees caused numerous peasant revolts in the Volga region; in total, scattered detachments operating within their estates numbered tens of thousands of fighters. The movement covered most of the Volga districts, approached the borders of the Moscow province, and really threatened Moscow.
The publication of decrees (in fact, manifestos on the liberation of peasants) in Saransk and Penza is called the culmination of the Peasant War. The decrees made a strong impression on the peasants, on the Old Believers hiding from persecution, on the opposite side - the nobles and on Catherine II herself. The enthusiasm that gripped the peasants of the Volga region led to the fact that a population of more than a million people was involved in the uprising. They could give nothing to Pugachev’s army in the long-term military plan, since the peasant detachments operated no further than their estate. But they turned Pugachev’s campaign across the Volga region into a triumphal procession, with bells ringing, the blessing of the village priest and bread and salt in every new village, village, town. When Pugachev’s army or its individual detachments approached, the peasants tied up or killed their landowners and their clerks, hanged local officials, burned estates, and smashed shops. In total, in the summer of 1774, at least 3 thousand nobles and government officials were killed.
In the second half of July 1774, when the flames of the Pugachev uprising approached the borders of the Moscow province and threatened Moscow itself, the alarmed empress was forced to agree to the proposal of Chancellor N.I. Panin to appoint his brother, the disgraced general-in-chief Pyotr Ivanovich Panin, commander of a military expedition against rebels. General F. F. Shcherbatov was expelled from this post on July 22, and by decree of July 29, Catherine II gave Panin emergency powers “in suppressing rebellion and restoring internal order in the provinces of Orenburg, Kazan and Nizhny Novgorod”. It is noteworthy that under the command of P.I. Panin, who received the Order of St. for the capture of Bender in 1770. George I class, Don cornet Emelyan Pugachev also distinguished himself in that battle.
To speed up the conclusion of peace, the terms of the Kuchuk-Kainardzhi Peace Treaty were softened, and the troops released on the Turkish borders - a total of 20 cavalry and infantry regiments - were recalled from the armies to act against Pugachev. As Ekaterina noted, against Pugachev “So many troops were equipped that such an army was almost terrible for its neighbors”. It is noteworthy that in August 1774, Lieutenant General Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov, at that time already one of the most successful Russian generals, was recalled from the 1st Army, which was located in the Danube principalities. Panin entrusted Suvorov with command of the troops that were supposed to defeat the main Pugachev army in the Volga region.
Suppression of the uprising
After Pugachev’s triumphant entry into Saransk and Penza, everyone expected his march to Moscow. Seven regiments under the personal command of P.I. Panin were gathered in Moscow, where memories of the Plague Riot of 1771 were still fresh. Moscow Governor-General Prince M.N. Volkonsky ordered artillery to be placed near his house. The police strengthened surveillance and sent informants to crowded places in order to capture all those who sympathized with Pugachev. Mikhelson, who was promoted to colonel in July and was pursuing the rebels from Kazan, turned towards Arzamas to block the road to the old capital. General Mansurov set out from the Yaitsky town to Syzran, General Golitsyn - to Saransk. The punitive teams of Mufel and Mellin reported that Pugachev was leaving rebellious villages behind him everywhere and they did not have time to pacify them all. “Not only peasants, but priests, monks, even archimandrites outrage sensitive and insensitive people”. Excerpts from the report of the captain of the Novokhopyorsky battalion Butrimovich are indicative:
“...I went to the village of Andreevskaya, where the peasants were keeping the landowner Dubensky under arrest in order to extradite him to Pugachev. I wanted to free him, but the village rebelled and the team was dispersed. From there I went to the villages of Mr. Vysheslavtsev and Prince Maksyutin, but I also found them under arrest among the peasants, and I freed them and took them to Verkhny Lomov; from the village of Prince I saw Maksyutin as a mountain. Kerensk was burning and, returning to Verkhny Lomov, he learned that all the inhabitants there, except the clerks, had rebelled when they learned about the burning of Kerensk. Starters: one-palace Yak. Gubanov, Matv. Bochkov, and the Streltsy settlement of the tenth Bezborod. I wanted to grab them and bring them to Voronezh, but the residents not only did not allow me to do so, but also almost put me under their guard, but I left them and 2 miles from the city I heard the cry of the rioters. I don’t know how it all ended, but I heard that Kerensk, with the help of captured Turks, fought off the villain. During my travels, I noticed everywhere among the people a spirit of rebellion and a tendency towards the Pretender. Especially in Tanbovsky district, the departments of Prince. Vyazemsky, in economic peasants, who, for Pugachev’s arrival, repaired bridges everywhere and repaired roads. Moreover, the village headman of Lipnego and his guards, considering me an accomplice of the villain, came to me and fell to their knees.”
Map of the final stage of the uprising
But from Penza Pugachev turned south. Most historians point to the reason for this as Pugachev’s plans to attract the Volga and, especially, Don Cossacks into his ranks. It is possible that another reason was the desire of the Yaik Cossacks, tired of fighting and having already lost their main atamans, to hide again in the remote steppes of the lower Volga and Yaik, where they had already taken refuge once after the uprising of 1772. An indirect confirmation of such fatigue is that it was during these days that the conspiracy of Cossack colonels began to surrender Pugachev to the government in exchange for receiving a pardon.
On August 4, the impostor's army took Petrovsk, and on August 6, it surrounded Saratov. The governor with part of the people along the Volga managed to get to Tsaritsyn and after the battle on August 7, Saratov was taken. Saratov priests in all churches served prayers for the health of Emperor Peter III. Here Pugachev sent a decree to the Kalmyk ruler Tsenden-Darzhe with a call to join his army. But by this time, punitive detachments under the overall command of Mikhelson were already literally on the heels of the Pugachevites, and on August 11 the city came under the control of government troops.
After Saratov, we went down the Volga to Kamyshin, which, like many cities before it, greeted Pugachev with the ringing of bells and bread and salt. Near Kamyshin in the German colonies, Pugachev’s troops encountered the Astrakhan astronomical expedition of the Academy of Sciences, many members of which, along with the leader, Academician Georg Lowitz, were hanged along with local officials who failed to escape. Lowitz's son, Tobias, later also an academician, managed to survive. Having joined a 3,000-strong detachment of Kalmyks, the rebels entered the villages of the Volga army Antipovskaya and Karavainskaya, where they received widespread support and from where messengers were sent to the Don with decrees on the Don people joining the uprising. A detachment of government troops that arrived from Tsaritsyn was defeated on the Proleika River near the village of Balyklevskaya. Further along the road was Dubovka, the capital of the Volga Cossack army. Since the Volga Cossacks, led by the ataman, remained loyal to the government, the garrisons of the Volga cities strengthened the defense of Tsaritsyn, where a thousand-strong detachment of Don Cossacks arrived under the command of the marching ataman Perfilov.
“A true portrayal of the rebel and deceiver Emelka Pugachev.” Engraving. Second half of the 1770s
On August 21, Pugachev tried to attack Tsaritsyn, but the assault failed. Having received news of Mikhelson's arriving corps, Pugachev hastened to lift the siege of Tsaritsyn, and the rebels moved to Black Yar. Panic began in Astrakhan. On August 24, at the Solenikovo fishing gang, Pugachev was overtaken by Mikhelson. Realizing that a battle could not be avoided, the Pugachevites formed battle formations. On August 25, the last major battle between the troops under the command of Pugachev and the tsarist troops took place. The battle began with a major setback - all 24 cannons of the rebel army were repulsed by a cavalry attack. More than 2,000 rebels died in a fierce battle, among them Ataman Ovchinnikov. More than 6,000 people were captured. Pugachev and the Cossacks, breaking up into small detachments, fled across the Volga. Search detachments of generals Mansurov and Golitsyn, Yaik foreman Borodin and Don Colonel Tavinsky were sent in pursuit of them. Not having time for the battle, Lieutenant General Suvorov also wanted to participate in the capture. During August-September, most of the participants in the uprising were caught and sent for investigation to the Yaitsky town, Simbirsk, and Orenburg.
Pugachev with a detachment of Cossacks fled to Uzeni, not knowing that since mid-August Chumakov, Tvorogov, Fedulev and some other colonels had been discussing the possibility of earning forgiveness by surrendering the impostor. Under the pretext of making it easier to escape the pursuit, they divided the detachment so as to separate the Cossacks loyal to Pugachev along with Ataman Perfilyev. On September 8, near the Bolshoi Uzen River, they pounced and tied up Pugachev, after which Chumakov and Tvorogov went to Yaitsky town, where on September 11 they announced the capture of the impostor. Having received promises of pardon, they notified their accomplices, and on September 15 they brought Pugachev to the Yaitsky town. The first interrogations took place, one of them was conducted personally by Suvorov, who also volunteered to escort the impostor to Simbirsk, where the main investigation was taking place. To transport Pugachev, a tight cage was made, installed on a two-wheeled cart, in which, chained hand and foot, he could not even turn around. In Simbirsk, he was interrogated for five days by P. S. Potemkin, head of the secret investigative commissions, and Count P. I. Panin, commander of the government's punitive forces.
Perfilyev and his detachment were captured on September 12 after a battle with punitive forces near the Derkul River.
Pugachev under escort. Engraving from the 1770s
At this time, in addition to scattered centers of uprising, military operations in Bashkiria were of an organized nature. Salavat Yulaev, together with his father Yulay Aznalin, led the insurgent movement on the Siberian Road, Karanay Muratov, Kachkyn Samarov, Selyausin Kinzin - on Nogai, Bazargul Yunaev, Yulaman Kushaev and Mukhamet Safarov - in the Bashkir Trans-Urals. They pinned down a significant contingent of government troops. At the beginning of August, a new assault on Ufa was even launched, but as a result of poor organization of interaction between various detachments, it was unsuccessful. Kazakh detachments harassed with raids along the entire border line. Governor Reinsdorp reported: “The Bashkirs and Kyrgyzs are not pacified, the latter constantly cross the Yaik, and grab people from near Orenburg. The troops here are either pursuing Pugachev or blocking his path, and I can’t go against the Kyrgyz people, I admonish the Khan and the Saltans. They replied that they could not hold back the Kyrgyz people, of whom the entire horde was rebelling.”. With the capture of Pugachev and the dispatch of liberated government troops to Bashkiria, the transition of Bashkir elders to the side of the government began, many of them joined the punitive detachments. After the capture of Kanzafar Usaev and Salavat Yulaev, the uprising in Bashkiria began to decline. Salavat Yulaev gave his last battle on November 20 under the Katav-Ivanovsky plant besieged by him and after the defeat he was captured on November 25. But individual rebel groups in Bashkiria continued to resist until the summer of 1775.
Until the summer of 1775, unrest continued in the Voronezh province, in the Tambov district and along the Khopru and Vorone rivers. Although the operating detachments were small and there was no coordination of joint actions, according to eyewitness Major Sverchkov, “many landowners, leaving their homes and savings, move to remote places, and those who remain in their houses save their lives from threatened death by spending the night in the forests”. The frightened landowners declared that “If the Voronezh provincial chancellery does not speed up the extermination of those villainous gangs, then the same bloodshed will inevitably follow as happened in the last rebellion.”
To stem the wave of riots, punitive detachments began mass executions. In every village, in every town that received Pugachev, on the gallows and “verbs”, from which they barely had time to remove the officers, landowners, and judges hanged by the impostor, they began to hang the leaders of the riots and the city heads and atamans of local detachments appointed by the Pugachevites. To enhance the terrifying effect, the gallows were installed on rafts and floated along the main rivers of the uprising. In May, Khlopushi was executed in Orenburg: his head was placed on a pole in the city center. During the investigation, the entire medieval set of proven means was used. In terms of cruelty and number of victims, Pugachev and the government were not inferior to each other.
In November, all the main participants in the uprising were transported to Moscow for a general investigation. They were placed in the building of the Mint at the Iversky Gate of China Town. The interrogations were led by Prince M.N. Volkonsky and Chief Secretary S.I. Sheshkovsky. During interrogation, E. I. Pugachev gave detailed testimony about his relatives, about his youth, about his participation in the Don Cossack Army in the Seven Years and Turkish Wars, about his wanderings around Russia and Poland, about his plans and intentions, about the course of the uprising. Investigators tried to find out whether the initiators of the uprising were agents of foreign states, or schismatics, or anyone from the nobility. Catherine II showed great interest in the progress of the investigation. In the materials of the Moscow investigation, several notes from Catherine II to M.N. Volkonsky were preserved with wishes about the plan in which the investigation should be conducted, which issues require the most complete and detailed investigation, which witnesses should be additionally interviewed. On December 5, M.N. Volkonsky and P.S. Potemkin signed a determination to terminate the investigation, since Pugachev and other defendants could not add anything new to their testimony during interrogations and could not in any way alleviate or aggravate their guilt. In their report to Catherine they were forced to admit that they “...with this investigation being carried out, we tried to find the beginning of the evil undertaken by this monster and his accomplices or... to that evil enterprise by the mentors. But despite all this, nothing else was revealed, such as that in all his villainy, the first beginning took its beginning in the Yaitsky army..
Execution of Pugachev on Bolotnaya Square. (Drawing by an eyewitness to the execution of A. T. Bolotov)
On December 30, the judges in the case of E.I. Pugachev gathered in the Throne Hall of the Kremlin Palace. They heard Catherine II's manifesto on the appointment of a trial, and then the indictment in the case of Pugachev and his associates was announced. Prince A. A. Vyazemsky offered to bring Pugachev to the next court hearing. Early in the morning of December 31, he was transported under heavy escort from the casemates of the Mint to the chambers of the Kremlin Palace. At the beginning of the meeting, the judges approved the questions that Pugachev had to answer, after which he was brought into the meeting room and forced to kneel. After a formal questioning, he was taken out of the courtroom, the court made a decision: “Emelka Pugachev will be quartered, his head will be stuck on a stake, body parts will be carried to four parts of the city and placed on wheels, and then burned in those places.” The remaining defendants were divided according to the degree of their guilt into several groups for each appropriate type of execution or punishment. On Saturday, January 10, an execution was carried out on Bolotnaya Square in Moscow in front of a huge crowd of people. Pugachev behaved with dignity, ascended to the place of execution, crossed himself at the Kremlin cathedrals, bowed to four sides with the words “Forgive me, Orthodox people.” The executioner first cut off the heads of E. I. Pugachev and A. P. Perfilyev, who were sentenced to quartering; such was the wish of the empress. On the same day, M. G. Shigaev, T. I. Podurov and V. I. Tornov were hanged. I. N. Zarubin-Chika was sent for execution to Ufa, where he was quartered in early February 1775.
Sheet metal shop. Painting by Demidov serf artist P. F. Khudoyarov
Pugachev's uprising caused enormous damage to the metallurgy of the Urals. 64 of the 129 factories that existed in the Urals fully joined the uprising; the number of peasants assigned to them was 40 thousand people. The total amount of losses from the destruction and downtime of factories is estimated at 5,536,193 rubles. And although the factories were quickly restored, the uprising forced concessions to be made towards factory workers. The chief investigator in the Urals, Captain S.I. Mavrin, reported that the assigned peasants, whom he considered the leading force of the uprising, supplied the impostor with weapons and joined his troops, because the factory owners oppressed their assigned peasants, forcing the peasants to travel long distances to the factories and did not allow them engaged in arable farming and sold them food at inflated prices. Mavrin believed that drastic measures must be taken to prevent similar unrest in the future. Catherine wrote to G.A. Potemkin that Mavrin “what he says about the factory peasants is all very thorough, and I think that there is nothing else to do with them but to buy factories and, when they are state-owned, then provide the peasants with benefits.”. On May 19, 1779, a manifesto was published on the general rules for the use of assigned peasants in state-owned and private enterprises, which somewhat limited factory owners in the use of peasants assigned to factories, limited the working day and increased wages.
There were no significant changes in the situation of the peasantry.
Research and collections of archival documents
- Pushkin A. S. “The History of Pugachev” (censored title - “The History of the Pugachev Rebellion”)
- Grot Y. K. Materials for the history of the Pugachev rebellion (Papers of Kara and Bibikov). St. Petersburg, 1862
- Dubrovin N.F. Pugachev and his accomplices. An episode from the reign of Empress Catherine II. 1773-1774 Based on unpublished sources. T. 1-3. St. Petersburg, type. N. I. Skorokhodova, 1884
- Pugachevism. Collection of documents.
- Peasant War 1773-1775 in Russia. Documents from the collection of the State Historical Museum. M., 1973
- Peasant War 1773-1775 on the territory of Bashkiria. Collection of documents. Ufa, 1975
- Peasant war led by Emelyan Pugachev in Chuvashia. Collection of documents. Cheboksary, 1972
- Peasant war led by Emelyan Pugachev in Udmurtia. Collection of documents and materials. Izhevsk, 1974
- Gorban N.V. Peasantry of Western Siberia in the Peasant War of 1773-75. // Questions of history. 1952. No. 11.
- Muratov Kh. I. Peasant War 1773-1775. in Russia. M., Voenizdat, 1954
Art
Pugachev's uprising in fiction
- A. S. Pushkin “The Captain's Daughter”
- S. A. Yesenin “Pugachev” (poem)
- S. P. Zlobin “Salavat Yulaev”
- E. Fedorov “Stone Belt” (novel). Book 2 “Heirs”
- V. Ya. Shishkov “Emelyan Pugachev (novel)”
- V. I. Buganov “Pugachev” (biography in the series “Life of Remarkable People”)
- V. I. Mashkovtsev “Golden Flower - Overcome” (historical novel). - Chelyabinsk, South Ural Book Publishing House, , .
Cinema
- Pugachev () - feature film. Director Pavel Petrov-Bytov
- Emelyan Pugachev () - historical duology: “Slaves of Freedom” and “Will Washed in Blood” directed by Alexei Saltykov
- The Captain's Daughter () - a feature film based on the story of the same name by Alexander Sergeevich Pushkin
- Russian Revolt () - a historical film based on the works of Alexander Sergeevich Pushkin “The Captain's Daughter” and “The Story of Pugachev”
- Salavat Yulaev () - feature film. Director Yakov Protazanov
Links
- Bolshakov L. N. Orenburg Pushkin Encyclopedia
- Vaganov M. Report of Major Mirzabek Vaganov on his mission to Nurali Khan. March-June 1774 / Report. V. Snezhnevsky // Russian antiquity, 1890. - T. 66. - No. 4. - P. 108-119. - Under the title: On the history of the Pugachev rebellion. In the steppe among the Kirghiz-Kaisaks March - 1774 - June.
- Military campaign journal of the commander of the punitive corps, Lieutenant Colonel I. Mikhelson, about military operations against the rebels in March - August 1774.// Peasant War 1773-1775. in Russia. Documents from the collection of the State Historical Museum. - M.: Nauka, 1973. - P. 194-223.
- Gvozdikova I. Salavat Yulaev: historical portrait (“Belskie Prostori”, 2004)
- Diary of a member of the noble militia of the Kazan province “About Pugachev. His villainous actions"// Peasant War 1773-1775. in Russia. Documents from the collection of the State Historical Museum. - M.: Nauka, 1973. - P. 58-65.
- Dobrotvorsky I. A. Pugachev on the Kama // Historical Bulletin, 1884. - T. 18. - No. 9. - P. 719-753.
- Catherine II. Letters from Empress Catherine II to A.I. Bibikov during the Pugachev rebellion (1774) / Communication. V. I. Lamansky // Russian Archive, 1866. - Issue. 3. - Stb. 388-398.
- Peasant war led by Pugachev on the website History of the Orenburg region
- Peasant War led by Pugachev (TSB)
- Kulaginsky P. N. Pugachevites and Pugachev in Tresvyatsky-Elabuga in 1773-1775. / Message P. M. Makarov // Russian antiquity, 1882. - T. 33. - No. 2. - P. 291-312.
- Lopatina. Letter from Arzamas dated September 19, 1774 / Communication. A. I. Yazykov // Russian antiquity, 1874. - T. 10. - No. 7. - P. 617-618. - Under the title: Pugachevism.
- Mertvago D. B. Notes of Dmitry Borisovich Mertvago. 1790-1824. - M.: type. Gracheva and K, 1867. - XIV, 340 stb. - Adj. to the “Russian Archive” for 1867 (Issue 8-9).
- Definition of the Kazan nobility on the assembly of a cavalry corps of troops from their people against Pugachev// Readings at the Imperial Society of Russian History and Antiquities at Moscow University, 1864. - Book. 3/4. Dept. 5. - pp. 105-107.
- Oreus I.I. Ivan Ivanovich Mikhelson, winner of Pugachev. 1740-1807 // Russian antiquity, 1876. - T. 15. - No. 1. - P. 192-209.
- Pugachev sheets in Moscow. 1774 Materials// Russian antiquity, 1875. - T. 13. - No. 6. - P. 272-276. , No. 7. - P. 440-442.
- Pugachevshchina. New materials for the history of the Pugachev region// Russian antiquity, 1875. - T. 12. - No. 2. - P. 390-394; No. 3. - pp. 540-544.
- Collection of documents on the history of the Pugachev uprising on the website Vostlit.info
- Cards: Map of the lands of the Yaitsky army, the Orenburg region and the Southern Urals, Map of the Saratov province (maps of the early 20th century)
Notes
- Petition of the Yaik army of the imp. Catherine II regarding the oppression of ordinary Cossacks
- Petition of the Yaik Cossacks to the imp. Catherine II, 1772 January 15, 1772, text on the “Oriental Literature” website
Peasant war led by E.I. Pugacheva and its consequences.
Introduction
1. Causes of the Peasants' War of 1773–1775. under the leadership of E.I. Pugachev
2. The course of the Peasant War of 1773–1775.
3. Results of the Peasant War of 1773–1775.
Conclusion
Literature
Introduction.
XVIII A century in the history of our country is a turning point, significant, filled with turbulent events. The peasants constituted the exploited class since the times of Kievan Rus, and the nobility was the ruling class, while the state acted as the protector of the nobility.
The state's serfdom policy became the main reason for powerful social uprisings in the second half of the 18th century.
The problem of social peace and social conflicts has always been and remains relevant for our country. Even now, in our time, problems related to the correctness of leadership and the meaningfulness of the actions of our government continue to arise, which leads to protests, rallies, and demonstrations in defense of our rights, freedoms and interests. There will probably never be a government that would satisfy the interests of all segments of the population. Especially in Russia, where the tax burden often exceeds the income of the bulk of the population living below the poverty line.
In this work, I will try to consider and understand what the prerequisites were that prompted such a large, geographically scattered number of people, different in their class composition and interests. In my work, I will gradually consider all the facts and events from which we can conclude what was the reason and why the uprising did not lead to the victory of the rebels, taking into account different points of view based on historical documents, articles and scientific monographs.
1. Causes of the Peasants' War of 1773–1775. under the leadership of E.I. Pugachev
Dissatisfaction of the Yaik Cossacks with government measures aimed at eliminating their privileges. In 1771, the Cossacks lost their autonomy and were deprived of the right to traditional trades (fishing, salt mining). In addition, discord was growing between the rich Cossack “sergeant major” and the rest of the “army”.
Strengthening the personal dependence of peasants on landowners, the growth of state taxes and landowner duties, caused by the beginning of the development of market relations and the serfdom legislation of the 60s.
The continuous strengthening of serfdom and the growth of duties during the first half of the 18th century caused fierce resistance from the peasants. Its main form was flight. The fugitives went to the Cossack regions, to the Urals, to Siberia, to Ukraine, to the northern forests.
They often created “robber gangs” that not only robbed on the roads, but also destroyed landowners’ estates, beat and even killed their masters, and destroyed documents on the ownership of land and serfs.
The situation at the fast-growing factories of the Urals was also explosive. Beginning with Peter the Great, the government solved the problem of labor in metallurgy mainly by assigning state peasants to state-owned and private mining factories, allowing new factory owners to buy serf villages, and granting the unofficial right to keep runaway serfs, since the Berg Collegium, which was in charge of the factories, I tried not to notice violations of the decree on the capture and deportation of all fugitives. At the same time, it was very convenient to take advantage of the lack of rights and hopeless situation of the fugitives, and if anyone began to express dissatisfaction with their position as slaves, they were immediately handed over to the authorities for punishment and return to their former owners.
Former peasants hated and resisted forced labor in factories, the severity of which was equal to hard labor. The wages were not enough to feed families; women and children were recruited to work in mines and factories. There was no time left for farming; in addition, in order to remove the cause of distraction from factory work, raids by teams of factory clerks were sometimes practiced to destroy crops.
Peasants assigned to state-owned and private factories dreamed of returning to their usual village labor, while the situation of peasants on serf estates was little better. The economic situation in the country, almost continuously waging one war after another, was difficult; in addition, the gallant age required the nobles to follow the latest fashions and trends. Therefore, landowners increase the area under crops, and corvée increases. The peasants themselves become a hot commodity, they are pawned, exchanged, and entire villages simply lose out. To top it off, Catherine II issued a Decree of August 22, 1767, prohibiting peasants from complaining about landowners. In conditions of complete impunity and personal dependence, the slave position of the peasants is aggravated by the whims, caprices or real crimes occurring on the estates, and most of them were left without investigation or consequences.
The frequent repetition of popular uprisings and the fierceness of the rebels testified to the trouble in the country and the impending danger.
The spread of imposture indicated the same thing. The contenders for the throne declared themselves either the son of Tsar Ivan, or Tsarevich Alexei, or Peter II. There were especially many “Peter IIIs” - six before 1773. This was explained by the fact that Peter III eased the situation of the Old Believers, tried to transfer monastic peasants to state peasants, and also by the fact that he was overthrown by his wife and nobles. (The peasants believed that the emperor suffered for caring for the common people). However, only one of the many impostors managed to seriously shake the empire.
2. The course of the Peasant War of 1773–1775.
2.1 Beginning of the Peasants' War
Despite the fact that the internal readiness of the Yaik Cossacks for the uprising was high, the speech lacked a unifying idea, a core that would unite the sheltered and hidden participants in the unrest of 1772. The rumor that the miraculously saved Emperor Peter Fedorovich appeared in the army instantly spread throughout Yaik. Pyotr Fedorovich was the husband of Catherine II; after the coup in 1762, he abdicated the throne and died mysteriously at the same time.
In 1772, there was an uprising on Yaik with the aim of removing the chieftain and a number of elders. The Cossacks resisted the punitive troops. After the rebellion was suppressed, the instigators were exiled to Siberia, and the military circle was destroyed. The situation on Yaik has become extremely tense.
In 1773, another “Peter III” showed up in the Yaitsky (Ural) Cossack army. He declared himself to be the Don Cossack Emelyan Ivanovich Pugachev, a native of the Zimoveyskaya village (which had previously given Russian history Stepan Razin and Kondraty Bulavin), a participant in the Seven Years' War and the war with Turkey of 1768-1774.
Finding himself in the Trans-Volga steppes in the fall of 1772, he stopped in the Mechetnaya Sloboda and here from the abbot of the Old Believer skete Filaret learned about the unrest among the Yaik Cossacks. Where the idea of calling himself a tsar came from in his head and what his initial plans were is not known for certain, but in November 1772 he arrived in the Yaitsky town and at meetings with the Cossacks called himself Peter III.
The Cossacks enthusiastically greeted the “emperor,” who promised to reward them with “rivers, seas and herbs, cash salaries, lead and gunpowder and all freedom.” On September 18, 1773, with a detachment of 200 Cossacks, Pugachev set out for the capital of the army - Yaitsky town. Almost all of the military teams sent against him went over to the side of the rebels. And yet, having about 500 people, Pugachev did not dare to storm the fortified fortress with a garrison of 1000 people. Having bypassed it, he moved up the Yaik, capturing small fortresses along the way, the garrisons of which joined his army. Bloody reprisals were carried out against nobles and officers.
2.2 Siege of Orenburg and first military successes
The capture of Orenburg became the main task of the rebels due to its importance as the capital of a huge region. If successful, the authority of the army and the leader of the uprising himself would have increased significantly, because the capture of each new town contributed to the unhindered capture of the next ones. In addition, it was important to capture the Orenburg weapons depots.
On October 5, 1773, Pugachev approached Orenburg, a well-fortified provincial city with a garrison of 3.5 thousand people with 70 guns. The rebels had 3 thousand people and 20 guns. The assault on the city was unsuccessful, and the Pugachevites began a siege. Governor I.A. Reinsdorp did not dare to attack the rebels, not relying on his soldiers.
On October 14, Catherine II sent a detachment of General V.A. to help Orenburg. Kara numbering 1.5 thousand people and 1200 Bashkirs led by Salavat Yulaev. On November 7, near the village of Yuzeeva, 98 versts from Orenburg, rebel detachments defeated Kara, and S. Yulaev went over to the side of the impostor. Pugachev was also joined by 1,200 soldiers, Cossacks and Kalmyks from Colonel Chernyshev’s detachment (the colonel himself was captured and hanged). Only Brigadier Korfu managed to safely lead 2.5 thousand soldiers to Orenburg.
Pugachev, who had set up his headquarters in Berd, five miles from Orenburg, was constantly receiving reinforcements: Kalmyks, Bashkirs, mining workers of the Urals, and assigned peasants. In total, according to rough estimates by historians, there were from 25 to 40 thousand people in the ranks of Pugachev’s army by the end of 1773. True, most of them were armed only with edged weapons, or even spears. The level of combat training of this heterogeneous crowd was also low. However, Pugachev sought to give his army a semblance of organization. He established the “Military Collegium” and surrounded himself with guards. He assigned ranks and titles to his associates.
The expansion of the uprising seriously worried the government. Chief General A.I. is appointed commander of the troops sent against Pugachev. Bibikov. Under his command there were 16 thousand soldiers and 40 guns. At the beginning of 1774, Bibikov's troops began an offensive. On March 22, Pugachev was defeated at the Tatishchev Fortress, and Lieutenant Colonel Mikhelson defeated the troops of Chiki-Zarubin near Ufa. Pugachev's main army was practically destroyed: about 2 thousand rebels were killed, over 4 thousand were wounded or captured. The government announced the suppression of the rebellion.
PEASANT WAR 1773-1775 UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF EL. PUGACHEV
The eve of the Peasant War. In 1771, an uprising of townspeople broke out in Moscow, called the “Plague Riot.” The plague, which began in the Russian-Turkish theater of war, despite strict quarantine, was brought to Moscow and killed up to a thousand people a day. The city authorities were at a loss in the extreme situation, which increased distrust in them. The reason for the uprising was an attempt by Moscow Archbishop Ambrose and Governor P.D. Eropkin, for hygienic reasons, to remove the miraculous icon of the Mother of God from the Varvarsky Gate of Kitay-Gorod (thousands of Muscovites venerated it). Ambrose was torn to pieces by a crowd in the Donskoy Monastery. For three days a riot raged in the city. From St. Petersburg, the Empress's favorite G. G. Orlov with a guards regiment was sent to suppress the uprising. Over a hundred people were killed, many were punished with whips, rods, and lashes. The decisive measures taken by Orlov led to a decline and gradual cessation of the epidemic.
In the decade preceding the Peasant War, historians count more than 40 speeches by serfs. In the 50-70s of the 18th century. The flight of desperate peasants from their masters reached great proportions. Forged decrees and manifestos containing rumors about the supposed imminent liberation of peasants from serfdom became widespread among the population. Imposture also took place: there is information about six cases of the appearance before the start of the Peasant War of “Petrov III” - doubles of the emperor who died in 1762. In such a situation, the Peasant War broke out under the leadership of E.I. Pugacheva.
Emelyan Ivanovich Pugachev was born in the Zimoveyskaya village on the Don (it was also the birthplace of S.T. Razin), in a family of poor Cossacks. From the age of 17, he took part in the wars with Prussia and Turkey, and received the junior officer rank of cornet for bravery in battle. E.I. Pugachev more than once acted as a petitioner from peasants and ordinary Cossacks, for which he was arrested by the authorities. In 1773 E.I. Pugachev, who was then 31 years old, escaped from a Kazan prison. His path lay on Yaik, where he introduced himself to the local Cossacks as Emperor Peter III. With a detachment of 80 Cossacks, he moved to the Yaitsky town - the center of the local Cossack army. Two weeks later, the army of E.I. Pugacheva already numbered more than 2.5 thousand people and had 29 guns.
Participants in the Peasant War. The movement under the leadership of Pugachev began among the Cossacks. The uprising was given a special scope by the participation in it of serfs, artisans, working people and assigned peasants of the Urals, as well as Bashkirs, Mari, Tatars, Udmurts and other peoples of the Volga region. Like his predecessors, B.I. Pugachev was distinguished by religious tolerance. Orthodox Christians, Old Believers, Muslims, and pagans fought together under his banner. They were united by hatred of serfdom.
A.S. called them “amazing examples of folk eloquence.” Pushkin several manifestos and decrees of E.I. Pugachev, giving an idea of the main slogans of the rebels. In form, these documents differed from the “charming letters” of I. I. Bolotnikov and S. T. Razin. In the conditions of the established administrative-bureaucratic apparatus of power, the leader of the rebels used forms of state acts characteristic of the new stage of the country's development - manifestos and decrees.
Historians called one of the most striking manifestos of E.I. “a charter to the peasantry.” Pugacheva. “All those who were previously in the peasantry and in the citizenship of the landowners” he granted “liberty and freedom,” lands, hayfields, fishing grounds and salt lakes “without purchase and without quitrent.” The manifesto freed the country's population "from taxes and burdens" "inflicted by the villains of the nobles and city bribe-takers."
The course of the Peasant War. The peasant war began with the capture by a detachment of E.I. Pugachev of small towns on Yaik and the siege of Orenburg - the largest fortress in southeast Russia. Tsarist troops under the command of General V.A. Kara, sent to the rescue of Orenburg, were defeated. The Bashkirs, led by Salavat Yulaev, walking together with V.A. Karom, took the side of E.I. Pugacheva. The rebel army was organized on the model of the Cossack army. The headquarters of the rebels, the Military Collegium, was formed near Orenburg. Discipline and organization in the army E.I. Pugachev were relatively high, but in general the movement, as in previous peasant wars, remained spontaneous.
Separate detachments of rebels led by comrades-in-arms of E.I. Pugachev - Salavat Yulaev, working people of the Ural factories Khlopushi and Ivan Beloborodov, Cossack Ivan Chiki-Zarubin and others - captured Kungur, Krasnoufimsk, Samara, besieged Ufa, Yekaterinburg, Chelyabinsk.
Frightened by the scale of the peasant movement, Catherine II placed the former head of the Code Commission, General A.I., at the head of the government forces. Bibikova. Catherine II herself declared herself a “Kazan landowner,” emphasizing the closeness of interests of the royal power and the nobility.
In March 1774 E.I. Pugachev was defeated at the Tatishchev Fortress in the Orenburg region. After the defeat at Tatishcheva, the second stage of the Peasant War began. The rebels retreated to the Urals, where their army was replenished by assigned peasants and factory miners. From there, from the Urals E.I. Pugachev moved towards Kazan and took it in July 1774. However, soon the main forces of the tsarist troops under the command of Colonel I.I. approached the city. Mikhelson. In the new battle E.I. Pugachev was defeated. With a detachment of 500 people, he moved to the right bank of the Volga.
The third, final stage of the uprising began. “Pugachev fled; but his flight seemed like an invasion,” wrote A.S. Pushkin. The peasantry and peoples of the Volga region met E.I. Pugachev as a liberator from serfdom. At the head of government troops instead of the deceased A.I. Bibikova was directed by P.I. Panin. A.V. was called from the theater of the Russian-Turkish war. Suvorov. The detachment of E.I. himself Pugacheva moved down the Volga in order to subsequently break through to the Don, where he expected to receive the support of the Don Cossacks. During the movement to the south, the Pugachevites captured Alatyr, Saransk, Penza, Saratov.
The last defeat of E.I. Pugachev suffered after an unsuccessful attempt to take Tsaritsyn from the Salnikov plant. With a small number of people devoted to him, he tried to hide behind the Volga in order to subsequently continue the fight. A group of wealthy Cossacks, trying to earn the favor of the Empress through treachery, captured E.I. Pugacheva and handed him over to the authorities. In a wooden cage E.I. Pugachev was sent to Moscow. On January 10, 1775, Pugachev and his closest supporters were executed in Moscow on Bolotnaya Square. Tsarism dealt just as cruelly with ordinary participants in the uprising: rafts with gallows floated along the Volga and other rivers. The corpses of the hanged, swaying in the wind, were supposed, according to the punitive forces, to intimidate the population of the country and thereby prevent new uprisings.
Peasant war led by E.I. Pugacheva ended in defeat for the same reasons as other major uprisings of the masses: it was characterized by a spontaneous nature, locality of the movement, heterogeneity of its social composition, poor weapons, naive monarchism, lack of a clear program and goal of the struggle. The Peasant War forced Catherine II to carry out a series of reforms to centralize and unify government bodies in the center and locally and to legislate the class rights of the population.
Factors leading to the formation of nation states. Features of the formation of the Russian state.
The reign of Ivan III and Vasily III. Annexation of Nizhny Novgorod, Yaroslavl, Rostov, Novgorod the Great, and Vyatka land to Moscow. Overthrow of the Horde yoke. Entry into the single state of Tver, Pskov, Smolensk, Ryazan.
Political system. Strengthening the power of the Moscow Grand Dukes. Code of Law of 1497 Changes in the structure of feudal land ownership. Boyar, church and local land ownership.
The beginning of the formation of central and local authorities. Reducing the number of appanages. Boyar Duma. Localism. Church and grand ducal power. The growth of the international authority of the Russian state.
Economic recovery and the rise of Russian culture after the Kulikovo victory. Moscow is the center of the emerging culture of the Great Russian people. Reflection of political trends in literature. Chronicle. "The Legend of the Princes of Vladimir." Historical stories. "Zadonshchina". "The Tale of the Massacre of Mamayev." Hagiographic literature. "Walking" by Afanasy Nikitin. Construction of the Moscow Kremlin. Theophanes the Greek. Andrey Rublev.
