Features of the Russian elite
What kind of beast is the Russian elite? Is it special to us, exclusive, limited, like a Prada bag for which glamorous young ladies stand in line? Or is it the same as everyone else? Why is corruption sometimes for good, and the struggle of Kremlin clans is often a guarantee of stability? Who makes history - the people or those on top?
We met with Olga Viktorovna Kryshtanovskaya, director of the Center for the Study of the Russian Elite of the State University of Management, on a historic day - the day the president expected to voice his desire to run for a fourth term. In the traditional absence of any equal competitors.
What awaits our elite in 2018 and will Putin’s next election victory be the beginning of a systemic crisis of power in Russia, which they love to scare us all with?
- Olga Viktorovna, is Putin still our president?
But of course! Although any elections for Russia are always a crisis, always a strain of all forces. And now this is so, despite the obviousness of the outcome of the vote. Putin, of course, will win easily, but difficulties will begin the very next day after the elections. After all, the next morning after the victory he will wake up as a “lame duck.” Because everyone knows that this is his last term.
- Why the last one? In 2024 he will be only 72. Elizabeth II is 91, and still reigns.
Last term under the current Constitution. Putin is a lawyer. He always respected the law. Therefore, this is the last deadline for him. And he understands this. But he also understands something else: once he becomes a lame duck, the elite will begin to look for a successor to bet on. The struggle “of all against all” will begin - for influence in the new power structure. And he doesn't just have to leave. He needs to rebuild the system so that there is no great turmoil. It's complicated.
- So how can we avoid that by 2024 the leadership will be at each other’s throats? How?
There are different options. For example, Putin can step aside, leaving a significant amount of power behind him. To do this, it will be necessary to weaken the post of president and transfer part of his powers to another body. For example, to some conditional “State Council” or “Supreme Council”. Putin goes there, but retains the functions of Supreme Commander-in-Chief. And the new president (successor) will only be a top diplomat. Gradually, the elite gets used to this person, power changes hands, without drama, calmly.
Olga Kryshtanovskaya.
- But for this we need to change the Constitution!
Yes need. And this is the disadvantage of this option.
- So, maybe it’s cheaper to restore the monarchy in Russia? Then the succession of power will become simpler and clearer.
The transition of power is a weakness of any authoritarian system where elections are not the determining mechanism. Therefore, there is a crisis, a threat to the “Orange (electoral) revolution.” Monarchy is a system where the transfer of power is theoretically clear. It would be great: to make the head of state a monarch for life, who decides little. And move the center to the government or another institution. In practice, of course, it is an oxymoron to resurrect all these rituals with ermine robes and crowns in our time.
- Is there another option for saving the fatherland, a more modern one?
I think that Putin would really like his successor to be elected in fair, free elections by the entire population of the country. But he understands how it will end - a battle between the elites for life and death, unrest that may last for years. Therefore, a successor is a more realistic option. Elections, but not without a rudder and sails (that is, not absolutely free), but ones where the bureaucracy will nominate its candidate and support him with all possible means.
- So we still have no chance of democratic procedures?
We were raised in an authoritarian environment. We have authoritarian relationships in families, at school - almost everywhere. We carry within us an authoritarian syndrome. Power cannot be democratic in an authoritarian society. Even if some enlightened rulers want it. It's not a button to press. It's more complicated.
Maybe the problem is also in the irremovability of our elite? No matter how much the officials are at fault, they will be transferred to another position, sometimes with a promotion. The same Vitaly Mutko. It pisses everyone off!
Mutko - yes... But look how many years Shoigu has been sitting in top positions. How many Lavrovs are headed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? For some reason this doesn't annoy anyone. And Mutko is annoying. Maybe it's not the duration, but the quality of the work? But really, our sport is in trouble. And it’s not just because Mutko doesn’t work well.
- And because of what?
There are things of a higher ideological order. Which do not depend on Mutko in any way. I mean the role that sport plays in Russia.
There was a time when we followed the path of “shameful nationalism.” Remember, the slogan “Russia for Russians” sounded more and more confidently. But it never became the banner of state policy, since it laid a mine under our society: a gigantic conflict of ethnic groups, peoples, and religions.
The power stopped. And she replaced nationalism with patriotism, which does not divide, but unites the civil nation. Russian, Ukrainian, Tatar, Jew - we are all citizens of Russia and we all love our Motherland. What is the platform for patriotism?
- Common enemies?
Including enemies. But there are also more positive concepts: culture, Russian language, sports. Sports are very important for instilling patriotism. That's why it became part of state policy. Our sporting victories were perceived as Putin's victories. Putin achieved the Sochi Olympics! Putin achieved the holding of a football world championship in the Russian Federation! Sports victories are victories of Putin's policies. Therefore, the blow to sports that has been dealt today is not so much a blow to Mutko as to the president.
- So, maybe it’s the insult that will force the Russians to give a worthy rebuff?
I think when our athletes go to the Olympics, it will cause an unprecedented patriotic surge. The tricolor will not be in the hands of athletes? This means there will be ten times more of him in the stands. Shouldn't we be called the “Russian team”? This means we will glorify “Olympic athletes from Russia.” There will be other hashtags and memes, but the intensity of our support will be many times stronger. But Mutko has already suffered, and I think he will not remain a member of the government for long.
By the way, Mutko is in second place in the traditional anti-rating of the elite, which is your center. And the leader - however, as expected - is presidential candidate Ksenia Anatolyevna Sobchak.
Yes, Sobchak holds the lead in the ranking of anti-heroes for the second year. We analyzed what people are so outraged about it? First: her wealth. She says she earned it herself. But people see it differently: those who plowed for forty years in a mine, at school, in a hospital, on a farm will never understand how this girl “earned” millions while still a student at MGIMO. It is clear to people that these are mom’s and dad’s, that she is not a “hard worker,” but a banal “major.”
Second: her manner of speaking in a mentoring tone, teaching, ridiculing. This is seen as arrogance, snobbery and disrespect for people. Here Ksenia Sobchak can be compared with Raisa Gorbacheva - the same communication style that causes irritation.
- I don’t think that Ksenia Anatolyevna knows how they really treat her.
I think he does. This is not a matter of ignorance, but of interpretation. Glamorous young ladies firmly believe that they are not loved because they are jealous. This is a simple and satisfying explanation for them, which indicates a lack of emotional intelligence.
- Or maybe they just don’t care about other people’s opinions?
No, we all want to be loved and respected. You know, Anatoly Chubais once admitted how hard it was for him to bear the burden of people’s dislike for years. Nobody cares.
“Clans are just what we need”
It turns out that the Russian elite is so unhappy. How she suffers. Is this true in all countries? Still, the elite is a global concept. So how is ours, dear, different from theirs, Western?
Nothing. The elites are no different. Political systems differ. If you are elected like in the West, then you are accountable to the people and do everything so that people value you.
With us, it is absolutely not necessary to please all the people. It is enough to please one, the most important person.
If you are appointed, then you serve not the people, but the boss. Therefore, the Western elite is focused on efficiency. And ours is for strength and devotion. That is, the hypothetical applicant must behave in such a way that his superior comrades accept him into their narrow circle. In this situation, officials are divided into two categories: loyal and competent. If everyone becomes loyal, the system will stop working.
- Just like we have now!
No, now the system is functioning completely: the state exists, there is a budget, salaries and pensions are paid, teachers teach, doctors treat, trains run. And since the system works, it means that in addition to the loyal ones, there are also professionals in it.
- Why not increase the number of professionals to one hundred percent?
Because every boss wants to be surrounded by loyal people. This way you can make decisions faster. It's more reliable. So you have more hardware weight. We also try to surround ourselves with friends whenever possible. But in any system there must be a balance between the competent and the loyal. Otherwise the system will collapse.
- Look, there are some “clans” everywhere!
When social institutions are not developed, when there is no well-functioning system of separation of powers, clans are exactly what is needed. Clans are a system of checks and balances. This is a barrier to absolutism, when one person can do anything.
- Is the clan system good? Relatives, friends, classmates - are they all involved?
Under certain political conditions, the clan system plays a useful role. There would be trouble if this did not happen. It is customary in certain circles to say that Putin is the sole ruler. But that's not true. He is a very careful and flexible leader. From the very first day of his presidency, he held the balance of several factions. He never gave full priority to either the security forces or the liberals. This is his strong point.
“We are only capable of loving a strong hand”
But why did anyone decide that we generally need this - to have an unsinkable inner circle, to which absolutely everything is allowed. Everything for friends, law for enemies. Is it fair that some corrupt officials are more equal than others?
Here, I believe, there is a substitution of concepts. True corruption, in its pure form, does not strengthen, but destroys unity of command. When a commander in a war shouts to everyone to go on the attack, but someone took a thousand rubles and does not go - how is that? Is this unity of command? They don't listen to the commander.
Isn't Putin obeyed? Direct corruption is only a small part of what we are used to calling corruption. Rather, we are dealing with feeding that has existed in Rus' since the 15th century, since the time of Ivan the Terrible. This was not a crime then. And even today we do not consider a waiter who takes tips for his work to be corrupt.
The restructuring of this feeding system is gradually taking place, but it requires some time, effort, and money. It is difficult and expensive to change the long-established state of affairs. But we are moving forward.
Before, everything was much simpler: once - money in an envelope, but now these offerings are increasingly formalized as grants and awards. At the same time, the amount that was previously required to resolve the issue - say, a million rubles - is now quite officially covered in taxes and sometimes becomes ten million in expenses.
- Poor corrupt officials! Such a waste!
There is also a third scheme to support Russian officials - the so-called latent salaries. At the legislative level, it is stated that the salary of a particular official is, say, one hundred thousand rubles. But in addition to this, he receives another twelve salaries monthly. Can this be called corruption?
The state is not always able to pay large salaries from its budget to senior officials, which they undoubtedly deserve due to the wide range of duties they perform. And this is an absolutely legal way to increase the income of officials, although it is not particularly advertised. And the fact that many of them then buy yachts, huge houses, expensive cars... people, of course, may think that they are all bribe-takers, but they actually live on their salaries. And that's okay. This is a tradition. That officials are rich.
Maybe this is our special country? Due to its size, geographical location, natural resources, mentality. They have stolen and will continue to steal. Because there is something to steal and it’s far from Moscow. And any new ruler, if he wants to stay at the top, has to accept these rules, bend to Russia, to its matrix. And at the same time be very strong, so that they listen and are afraid.
Yes, and if another leader comes, with a different character, Russia may not exist at all. We Russians are capable of loving and understanding only a strong hand. No one else.
After all, there was Alexander the Second Liberator, who was blown up, the pious family man Nicholas the Second, who eventually led the country to revolution and was shot.
The list goes on. Of the latter, of course, Mikhail Gorbachev, also one of the leaders of our anti-rating. Yes, you can try to change something in our mentality, and Peter the Great is one of those who tried to do this.
- Democratically cutting off the boyars' beards?
To make them obey you. Because under any reforming tsar, as a rule, a revolt of the elite begins. And this black sheep immediately faces a difficult choice: is he ready, for the sake of his principles, to fight his country, which wants something completely different?
“Lomonosov is the illegitimate son of Peter the Great”
Do what you must, and come what may. But sometimes society reaches a dead end - when the lower classes don’t want to, but the upper classes cannot. Is a revolt of the elites possible in the near foreseeable future? Or should we rather expect a protest from the mob?
The protest of the grassroots is not so terrible, believe me, our country is too large, it is almost impossible to concentrate and simultaneously mobilize the masses of the people throughout its entire territory at once. Too many things must come together for this to happen. Time, place. Just like in 1917.
Revolutions were never conceived or carried out by the masses; they simply joined them. And all changes in society begin exclusively in the elite.
In the same year of 1991, during the relatively peaceful collapse of the USSR, in principle, the same representatives of the party nomenklatura remained in power, but from the second echelon, they had thrown off the shackles of ideology, they were young. The Politburo, due to its age, simply could not fight them.
What is characteristic of a democratic system - a calm transition of power - is the Achilles heel of an authoritarian system. In a democracy, the elite is immediately divided into two clans, and they take turns swinging on a swing. Maintaining, again, a stable balance.
- Republicans and Democrats...
Whigs and Tories. Scarlet and White roses. We tried to artificially cultivate a similar system, but nothing worked.
Stability is good. But probably not when there are no social elevators in society, except for children whose parents are already built into the system.
In my opinion, the situation is not at all what it seems among the people. The problem is somewhat different. Professions, entire social strata in which these career advancements were possible, are gradually disappearing. Not only here - all over the world.
Most people today are turning into the precariat, or, one might say, the “dangerous proletariat”, which has no permanent job, an unstable social position, an unstable income, and no specialty that would be truly in demand by society.
This whole gigantic human mass dangles between heaven and earth. She is the one who is ready to go to rallies at any moment, since she has a lot of free time. Moreover, these people may well have a university education and a diploma with honors. After graduating from one university, they sometimes go to enroll in a second, a third, in order to do at least something... Five years after graduating from the last institute, it finally dawns on them that what they have is life.
These “don’t understand who” people really don’t have an elevator. We calculated that this is somewhere around 20 million people. They are dangerous because they are angry, frustrated, aggressive and unjustifiably believe that they deserve better and that someone else is to blame for their troubles.
Is it the same elite that is to blame? I read somewhere that a study was conducted in the West and it turned out that only a society close to the medieval one can make humanity happy. But with running water, sewerage and airplanes. There is an aristocracy that receives a good education, understands the world, and lives for its own pleasure, and there are lower classes that must cultivate their fields. At the same time, the latter have minimal education - read, write, count. “Many knowledge gives birth to many sorrows.” An almost ideal society, there are no reasons for revolution, because the lower castes do not even suspect that they can live differently.
What you said sounds, of course, wild, but from an economic point of view it makes a certain sense.
Every society needs janitors. And imagine that three candidates are applying for such a vacancy at once. One with three years of education, the other after high school, the third with a university diploma. Who will take revenge better? Why does a janitor need an education from Moscow State University? And if they choose a certified specialist, won’t he eventually begin to think about the meaning of life and about the fact that he is out of place?
Internal dissatisfaction gives rise to aggression, which would not exist if a person did not think about anything like that. He would be much happier. You watch old films about the 19th century - there, after all, servants do not pretend to become masters. Their ultimate dream is to become managers, majordomos. And this is the key to stability and harmony of the entire society.
Sorry, but what if a simple person, born into the family of the same janitor from the previous story, suddenly turns out to be smart and talented and capable of much more? We will return again to where we started - sooner or later it will end with an attempt to restore class justice.
Yes, of course, ball wipers often appear among wipers.
- And the Lomonosovs, by the way, too!
But here it’s not so clear. When I studied at Moscow State University, in the 80s, a doctoral dissertation was defended at the Faculty of History stating that in fact there was no bast peasant from the Arkhangelsk province: Lomonosov was the illegitimate son of Peter the Great. There's no getting around genetics. He even looked like a king. But in those days they talked about this in a whisper for propaganda reasons.
- And how did you defend your dissertation?
Imagine, yes.
Ok, I agree. There is the current Russian elite, and there are us - the rest. And we can't get together. Although even in Royal England today there are quite successful attempts to cross the commoner Kate Middleton and Prince William, and now African-American Meghan Markle has received an offer from Prince Harry. Why is it not like this with us?
Understand that other countries have a different history of elites. They generally have them - history and the elite. And in our country, the entire aristocracy was completely cut out, time after time, even the Soviet nomenklatura had its own sad experience: it had everything while it was in office, and then lost everything overnight, and the next Sharikovs came to the top again, who rebuilt the system for yourself. That’s why they held on to power then and hold on to it now.
Let our new aristocracy get stronger, mature, calm down, get used to their “golden toilets”, feel like they are not temporary workers when they sat down at the ministry and grabbed as much and quickly as possible before they were removed and imprisoned. People must inherit their status and wealth, know that no one will definitely take anything away from anyone, that this is their property, which they will pass on to their children, and those to their grandchildren, and believe me, then their attitude towards the country and the people who are in it live, it will be completely different. And these are all growing pains.
Olga Kryshtanovskaya
ANATOMY OF THE RUSSIAN ELITE
Dedicated to the agro-industrial complex
Russia is seething. A thick broth of history is brewing here. There is never calm here. Exploring modern Russia is about the same as studying the composition of smoke carried away by gusts of wind. Or ripples on the water during a storm.
As soon as something becomes clear, stops, becomes clear - then, it would seem, sit down and write. I sit down. I open the computer. I name the file “Castle. doc". I start typing words. I look out the window to compare my feelings with reality. The castle stands on the shore - majestic, powerful, mysterious. I write: “The castle has five towers, five stars and five gates. It was built a long time ago and will last a long time.”
A clarifying look out the window: There is a castle. But the wind got stronger. He tears grains of sand from the Castle's body and they fly away. A wave with a white crest is approaching quickly. A moment - and she is at the foot of the Castle, washing away the foundation. And behind her the second one destroys the gate. And then the third - and there are no towers, no stars. Seconds - and everything is smooth, as if nothing had happened here. Sand, waves, wind...
This is how to write a book about modern Russia! While you are thinking, you choose words - and there is nothing. And you look another time - it’s standing again, only there are six towers, and instead of stars there are birds.
Of course, I understood when I sat down to write this book that by the time I finished writing it, a lot could change. Much has changed. What can we do about it? Someone is constantly rebuilding the Castle. And someone destroys it. I look out the window and try to describe it.
Olga Kryshtanovskaya
Bank of the Moscow River November 2004
From the publisher
The first edition of Olga Kryshtanovskaya’s monograph “Anatomy of the Russian Elite” was published in early 2004. The book was printed on a risograph in a modest edition of one thousand copies, and they quickly sold out. Since demand has clearly outstripped supply, I am republishing this book in a mass edition. You have in your hands an updated version of the book: the author has slightly reduced the theoretical part, added “textures” and edited it for a wider range of readers. It also contained new fragments about the latest changes in the political landscape of Russia related to the Yukos affair or the cancellation of gubernatorial elections.
Igor ZakharovIntroduction
This book is about the changes that have occurred in Russian society over the past 20 years, about the elite who made these changes and who changed themselves. Who are the current rulers of Russia: old people in a new guise or a new tribe trying to remember the Soviet past?
This book is the result of my many years of work as the head of the department of elite studies at the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. This department was created in 1989 - the first unit in the country to specialize in research into such a closed group of society.
Until 1989, any questions related to the study of the country's ruling group were a closely guarded secret. At that time, not only research, but also the use of the word “elite” itself was prohibited in the USSR. M. Voslensky’s book “Nomenklatura” was classified as “top secret” and was kept in a single copy in the library of the CPSU Central Committee. The Soviet people were not supposed to know about the lives of those who ruled the country. Ideological myths replaced the truth. The “first departments” (these KGB cells that functioned in each work collective) tirelessly ensured that sociologists did not ask the population about their attitude towards the leaders of the party and government. Anyone who violated this requirement would face great trouble: the end of a scientific career, repression, or even prison.
Perestroika, started by M. Gorbachev, changed everything. The liberalization of life began, which also affected the USSR Academy of Sciences, where I then worked as a junior researcher. A new director came to the Institute of Sociology, reputed to be a great liberal - Vladimir Yadov. For the first time, an open competition for projects was announced at the Institute of Sociology.
The activity of scientists was low: everyone was sure that forfeits would only be given to the “red professors” - ideologically consistent and morally stable members of the CPSU who headed large departments. But I decided to try. Friends and colleagues were surprised at my naivety and did not believe in success. I didn’t have much hope either, but still applied for a project called “The Administrative System of the USSR and Its Subjects” (the term “elite” still looked too risky). And imagine my jubilation when the project was approved and this topic was included in the register of state topics financed by the Academy of Sciences.
Our small group of 5 people was given a room and a computer. And we started working. We were burning with enthusiasm - after all, we were the first and were doing something almost forbidden, so mysterious and important. We spent 12 hours at work, arguing about politics, about nomenklatura, figuring out how to gain access to people at the very top of power. All the walls of our closet were covered with portraits of members of the Politburo and the CPSU Central Committee.
Of course, we knew that in the West there are Sovietological centers that have been successfully studying our elite for a long time. We felt like their timid students, reading with delight the articles and books we managed to get our hands on.
More than a year passed before my colleagues and I felt confident in our abilities - after all, we were in the thick of things, had much better access to the objects of our study than Western analysts, and felt the atmosphere of the changes taking place. Gradually, we found our own method, which we jokingly called “detective sociological.” Standard sociological questionnaire surveys are almost inapplicable in elite studies. It makes no sense to add Putin's opinion to Yavlinsky's opinion and then calculate the arithmetic average. The sociology of the elite is a special science, the object of which is the “piece goods” - the country’s leaders. And the price of failure here is different: every mistake is a slammed door, a loss of access to information.
I wrote several letters to Western Sovietologists, and foreigners began to come to us. This caused concern among our intelligence services.
One day in the fall of 1990, a call came from the KGB. The officer was very polite, he said that they had a graduate student interested in the problems of the elite who wanted to consult with me. Could I refuse? The next day a pale young man with a forgettable face came. He said that he wanted to intern in our group. And I started going to work every day. He came, sat silently in the corner, and listened to everything we said, and at exactly 17.00 he took out a bottle of vodka. Since I knew which organization sent him “for an internship,” I asked more than once whether we were doing something prohibited. But every time he answered: “No, no, everything is fine. We are not interested in you, but in those who come to you.” We were afraid, but the interest in the research of the elite was so all-consuming that we tolerated the presence of the “trainee” and began to almost not notice him. Six months later he began to appear less and less often, and in 1992 this colorless young man disappeared without a trace. (I wonder what he's doing now?!)
We conducted the first large study on the genealogy of the Brezhnev elite together with British scientists Stephen White and Evan Model from the University of Glasgow (UK). We took upon ourselves the obligation to interview all living members of the CPSU Central Committee of the Brezhnev era at that time.
We really wanted to do this, but we still had little understanding of how to gain access to these people. The addresses of the highest nomenklatura were classified, and they were not in address books or in city directories. But perestroika began in the country, the nomenklatura collapsed, and chaos reigned in bureaucratic organizations. No one else knew what was possible and what was not. We went to the central office of the Moscow City Information Bureau. It turned out that “secret addresses” can now be bought for 4 rubles apiece. This is how we became the owners of unique information, which became the basis of our database, which grew and developed over the years.
And then we had to try to get these people’s consent to be interviewed. We found several former members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee who were friendly, and they began to help us - they called their good friends - former ministers, first secretaries of regional party committees, and asked to receive us. This was invaluable assistance; without it, access to many senior managers would simply have been impossible.
Obviously, in order to win over a high-ranking interlocutor, it was necessary to prepare thoroughly. It was not enough to know his biography; one had to study the textbook “History of the CPSU.” Otherwise, nothing would work. If the interlocutor said: “Remember how at the April plenum of the Central Committee...”, we had to react, and not ask him: “What happened there?” Our incompetence was costly: the interlocutor closed himself off, realizing that we were not serious people and there was nothing to talk to us about.
A sociologist, director of the Kryshtanovskaya Laboratory, who left United Russia in the summer in order to study not the establishment, but those processes that could demolish it, believes that the young part of the elite, raised to the top by Medvedev, is capable of becoming an ally of the coming revolution, the main the subject of which remains the intelligentsia and students.
Photo by Anna Artemyeva
The sociologist, director of the Kryshtanovskaya Laboratory*, who left United Russia in the summer in order to study not the establishment, but those processes that could demolish it, believes that the young part of the elite, raised to the top by Medvedev, is capable of becoming an ally of the coming revolution, the main subjects of which remain the intelligentsia and students.
— Olga Viktorovna, at the very beginning of summer you publicly announced that you were suspending your membership in United Russia and participation in politics in general in order to return to science - to study the revolution. Have you changed your mind?
— Yes, I still believe that a revolutionary situation is brewing in Russia, that everything is very serious, and if you close your eyes and pretend that “it will resolve itself,” then this could end badly for the country. Our history is full of revolutionary drama. And now we are at that stage of the cycle when the idea of breaking the stagnant state machine may prevail. Many are confident that this is the only way to make a new leap in the country’s development. But I really hope that this time I won’t have to break it. We must not give up attempts, by putting pressure on the state, to achieve movement in the direction that the majority of people need.
“However, in reality we see something completely different: increased repression against dissidents, ignoring and distortion of all opposition demands, the triumphant return of a “strong hand” in the person of Putin.
— There is logic in these “repressions” (and in other words, in attempts to strengthen state power). Our political structure is such that the Russian “Tsar” can only rule when he is able to protect his “boyars”. He is the guarantor not only of the Constitution, but also of the integrity of the political class. In this regard, from the first Rurikovichs to the times of Navalny and Udaltsov, little has changed in the country. Antagonism between the ruling class and the people has existed for centuries. And now it exists. As soon as the owner class strengthens in Russia, and the central government weakens, the people begin to fight for freedom. Power is defended. By defending herself, she hides the true extent of her power and wealth. The people expose the authorities, accusing them of illegal wealth and illegitimacy. This is war. A real war for power, for property, for morality. This system was not invented by Putin. This is an old system. And Putin, having come to the Kremlin in 2000, was forced to comply with the existing rules. And now he is obliged to fulfill the “social contract” between the ruler and the elite. He is between two fires: if he defends the elite, the people rebel. If he takes the side of the people, the elite will rebel. What's better? In chess, this situation is called “zugzwang”, when any move only worsens the position.
If everything in the country continues as it is now, then people at the very top levels of power will face a dilemma: 1) preserve the system, but surrender their leader, or 2) change the system (the leader may be the same or different).
Changing a leader is relatively easy. But by and large this will not change anything in the country. Although it may calm the protesters. Changing the system is extremely difficult and time-consuming. I doubt that the revolutionaries understand this. Even if Putin starts doing this (and he is starting!), people don’t believe it, they don’t see it.
Which exit? Putin is forced to constantly demonstrate his strength in order not to lose his leadership position in the political class and to prevent destabilization of society. Therefore, he acts consistently harshly, sometimes using violent instruments of the state, but more often only by threatening force. Where it leads? Some of the protesters (the majority, I think) will come to their senses and go home, not wanting any trouble. The other (smaller) part will radicalize, become more desperate and daring. It will better prepare for further war, arm itself, organize itself and continue.
Risk area
— Currently, two points of view predominate in the expert community. First: the government has enough resources to stay within the framework of the scenario it has set (the next election of Vladimir Putin as president in a few years while maintaining a simulated democracy and full control over political and social processes). Second: the possibility of the system collapsing at any moment with unpredictable consequences. Which scenario seems most realistic to you?
“I believe that we are at great risk.” Everything can start to fall apart quite quickly and suddenly. I assess the readiness of the revolutionary situation as high. Even if it is not yet sufficient for inevitability, it is already very close to it. The collapse of the power structure can happen at any moment. The reason for the explosion could be anything: someone’s death at a protest rally, Navalny’s arrest, a religious provocation, a brawl on ethnic grounds, a man-made or natural disaster, a collapse in oil prices, and the like.
For example, in South Korea, due to the lifting of the embargo on American meat, protests arose that did not subside for several months, and the government eventually made concessions. The phenomenon was named “Cheonggyecheon”, after the gathering place of the protesters. We know of other long-term actions in Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, the USA and, finally, in the Maghreb countries. The extraordinary tenacity of the protesters is directly related to online communities, which make it possible not to lose connections between people and maintain morale and the desire to achieve victory at any cost. This is a new form of direct democracy, the manifestation of which we see today in Russia.
These actions have not only a political context. This is also a new form of interesting pastime. The deficit of communication, physical activity, and risk is compensated. People at protests meet like-minded people. An unprecedented feeling of solidarity, delight, even euphoria arises. If danger is added to this, then it tickles the nerves. Risk is especially attractive to young people. The adrenaline rush from participating in protests is becoming a necessity. This is accompanied by colossal creative work - inventing new forms, methods, slogans, posters, political moves. The online crowd is no longer the crowd that is usually referred to as a “herd.” This is a smart, creatively charged crowd. What can replace this feeling? What can compete in fullness of life, in emotions with #OccupyAbai, with wandering rallies, with single (but massive) pickets? Combating such phenomena with old police methods is ineffective. In return, you need to offer something else, no less exciting.
Hereditary aristocracy
— In sociology, you are known for your numerous and detailed studies of the modern elite. What is happening now in this part of society: consolidation or processes close to a split? Is it even possible to form a counter-elite and who can join it? Finally, which group dominates in the elite today: the security forces, liberal technocrats or, conditionally, the offshore aristocracy?
— The counter-elite always exists. These are those who did not receive something, who are offended, but are part of the elite. Regarding the security forces and liberals: in my opinion, now the crack is not here. During the four years of Medvedev's presidency, the number of security officials in our establishment has been halved (from 45% at the beginning of 2008 to 20% now). And it is not the security forces who are leading, but the conservative bureaucracy. Of course, she wants to maintain her dominant position in society. She wants to maintain the status quo, but by bringing order and restoring stability. Destabilization threatens her privileged position. She was previously the most powerful and wealthy layer of our society, but only now she has the opportunity to transform into a hereditary aristocracy. The previous system guaranteed all benefits only when holding a public office. Back in the early 1990s, I called this process “privatization of the state by the state.” Now things have gone quite far. We already have the first generation of a new aristocracy. Without any quotes.
A dangerous process of elite fragmentation began during Medvedev's presidency. This was partly due to the very design of the tandem (that is, the sharing of absolute power). Partly - with the fight against corruption, which Medvedev began. In part, this is due to the sharp rejuvenation of the ruling stratum, which was facilitated by Medvedev (in the regions, rejuvenation occurred immediately by 14 years on average across the country). All sorts of “personnel reserves” also played a role. Young people who were given hope demanded the promised positions, and the representatives of the older generation who occupied them, feeling the hot breath in their backs, experienced irritation towards the young president.
Street protests did not arise out of nowhere. This was preceded by serious unrest at the top even under Medvedev. Those who bet on him did their best to prevent Putin from returning to the Kremlin. The young part of the elite, raised to the top by Medvedev, can become an ally of the revolution, the main subject of which still remains the intelligentsia and students. There may be an expansion of protest across the entire vertical of society. If the protesters are joined by the poorest sections of the population, on the one hand, and part of the elite, on the other, a revolution cannot be avoided.
Moral factor
— And yet the next revolution in Russia is real?
— To bring about a revolution, you need several things. First: a single control center for clear organization of actions. Now it is just being created. Second: we need militants. These are not necessarily people with machine guns. These are people ready to fight. As far as I know, training of such detachments is also underway. Third: you need finance. I think this is also being resolved, secretly the opposition is being helped by both their businessmen and exiles eager to take revenge on Putin.
Of course, the state always has more power and financial resources. But the state lacks something else: sincere support from the population. Purchased loyalty does not motivate activity as much as beliefs. And the majority of Putin, alas, is passive, which is quite natural. Why fight for what we already have?
The revolution has another resource in its arsenal: it is an atmosphere of destructive protest, which, like an epidemic, covers entire countries and regions. Look: revolutionary events almost never come to one place. They, like a virus, spread. Russia is now in the grip of such a mood. After a long national depression, attempts to emigrate, and hopes for quick changes, new sentiments came: to take control of the situation, change the course of the political process. It's hard to stop.
— Is it possible to do without shocks?
- Hardly. The flywheel is running. A forest fire is stopped by counter fire. Such counterfire can be a counterforce. Or it could be something else: the solution is so extraordinary, creative, and large-scale that people will stop in amazement. And then they will join in this process. But this requires colossal will and innovative thinking. Is Putin capable of this? I think yes. Theoretically capable. He's a smart man. And it’s very difficult for him now. The authorities are experiencing colossal overloads. There, too, there is confusion, different opinions, there are poles of hardness and softness. The feeling of a historical impasse, of great danger for the entire system, can stimulate completely unexpected steps. Until the dissolution of the State Duma, the early emergence of a new successor, a grandiose plan for the development of Siberia, and so on. Now there is an intense struggle on the barricades. The opposition is advancing. The government is on the defensive. But it won't be like this forever. The authorities can find an asymmetrical answer. Or he will die.
It's all very dramatic. Because Russia needs great creative work, not revolution. A backward economy and an archaic structure of everyday life will not benefit from a revolution. Vice versa. Anyone who comes to the Kremlin will be forced to act taking into account the peculiarities of our Russian mentality, our political structure, and our legal culture. This cannot be changed in a hurry.
What can and should be changed? It is necessary to return the moral factor to politics. This is what the fight is going on now. We cannot live by the principle “money decides everything.” We tried it. We've reached a dead end. We need high goals. And the one who takes the moral high ground in this confrontation, who is more honest and fair, will win. That's the kind of country we are.
* Former director of the Center for the Study of Elites at the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Olga Viktorovna Kryshtanovskaya(born November 24, 1954, Moscow) is a famous Russian sociologist, specializing in the study of elites.
Born Olga Kryshtanovskaya November 24, 1954 in Moscow in a family of philologists. Olga Kryshtanovskaya Graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy of Moscow State University in 1979. Since 1989 he has directed the Center for the Study of Elites at the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In 2002 she defended her doctoral dissertation in sociology.
Honorary Professor at the University of Glasgow, Academician of the Academy of Political Science. Since 2009 Olga Kryshtanovskaya- Member of United Russia. In 2010, she headed the women's public "Excellence" movement.
February 6, 2012 Olga Kryshtanovskaya was officially registered as a proxy of the candidate for President of the Russian Federation and the current Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation. However, on June 11 Olga Kryshtanovskaya suspended her membership in United Russia, declaring that she was switching from studying government circles to opposition circles.
Literature by Olga Kryshtanovskaya
“The position of the security officers today is fantastically stable” // Power. - 2007. - No. 10.
Kryshtanovskaya O. V. Anatomy of the Russian elite. M.: Zakharov, 2005. - 384 p. ISBN 5815904570.
Kryshtanovskaya O.V. Political stratification of Russian society // World of Russia. 2004. No. 4.
Kryshtanovskaya O. V. Modern concepts of the political elite and Russian practice // World of Russia. 2004. T. XIII. No. 4. P. 3-39.
Modern Russian elite. What is this? // Finam FM, Realnoe Vremya, 06/10/2011.
Political scientist Olga Kryshtanovskaya - about Putin’s victory // Radio Liberty, 03/05/2012.
Putin can make Serdyukov wait, and his servants – “former compatriots” at a five-star pool
Recline and rule
Putin can make Serdyukov wait, and his servants – “former compatriots” at a five-star pool
Prominent sociologist of the Putin era, Olga Kryshtanovskaya, immortalized the memory of her stay in a five-star Cyprus hotel with a Facebook post that read:
“Here I was lying by the blue pool of the best 5 star hotel. in Cyprus and thought: “damn! Well, could I, a simple Russian woman, imagine that I would be relaxing as a mistress and mistress in such beauty? And what will our emigrants - maids, drivers, waiters - serve me? We, who remained in Russia, now come to different countries as wealthy tourists. And they - those who emigrated for a better life - clean up after us, drive us, serve us..."
After Marie Antoinette's famous tweet #if there is no bread, let them eat cake - this is, of course, a masterpiece. A small sociological masterpiece that brilliantly characterizes the worldview of Putin’s elite.
If this tweet was written by Sveta from Ivanov, we would shrug our shoulders. But it was written by a sociologist, and that’s wonderful.
First, check out this lovely “lying by the pool” look. Mrs. Kryshtanovskaya went to a wonderfully beautiful island, where you can relax as you please - walk in the mountains, swim in the sea. But the ideal of relaxation for the Putin elite is not this: I lie by the pool and get waited on.
Secondly, I must inform sociologist Kryshtanovskaya that her idea that all our former compatriots who left Putin’s blessed Russia are forced to sweep hotels is sociologically incorrect. Some of them - for example, Sergey Brin - you know, got their own companies. In countries where they were not imprisoned or stripped for this. And do you know what's most amazing? These people, who have made a career, can boast about many things. That they created a company that is worth a billion. Some are proud of their yachts, wives and sports hobbies. But I don't think any of them are able to be proud of the fact that they are "lying by the pool."
If only because lying by the pool in the West is no achievement. I’ll tell sociologist Kryshtanovskaya a little secret: all of Cyprus is covered with small villas, rather houses, in which the most ordinary British pensioners live: not millionaires, but the most ordinary people who have worked all their lives. And in the courtyard of each villa there is a swimming pool where you can lie.
But the most interesting thing in this whole story is this: indeed, in Cyprus - as in Israel or America - there are a lot of our “former compatriots” - both Pontic Greeks and Russians, and yes, many of them simply work in the most ordinary jobs in poor Western country: they build, have sabbaths, work as gardeners and goldsmiths. What is not visible, however, is that any of these “former compatriots” want to return to Putin’s blessed Russia.
I dare to suggest that this happens for two reasons.
Firstly, none of them wants to exchange their job as a gardener in Cyprus for a drunken animal existence in their native Mukhosransk. Because - unlike Cyprus - there is no work for ordinary Russian citizens in Russia. There is work for migrant workers. But if you are a citizen of Russia and are trying to get a job in the housing office to screw up pipes, you are unwanted.
Secondly... how can I explain this to a sociologist? If the sociologist Kryshtanovskaya had deigned to talk to these “maids,” she would have discovered that in Cyprus these people feel like human beings.
Cyprus is generally such a very free place. You are walking along a mountain road, and next to you is a Cypriot harvesting his avocados. Seeing you, he pours a full hem on you. You are walking along another road, and a Cypriot who notices you rushes to his car, pulls out honeycombs with honey and tries to treat you. And the regal elderly Greek woman who invited you into her house for a cup of coffee for the good reason that she was pottering in the garden and you walked past can tell you that she has already undergone three operations for cancer - and is still alive.
And “who emigrated for a better life,” just one of those same maids who so aroused Kryshtanovskaya’s lordly arrogance, can also tell why she left: because they tried to rape her daughter in her small town. The rapist cut her forehead on the step of the stairs, the mother jumped out, and he ran away. And since the police, of course, were not looking for the rapist, the family itself found him, fortunately he was known to everyone: he was the son of a local cop. And after that, a nightmare began in the life of the family.
So, what I mean is that in Cyprus (as in Israel, the USA, Norway, etc.) little ordinary people who serve as servers and wipers and arouse such contempt from Lady Kryshtanovskaya feel like people. They don't die of cancer at forty because doctors just tell them to go to hell, and the sons of local police officers don't slam their daughters' heads into concrete steps.
And these little people know that if they work - not to protect businesses, not to found companies - but just to work (not everyone can be Sergei Brin), then they will earn a house, a swimming pool, medical care and a normal school and country for their children . Something that a hard worker cannot get in Putin’s Russia: as evidenced by the example of Diana Nochivnaya, a mother of many children, who earned 13 thousand rubles in Rostov. a month, working day and night making tiles, and committed suicide by throwing herself onto high-voltage wires.
Oh yes. And one more small moment. It just so happened that at the same time, while Kryshtanovskaya was describing her high, NTV, on Putin’s 60th birthday, showed an amazing 50-minute program by Vadim Takmenev, dedicated to the personal life of all of us.
Takmenev showed everything. He showed Putin, who spends hours in the morning swimming in the pool and doing fitness, showed Minister Serdyukov, who at 11 pm waits for an audience for hours, the camera showed the Labrador Koni five times, showed Putin’s wondrous phrase: “I don’t deny myself anything,” which, in fact, , and shows where the legs grow from and where the Putin elite gets the feeling that the main thing in life is the buzz.
With the difference that Putin can make Serdyukov wait, and his servants can only make “former compatriots” wait at the five-star pool.
